CONTENTS

How To Use this Document .................................................................................................................. 4
SPPSP Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 13

  Proposed Programme of Work .......................................................................................................... 15
  Theory of change ................................................................................................................................. 16

Cross Cutting Issues ............................................................................................................................. 19

  Youth Inclusion ................................................................................................................................. 19
  HDP Nexus Approach to Programming .............................................................................................. 19
  Environmental Mainstreaming ......................................................................................................... 20
  Mainstreaming Gender Equality Women’s Empowerment ............................................................. 20

Pillar I: Political Transition, Good Governance and Human Rights ................................................. 22

  Background ....................................................................................................................................... 22
  The Mandate .................................................................................................................................... 23

  1.1 Constitution Making ..................................................................................................................... 23
  1.2 Elections ...................................................................................................................................... 27
  1.3 Good Governance and Anti-Corruption ......................................................................................... 29
  1.4 Participatory Governance: Civil Society, Youth Inclusion and Media Support ......................... 32
  1.5 Human Rights and Institutional Reforms ..................................................................................... 37
  1.6 Transitional Justice ....................................................................................................................... 42

Pillar II: Support to peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements .................. 48

  Background ....................................................................................................................................... 48
  The mandate ...................................................................................................................................... 49

  2.1 Support to the Peace Processes .................................................................................................... 49
  2.2 Structures and Mechanisms to Implement the Juba Peace Agreement ...................................... 52
  2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism of the Juba Peace Agreement ..................................... 58
  2.4 Transitional Security Arrangements ............................................................................................. 61
  2.5 Reform, Development and Modernisation of the Military Establishment and Other Security Services ........................................................................................................................................ 64
  2.6 Children in Armed Conflict .......................................................................................................... 68

Pillar III: Peacebuilding, Protection of Civilians and Rule of Law .................................................. 73

  Background ....................................................................................................................................... 73
  The mandate ...................................................................................................................................... 74

  3.1 Rule of Law and Access to Justice ................................................................................................. 74
  3.2 Protection of Civilians ................................................................................................................... 83
  3.3 Land Reform ................................................................................................................................. 91
Pillar IV: Mobilization of Economic and Development Assistance and coordination of humanitarian and Peacebuilding assistance .......................................................... 164

4.1 Adequate resources mobilized for national socio-economic reforms .................. 166
4.2 Support the establishment of a national architecture for development planning ........ 169
4.3 Data and Information management for aid effectiveness ..................................... 170
4.4 Population and Housing Census ........................................................................ 171
4.5 Comprehensive Agricultural census .................................................................... 173
Integration and Next Steps ....................................................................................... 175
The SPPSP articulates programme priorities of the UN in Sudan that support the transition, as requested by Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021). It is structured as a modular roadmap of UN support over the course of the transition – and is intended to facilitate programme design, fundraising and work-planning against the programme priorities.

The production of the Sudan Peacemaking, Peacebuilding and Stabilization Programme (SPPSP) has been a collaborative effort – building off comparative advantages of both UNITAMS and UNCT agencies funds and programmes. The process convened 13 thematic discussions as well as sessions with UNAMID colleagues. To learn lessons from the UNAMID programmes in Darfur an additional 16 thematic discussions were held up until April 2021 – bringing the total to about 30 consultation sessions in addition to a range of UNITAMS bilateral engagements with Government and Sudanese counterparts. Several agencies participated in drafting support and contributed with programme documents and strategies to inform the planning exercise.

The outcomes identified in the SPPSP under each of the four pillars are aligned with the Government’s priorities for the transitional period as set out in key guiding documents such as the Constitutional Charter, the Juba Peace Agreement, the National Plan for Protection of Civilians, the National Action Plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and are reflective of priorities as articulated by the Government of Sudan. The indicators in the results frameworks build on the UNITAMS mission benchmarks laid out in the Secretary-General’s report in addition to indicators derived from ongoing UN programmes, and government priorities. Collectively the indicators reflect the desired end-state of the transitional period.

Section, by section, the SPPSP outlines ongoing UN programmes and priorities as laid out in the guiding documents and identifies programmatic needs requiring investment. As such, the SPPSP articulates the totality of UN support to the government to achieve the aspiration of the transition – building on existing portfolio of work and adhering to priorities for 2021-2021 as laid out by the Security Council. Further prioritization and sequencing of the SPPSP will need to be part of a wider conversation of mutual accountability, together with the Government of Sudan.

The modular approach undertaken across the 30 different sections of the SPPSP provides a common reference point for UN Sudan support to the transition, based on the benchmarks adopted by the Security Council, and offers visibility on the intended portfolio of UN work in support of the transition.

**SPPSP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Sudan Peacemaking, Peacebuilding and Stabilization Programme (SPPSP) is the programmatic framework that articulates programme priorities of the UN in Sudan that support the transition, as requested by Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021). It is structured as a modular roadmap of UN support over the course of the transition – and is intended to facilitate programme design, fundraising and work-planning against the programme priorities and serves as the programmatic framework for the Sudan Financing Platform’s Multi-Partner Trust fund “Peacebuilding and Stabilization Window”.

The outcomes identified in the SPPSP under each of the four pillars are aligned with the Government’s priorities for the transitional period as set out in key guiding documents such as the
Constitutional Charter, the Juba Peace Agreement, the National Plan for Protection of Civilians, the National Action Plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and are reflective of priorities as articulated by the Government of Sudan. The indicators in the results frameworks build on the UNITAMS mission benchmarks laid out in the Secretary-General’s report in addition to indicators derived from ongoing UN programmes, and government priorities. Collectively the indicators reflect the desired end-state of the transitional period.

The SPPSP articulates the totality of UN support to the government to achieve the aspiration of the transition – building on existing portfolio of work and adhering to priorities for 2021-2021 as laid out by the Security Council. In each of the thematic areas identified under the mandate, the SPPSP references the relevant national documents of which programming has been developed. Further prioritization and sequencing of the SPPSP will need to be part of a wider conversation of mutual accountability, together with the Government of Sudan.

The SPPSP aims to create a joint programmatic framework for UNITAMS and the UNCT, identifying common areas of action and reflecting their respective comparative advantages. Under this programme, UNITAMS and UNCT will jointly plan and coordinate their programming, based on a shared analysis that takes account of the evolving political context. The UN implementing entities will articulate their support by mutually reinforcing their programmatic and technical proposals. The SPPSP represents the first step towards an integrated planning and implementation framework, to be expanded into an UN Integrated Strategic Framework plus. The modular approach undertaken across the 30 different sections of the SPPSP provides a common reference point for UN Sudan support to the transition, based on the benchmarks adopted by the Security Council, and offers visibility on the intended portfolio of UN work in support of the transition.

Sudan has a young demographic structure, with about two thirds of the population below the age of 24 years. Young people – and young women in particular – were the backbone of the Sudanese revolution and the establishment of the transitional government provides opportunities for young people to be the agents of change. Youth inclusion is therefore mainstreamed throughout the SPPSP.

The following is an executive summary of the reference document and the gaps identified for programming the UNITAMS mandate:

**Pillar I: Political Transition, Good Governance and Human Rights**

Throughout the transition, UNITAMS is mandated to assist the transition and to assist programming towards democratic governance in the protection and promotion of sustainable peace. In establishing a transitional government for an interim period of 39 months the Constitutional Charter laid out the fundamental components of the political transition. A key element of the democratic transition is the establishment of checks and balances and the separation of powers. Programming in support of the mandate throughout the transition will need to provide:

1.1 Constitution making: Technical assistance and institutional capacity building to assist the drafting and adaptation of enabling legislation for a constitutional process and establishment of a constitutional commission; supporting its work including broad-based consultations to ensure

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1 It is expected that the UN will develop an Integrated Strategic Framework aligned to the future National Development Framework (2021-2023). This latter will eventually inform the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, expected to articulate Sudan’s longer-term post-transition national priorities beyond 2023.
effective participation; assisting the completion of a draft constitution before the end of the transition.

1.2 Elections: Provision of advice on electoral systems, methods for the inclusion of women, minorities and other excluded groups; support to the development of an inclusive legislative framework for voter registration; advice capacity development of the electoral management body and related institutions; advice and assistance to media bodies on their role in democratic electoral processes. Sudanese institutions and civil society will be equipped to provide civic and voter education; strategy for the prevention of electoral violence and response to hate speech developed and implemented.

1.3 Good Governance and Anti-Corruption: Support to the governance conference; institution building support to ensure the Transitional Legislative Council is formed and functional; civil society empowered to participate meaningfully in the transition; strengthening the capacity for democratic oversight, accountability and transparency; providing technical assistance on anti-corruption legislation and policies; institution building the ministries and commissions created under the JPA at both national and sub-national level as well as to the autonomous areas and regions that may be created; building public officials capacity in policy development and administrative management including in public finance management and gender responsive budgeting at national and sub-national levels.

1.4 Participatory Governance: Support to civil society, youth, refugees, IDPs, persons with disabilities and members of marginalized groups engaged to participate meaningfully in the transition process; capacity building journalists and ensuring media standards that support accurate reports; combat misinformation and encourage the free flow of information; update media laws in compliance with Sudan’s international human rights obligations; assist legal reforms and technical assistance for CSOs supported; ensure the safety of journalists strengthened in accordance with the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and ensure the meaningful participation of youth in the transition process is supported.

1.5 Human rights and institutional reforms: Assistance to help Sudan follow up on Universal Periodic Review recommendations; independent Commissions under the Constitutional Charter will be equipped and capacitated; capacity building on the National Mechanisms to report and follow up on UN Human Rights Mechanisms and civil society to engage with UN Human rights mechanism and to follow up on the recommendations; capacity-building of Human Rights Commission; Ministry of Justice; Security Forces and Corrections Service to comply with human rights standards and gender equally.

1.6 Transitional Justice: Support in drafting legislation for the Survivor centre and gender-responsive transitional Justice processes. Transitional Justice Mechanisms need to be established including for Darfur and the Two Areas including establishment of the Court for Darfur; Truth Justice and Reconciliation commission; the TJ Commission needs to be formed and functional; legislative and institutional framework for transitional justice need to be built; training needs to be provided for Civil society Organizations to strengthen capacities to effectively contribute to and monitor the transitional justice process and to facilitate dialogue with the Transitional Justice Commission.
Pillar II: Support to Peace Processes and the Implementation of Peace Agreements

UNSCR 2579 (2021) mandates UNITAMS and the UNCT to support peace processes and implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and future peace agreements. When the Constitutional Charter was signed it outlined the vision of a comprehensive and inclusive peace. Since the signature of the Declarations of principles on 28 March 2021, UNITAMS has also provided facilitation and substantive and technical support with a view to signing, initially, a Framework Agreement.

2.1 Support to Peace Processes: Contingent on requests of the parties: mediation and technical advice, together with logistical and operational support. Support for an inclusive and gender sensitive process recognizing the role of women as peace actors, and to ensure that upcoming peace processes are consultative and fully inclusive to all segments of society.

2.2 Structures and Mechanisms to implement the Juba Peace Agreement: Assistance in the creation of functioning key mechanisms including the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism; the Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements in Khartoum (on which the UN has a seat); the Permanent Ceasefire Commission in El-Fasher and its subsidiary bodies in the states, which UNITAMS will chair, through the provision of technical support, capacity building of institutions and funding operational costs. In addition, support will need to be given to those mechanisms and processes that directly improve the lives of conflict-affected populations including but not limited to the Land Commissions in Blue Nile and South Kordofan and the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission and the Darfur Land Court and the East Sudan Land Commission to review land settlement and registration laws. On voluntary return/durable solutions the JPA calls for the establishment of an IDP and Refugees Commission and a Compensation and Reparations Fund in Darfur. The Two Areas track also provides for a National Commission for the Voluntary Return and resettlement of IDPs and refugees, with branches in the Two Areas. On Transitional Justice the JPA provides for a Conference for Reconciliation and Social Healing, and the Darfur Track includes comprehensive commitments to transitional Justice including establishment of a Special Court for Darfur and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Blue Nile and South Kordofan while also committing to the holding of reconciliation conferences.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism of the Juba Peace Agreement: Support in establishing the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism as an independent, credible and capable oversight mechanism with a fulltime chair and an efficient secretariat in order to generate greater momentum behind implementation, resolve deadlocks, provide more transparency and help bolster international support for implementation. Provision of set up costs and assistance in developing and fundraising for an operating budget. Secondment of expert staff and access to research capacity as required.

2.4 Transitional Security Arrangements: Almost a year into the signature of the JPA there is an urgent need to expedite the stand up of significantly delayed security arrangements of the Two Areas and Darfur tracks. This entails setting up a Joint High Council for Security Arrangements a Permanent Ceasefire Committee and Sectoral Committees in Darfur to ensure that the ceasefire support structures are functional and able to operate as soon as possible. The establishment of these bodies will require technical support, capacity building as well as fundraising for logistic support and other operational costs. If requested by the parties, technical advice may also be needed for the Joint Military Ceasefire Committee for the Two Areas as well as training and
capacity building on human rights, protection of civilians and dealing with victims of the SGBV. Community violence reduction measures and other POC-related activities, reconciliatory and transitional justice measures should be considered in the proximity of assembly areas and in dealing with security risks emanating from non-signatory armed movements.

2.5 Reform, Development and Modernisation of the Military Establishment and Other Security Measures: The reform, development and modernization of the military establishment and other security services is key to a successful democratic transition. Whereas the Constitutional Charter stated that the main task of reforming military bodies is entrusted to military bodies in accordance with the law the JPA defines. This requires a holistic approach including Rule of Law, human rights, judicial reform, prison reform, security sector governance reform, legislative reform, and the drafting of a new permanent constitution. The process also requires civilian actors to be empowered to be more influential stakeholders in these discussions. Achieving this will require the provision of technical advice to help define a national vision for the Reform, Development and Modernisation of the Military Establishment and Other Security Services by sharing international best practices for democratic governance; providing a platform for inclusive policy discussion and encouraging informed civil society and political debate by holding workshops for relevant actors. Capacity building for the Security and Defense committee of the Transitional Legislative Assembly will be required including technical support for defining key legal principles guiding the review of legislation. Technical support will be required to ensure representation of women in the structures as well as to develop new training curricula. Capacity building will be needed for women in the police and other security institutions.

2.5 Children in Armed Conflict: The CAAC mandate in Sudan is implemented by the Sudan Task Forces on Monitoring and Reporting (CRTMR) chaired by UNICEF and UNITAMS. Support is needed for engagement with the Government of Sudan and armed groups to develop and implement action plans and to target children affected by armed conflict with critical child protection services including Psychosocial Support, family tracing and reunification. To strengthen resilience and preparedness, child protection system strengthening, and child protection community-based interventions need to be prioritized. Children released from armed groups in line with the Juba Peace Agreement need to be provided with reintegration support by civilian actors and adequate provision should be made for children transitioning into adulthood in any DDR programming.

Pillar III: Peacebuilding, Protection of Civilians and Rule of Law

Security Council resolution 2579 mandates UNITAMS through its integrated UNCT partners to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas. Peacebuilding requires further efforts beyond the implementation of peace agreements and goes beyond former conflict-affected areas. In Darfur and Two Areas, but not limited to them, there are multiple threads of conflict – including political, tribal, inter-communal (over land, water and other resources), displacement and civic (between the population and local authorities) – many of which intertwine. These form a highly complex and interlinked web of peacebuilding challenges that has the potential to erode gains, leave civilians at great risk of attacks, including sexual violence targeting women and children, by all parties to the conflict. The situation is further compounded by weak governance and rule of law institutions and impunity for conflict-related violence.
In response to concerns regarding its capacity to enable a protective environment, in particular for women, girls and boys, in 2019 the GoS adopted a National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC), which tries to capture the different dimensions of PoC and translate them into a blueprint for coherent and mutually reinforcing actions. Therefore, as regards PoC, peacebuilding and the rule of law, several key objectives of the Constitutional Charter are interlinked and, in some cases, dependent upon one another, with simultaneous progress is required for the overall political transition to succeed.

3.1 Rule of Law and Access to Justice: Responsive, independent, and accountable justice institutions were a key ask of the revolution and the success of the political transition will be measured by delivery on these key tasks. Also, peacebuilding and peacemaking and economic recovery processes will depend on the government’s ability to consolidate the rule of law. Justice sector and policing must enable effective legal remedies for serious rights violations and deliver on addressing a long history of impunity. Imminent actions set forth in the Constitutional Charter are legislative reviews and reforms, the formation of commissions, the set-up of justice reform commissions, a commitment to accountability and the improvement of court and prosecution offices. An immediate focus must be on legal and judicial reform and on the extension of state authority to the locality level. National Rule of Law coordination mechanisms and the interface between local, state, and national-level stakeholders is a priority as must be the strengthening of the Attorney General’s Office. Absent a Legislative Council, work on a legislative framework will be needed to support consultations on laws and ensure an inclusive approach.

3.2 Protection of Civilians and Human Rights: In Sudan’s conflict affected areas, particularly in Darfur, multiple threats of conflict – including political, tribal, and inter-communal – are intertwined. The Transitional Government of Sudan acknowledges the states responsibility to protect civilians and developed a National Protection of Civilians Plan (NPPOC), with SCR 2527 (2021) mandating UNITAMS to provide support. Programmatic needs in the field of POC are vast encompassing rule of law/human rights. Capacity building for the judiciary, police and armed forces and humanitarian action. Support to prevention would need to include: protection monitoring; early warning and data analysis; support to physical protection; capacity building in International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law; protection by presence and demining and support to the creation of an enabling and protective environment would encompass: rule of law and human rights; addressing the issues of internally displaced persons and refugees; addressing the issue of farmers and nomads as well as combatting violence against women and children. In supporting the implementation of the NPPOC, work would be needed to help Sudan fulfill its humanitarian action commitments as well as to strengthen conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms.

3.3 Land Reform: Key challenges include the creation of an accountable and transparent land management system, the creation of a land disputes mechanism and the standing up of the requisite structures and mechanisms, including the Land Commission and state-level land commissions, as outlined in the Juba Peace Agreement. Work is needed to ensure gender equality and to ensure women do not have less control, and ownership of housing land and property (HLP) as a result of restrictive customary/cultural practices and gender inequality in inheritance rights, legal status and resource distribution. This will entail support to the Transitional Government on land governance and architecture, mainstreaming HLP best practices, assisting the development of urban and rural plans, ensure land management information and supporting equal undisputed legal access to livelihoods, investments sustainable land use management and ensuring an inclusive approach and participatory engagement in dispute resolution mechanisms.
3.4 Natural Resource Governance: The Juba Peace Agreement contains multiple references to the environment with article 14.2 highlighting that the parties agree that the government shall commit to establishing the necessary foundations, practices and laws and implementation mechanisms to [...] end degradation and mitigate conflict over responses. It mandates further committees to the development of foundations for wealth sharing. National capacity development is needed to enable national actors – including the newly-created Higher National Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) to maintain and update data and to strengthen the institutional capacity of environmental governance mechanisms. Technical assistance is needed to support the national green Sudan programme and further the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. The development of state/region and innovation models for co-management, use and sharing of natural resources are needed.

3.5 Peacebuilding: At the centre of conflict in Sudan are questions around governance, economic management, rule of law and a social legacy of decades of conflict and environmental management. Pursuant to the mandate and following on from the twin resolutions on sustaining peace, work to implement the mandate would continue according to the principle of national ownership; ensure an inclusive and participatory human rights approach; ensuring coordination against joined up evidence, assessments and data on peacebuilding needs and conflict sensitivity. It will need to support the existing infrastructure – following the outcome of the Governance Conference for peace at federal, state/regional and localities level. It would broaden participation and increase citizens voices; assist the Government of Sudan extend state authority, focus on community violence reduction, buttress human rights and rule of law efforts and address durable solutions for returnees.

3.6 Durable Solutions and Forced Displacement: By the end of 2021, Sudan may host as many as 1.1 million refugees and 2.5 million IDPs for the most part from protracted conflict affected regions. The Constitutional Charter, the National Protection of Civilians Plan and the Juba Peace Agreement, as well as SC resolution 2425 (2020) and 2579 (2021), all call for durable solutions for refugees and IDPs and the safe, voluntary and dignified return, reintegration and relocation with host populations. The JPA contains a separate Protocol on refugee and IDP return and the establishment of a Refugee and IDP commission, with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur. Work is now needed to support work on going with IGAD commitments to regional approaches to refugees’ populations. Work is needed to finalize a durable solutions strategy, to ensure a more coherent approach and to create a better-quality evidence base for Durable Solutions. Significant investments may be required in localities from which IDPs and refugees emanate. Long term programming and processes are required to achieve Durable Solutions for IDPs, returning refugees and host communities.

3.7 Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and Harmful Practices (HP): Physical and sexual violence remain a significant concern with 86.6 percent of women aged 15-49 years subjected to FGM and Sudan having one of the highest rates of child marriage in North Africa. A key focus going forward would be to ensure that women and girls have access to quality GBV services and to strengthen legal, policy and institutional frameworks in line with international standards. In line with the National Action Plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the evidence base for GBV and HP needs to be strengthened and programming on GBV and HP developed and implemented with the participation of women and girls.

3.8 Women, Peace and Security: Programming is needed to support commitments in the Constitutional Charter, which emphasizes that the participation of women in all levels of government should be 40%, the JPA and the NPPOC as well as the NAP SC resolution 1325 (2000). Three areas of support are identified under the UNITAMS mandate: inclusion of women in
peacebuilding processes, peace preservation and peace negotiation; promoting women’s right and gender equality and ensuring the protection of women from any violation based on gender. Interventions under the first area would aim to build the capacity for women in participation in the political and legislative, as well as sustainable development processes. Interventions under Pillar II promote gender equality through the provision of technical support and advice for gender responsive reform.

3.9 Integrated Community Stabilization: Community stabilization incorporates elements related to address humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding needs – while potentially enhancing the capacity of government. Out of a total of 189 localities priorities under the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan, the ICSP targets 150 localities directly impacting approximately 2.6 million individuals, along with the overall assistance of state authorities. It will also leverage activities focused on community violence reduction.

3.10 Local Governance and Decentralization: A legitimate well capacitated decentralized governance system is essential for rule of law, security protection of its citizens and managing the functions of the state in an equitable and participatory manner. The JPA provides significant detail on how the division of powers between the state, regional and the federal level should take place while introducing the concept of federalism. As Sudan looks to hold the governance conference, and to clarifying the mandates of various levels of governance, further programming will need to be articulated to: promote good governance at the local level beyond work on service delivery and good public administration; strengthen the civil service and build capacity for demo democratic participation of localities as state level—noting that local legislatives have not yet been operationalized in most cases. Fiscal decentration, public financial management and tax revenue and resource mobilization at the sub-national level should be supported.

3.11 Sudan Police Force: Estimated to be around 30,000, police personnel generally lack capacity training and equipment. Accountability is weak and most offences go unreported and unpunished. Where courts are absent police have taken on a prosecutorial role, often lacking resources and/or know-how. Programmatic needs focus on the provision of physical protection, community oriented policing family and child protection and investigations and evidence-based policing with a focus on implementing commitments articulated in both the National Protection of Civilians Plan (NPPOC) and the Juba Peace Agreement.

3.12 Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), Community Violence Reduction (CVR), Weapons and Ammunitions Management (WAM) and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW): DDR is part of the JPA and one of the sections of the NPPOC. Managing the armed actors by providing combatants with a passage out of the militarized structures and back into civilian life will be key to security and stabilization in Sudan. Support will be required for the restructuring of the Sudan DDR commission, including to make it more representative through the participation therein of representatives of the signatory armed movements. The SDDRC should also be provided with technical and capacity building support for developing a DDR policy and strategy that takes into account the special needs of women and children associated with armed forces and groups. Similar support will be required in the State level DDR committees foreseen in the Juba Peace Agreement. Coordination structures will also be required to ensure proper sequencing of DDR and other security-related activities in the peace agreement, most notable ceasefires, integration of forces, security sector reform/transition and the establishment of interim security arrangements. Assistance, both technical and financial is required for the development and funding of community violence reduction programmes to prevent and reduce violence, including by
addressing the presence and impact of arms in communities, through targeted community-based projects. Support should be provided to the TGoS and relevant stakeholders in developing a regulatory framework, strategy and operational plan for WAM so as to respond to the proliferation of arms and ammunition in Sudan.

3.13 Mine Action: There is known ordnance contamination in the Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions with likely more unknown sites contamination is posing a threat to civilian lives and livelihoods and impeding humanitarian access. Priorities include the survey and clearance of crossline humanitarian corridors, the clearance of Kauda airport and vicinity to enable humanitarian access as well as the survey and clearance of other priority areas under SPLM-N controlled by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu and in areas formerly under the control of SPLM-Malik Agar in preparation for the return of refugees to Ulu and the Ingessana mountain areas. This may entail the deployment of at least five international multi-task teams for 12 months. In parallel there will need to be local capacity development. There would also need to be victim assistance in opposition-controlled areas and strengthening of national capacity to handle residual contamination.

Pillar IV: Mobilization of Economic and Development Assistance and coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance

Sudan’s political transition is closely linked to the ability of the TGoS to mobilize and manage international financial support and to adhere to international standards and principles in the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus. The mission will support by (a) collaborating with IFIs to support the mobilization of international economic and development assistance; (b) supporting and facilitating, full, rapid, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance and its coordination; and (c) ensuring UN integration and cooperation with relevant partners, including IFIs and the international community, with a view to making maximum use of existing and forthcoming bilateral and multilateral assistance in Sudan, including in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

4.1 Support international resource mobilization and national socio-economic reforms: Development and economic assistance will be vital to cushion the social cost of economic stabilization, and to support economic reform. The support is coordinated with and complements efforts of the International Financial Institutions (IMF, WBG, AfDB) to Sudan’s economic reform. Priorities for the coming years as identified by the Government of Sudan are: 1) Sustainable development and successful economic transition needs to be build human and institutional capacities. Including an analysis of past initiatives, policies, and institutional structures. 2) Support to reform policy regimes and develop administrative capacity to integrate in the international economy. 3) Stimulate broad-based dialogue on economic priorities informed by evidence. Sudanese think-tanks and alternative institutions are needed to ensure discussion of government’s reform and policies plans and their results. 4) Re-energize bodies for systematic public-private dialogue, – including women and youth entrepreneurs.

4.2 Support the establishment of a national architecture for development planning and aid effectiveness: The Sudan Partners Forum will be responsible for coordination between the TGoS and its international development partners, function on two levels: 1) Strategic level (chaired by the PM) focusing on policy issues and the
peacebuilding processes based on the anticipated National Development Plan, the PRSP and the JPA and Three-Year Programme for Stability and Economic Development. 2) The coordination of development level (chaired by the MoFEP), is responsible for the formulation and implementation of the national development framework sector-wide strategies as well as progress and challenges in the implementation of the Three-Year Programme for Stability and Economic Development (2021-2023) and the PRSP. Within the second level thematic and/or sectoral groups, reflecting national priorities will be formed. Humanitarian coordination meetings at both Federal and State level will continue as currently established.

4.3 Data and Information Management: Sort, map and label existing information available in various government organizations. Identify gaps to be filled and accessed by uniform manageable data systems across departments. Invest in soft and hard capacity to access the information.

4.4 Population and Housing Census: The conduct of a census/survey is a politically sensitive exercise as it is a key element of resource sharing negotiations. Promoting greater openness and transparency of data is therefore a pathway to mitigate political economy constraints with evidence-base policymaking. With an up-to-date census, including accurate and current population and agricultural data, national services could more accurately target those who need it most. The Population and Housing Census (PHC) will provide data to measure/establish baseline indicators to monitor progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In addition, the PHC will offer the base to compute hundreds of indicators, including tens of SGD monitoring indicators. The provision of key data will be an important basis for the political and economic reform of the Transitional Government and political transition in Sudan.

4.5 Agricultural Census: This will entail the development of census methodology and instruments and the training of trainers for the listing and enumeration of a Comprehensive Agricultural Census (CAC). The conduct of a CAC will need to be coupled with the strengthening the capacity of CBS, MOAF and MOAR in large-scale data collection, analysis, and dissemination of data. This would require the knowhow and use of new technologies for the national statistics system in Sudan.

INTRODUCTION

The Revolution that started in December 2018, the overthrow of President Omar Bashir in April 2019 and the subsequent establishment of a Transitional Government in September 2019 have set Sudan on the path towards democratic transformation. Bold steps under way by the Transitional Government of Sudan towards resolving long-standing internal conflicts, unwinding economic distortions, renewing the social contract, and re-engaging with the international community hold the promise of political, social, and economic renewal following three decades of dictatorship. As summarized by the Prime Minister during a High-Level event in the margins of the 74th General Assembly immediately following his appointment in 2019, the key priorities of the transitional government are to end conflict, resolve the economic crisis, reform state institutions, strengthen the rule of law and human rights, and ensure the meaningful and equal participation of women and young people. Against this background, Sudan initiated a series of institutional and structural reforms that will be central to the political transition and will be critical to its progress toward the achievement of the SDGs and implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as to redress its precarious international standing. As the transition continues, this
programmatic framework aims to reflect the changing priorities of the transitional government of Sudan as they evolve, including the priorities set out in the Prime Minister’s June 2021 national initiative that set out the key requirements for a comprehensive political settlement, including reform of the security and military sector, justice, the economy, peace, dismantling the 30 June regime and fighting corruption, foreign policy and formation of the Transitional Legislative Assembly.

The Constitutional Charter of August 2019 mandated the Transitional Government to work on achieving a just and comprehensive peace in Sudan, that addresses both the root causes and effects of the country’s conflicts. The Juba Peace Agreement, signed on 3 October between the Transitional Government, the Sudan Revolutionary Front and the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minawi (and now incorporated in an amended Constitutional Charter) was an important step towards achieving this objective. It provides an ambitious political framework for addressing the grievances of Sudan’s historically marginalized and under-developed regions, covering both the root causes and consequences of conflict. However, the Juba Peace Agreement is not yet fully comprehensive as it does not include the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), which has yet to join the peace process, or the SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz al Hilu, which is negotiating in Juba on its own separate track based on a Declaration of Principles signed with the Chair of the Sovereign Council in March 2021.

Reflecting these momentous historical developments, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission was established by UN Security Council Resolution 2524 (2020) with a wide-ranging mandate to work with the UN Country Team (UNCT) in supporting the transition of Sudan towards durable peace and democratic transformation. Resolution 2524 (2020) gave UNITAMS a country-wide mandate to work on peacebuilding, stabilization, transitional security arrangements and DDR, protection of civilians, rule of law, governance reform, durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, transitional justice, and gender equality objectives, to be implemented jointly by the UNITAMS and the UNCT.

Building on the roadmap for UN engagement set out in UN Security Council Resolution 2524 (2020), UN Security Council Resolution 2579 (2021) highlighted six priorities for the mission in 2021/2022, which will need to be reflected in programming. These are: (i) ceasefire monitoring in Darfur in line with the role envisaged for the United Nations and the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA); (ii) implementation of the Sudan National Plan for Civilian Protection (s/2020/429), including for local conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation efforts, disarmament and community violence resolution with a particular focus on inter-communal violence; (iii) ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the armed groups, including through technical, administrative and logistical assistance in coordination with other partners; (iv) inclusive implementation of the power-sharing provisions of the JPA, including through facilitating the participation of civil society, women, youth and internally displaced persons, refugees and members of marginalized communities; (v) the Constitution drafting process, including facilitating the engagement of civil society, and providing technical and logistical support to the establishment of the Constitutional Commission and the holding of the Constitutional Conference, as well as support for the timely conduct of the national Census and initial preparatory work on elections; (vi) the Sudan Police Force (SPF) and the justice sector through advisory and capacity building support with the objective of enhancing civilian-led protection, security and the rule of law. Each of these areas are highlighted within the SPPSP as priorities for 2021/2022.

In order to address these multiple challenges, UN Security Council Resolution 2579 (2021) stipulates that cooperation between UNITAMS and its Integrated United National Country Team (UNCT) partners should be underpinned by an integrated Strategic framework (ISF) or equivalent and requests the Secretary- General, in partnership with all relevant actors, including International Financial Institutions, to support the Government of Sudan in conducting a comprehensive assessment to define the country’s longer-term conflict prevention, recovery and peacebuilding needs and in developing strategies to address them.
The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, (HC), functions as the highest country-level international humanitarian coordination platform agreeing on common strategic issues and policies related to humanitarian action. It is composed of heads of cluster lead agencies, INGOs and NGOs, and it meets regularly with humanitarian donors in a HCT plus format. At the operational level, the Inter-Sector Coordination Working Group (ISCG) leads operational discussions on humanitarian programming. Area HCTs and Area HCTs ISCGs established at state level serve as platforms to coordinate humanitarian operations.

Given the magnitude of the challenges involved, UNAMISD has also been tasked by the Security Council to support the Transitional Government in mobilizing international economic and development assistance and coordinating humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance. Work in the coming year will build on the establishment of a National Development Forum that will be responsible for coordination between the Transitional Government and international development partners. Such work will reflect the priorities of the Transitional Government set out in the National Development Framework (2021-2023), which will outline the national development trajectory.

PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF WORK

The proposed Sudan Peacemaking, Peacebuilding and Stabilization Programme (SPPSP) aims to create a joint programmatic framework for UNAMISD and the UNCT, identifying common areas of action and reflecting their respective comparative advantages. Under this programme, UNAMISD and UNCT will jointly plan and coordinate their programming, based on a shared analysis that takes account of the evolving political context. The UN implementing entities will articulate their support by mutually reinforcing their programmatic and technical proposals. The SPPSP represents the first step towards an integrated planning and implementation framework, to be expanded into an UN Integrated Strategic Framework plus.2

The SPPSP is articulated around four joint UNAMISD-UNCT programmatic pillars that reflect the key components of the UNAMISD mandate in UNSCR 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021):

- Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace.
- Support to peace processes and implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and future peace agreements.
- Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and Two Areas.
- Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance, and coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance.

Gender equality and Women’s Empowerment, Youth Inclusion, a Humanitarian-Development-peace Nexus approach to programming and Environmental mainstreaming are cross-cutting concerns among the four pillars and underpin UNAMISD’s mandate. The SPPSP highlights distinct thematic areas where targeted assistance is required to assist the Transitional Government in ensuring the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and young people at all levels of peace and political processes. Specific human rights programming will also be discussed within the context of Pillar III.

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2 It is expected that the UN will develop an Integrated Strategic Framework aligned to the future National Development Framework (2021-2023). This latter will eventually inform the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, expected to articulate Sudan’s longer-term post-transition national priorities beyond 2023.
Strategically and programmatically, the four Pillars of the SPPSP are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing with Pillar 1 focusing on assisting the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace through institutional reforms; Pillar 2 focuses on peace agreements as entry points for addressing both the roots and the consequences of conflict; Pillar 3 outlines some of the necessary reforms at community and national level in order to stabilize the situation, advance social cohesion and rebuild the social contract; and Pillar 4 supports the mobilization of economic and development assistance, and the coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance. Evidently, UNITAMS and its integrated partners will need to be wary of an approach, within any of the pillars that accepts quick win results as long-term goals are whittled down or deferred.

All of the above will entail close collaboration with development partners and the IFIs, including the World Bank and the IMF, following the Highly Indebted Country (HIPC) decision point in June 2021. This will entail optimizing collectively UN, IFIs and donor resources in support of the Government of Sudan’s national priorities. This programme intends to align fully to government priorities as defined in the upcoming 3-Year Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and relevant milestones set out in World Banks’ Turn-Around Allocation for Sudan and potential synergies with the upcoming UN Mission Benchmarks. The programme will also align with the assessment of longer-term conflict prevention, recovery and peacebuilding needs as requested to be conducted in collaboration with IFIs as envisioned in both Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021).

**THEORY OF CHANGE**

The overall objective of the SPPSP is to articulate the UN’s contribution to the political transition and peace implementation processes around a coordinated, coherent framework focused on consolidating stability through legitimate and functioning state institutions at national and sub-national levels, capable of delivering basic security and services to the population, in full compliance with the rule of law and human rights. Mandate implementation will take account of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) once finalized and UNITAMS and its integrated partners will seek to ensure complementarity to this. A key component of this work will be to deliver visible change and tangible benefits to those living outside Khartoum, and to serve development and peacebuilding needs at the community level. This may sometimes require a “quick win” approach while longer-term interventions are prepared. This will entail the development – by UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT components – of a coordinated methodology, in partnership with development partners and IFIs, for engaging at sub-national level in a more decentralized governance system as more powers are devolved to the states and regions.

Discussions between stakeholders led to a visual representation of a results chain in Figure 1 below, which in turn informed the development of a theory of change. A key objective in future will be to prioritize and sequence programming and to develop unified and coherent messaging.

The theory of change posits that:

- **IF** the UN in Sudan provides coherent and effective advisory and technical support to the Government and other national stakeholders to realize the transitional priorities in the Constitutional Charter, to ensure the inclusion and meaningful participation of women, and to establish the foundations for good governance and the rule of law
- **AND** provides political and conflict-sensitive programmatic support for the effective implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and any future peace agreements
- **THEN** the Transitional Government of Sudan will be better able to carry forward the process of democratic transition
- **AND** to develop sustainable programming and financing modalities so as to avoid critical peacebuilding gaps that may jeopardize peace and stability
- **LEADING TO** improved protection of civilians, enhanced respect for human rights and the inclusion of women, youth, IDPs, refugees and marginalized groups.
- **RESULTING IN** a coherent response to the root causes of conflict and a more sustainable peace in the country
- **RESULTING IN** social stabilization in communities and the country at large.
Supporting the Political Transition
- Provide Good Offices and mediation support
- Engage political parties and actors
- Collect, monitor, analyze, share data/info/analysis
- Engage civil society, women, youth, refugees, IDPs, members of marginalized groups to ensure meaningful participation in the transition
- Liaise with int/l./regional entities, Member States
- Support Sudan Peace Commission in implementing peace agreements
- Provide technical assistance and support to electoral and constitution making processes
- Support local-level conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation, and community violence reduction

Protection of Civilians and Strengthening Rule of Law
- Support implementation of Sudanese National Civilian Protection Strategy
- Coordinate UN response on civilian protection issues, particularly women, children and vulnerable groups
- Support to strengthening rule of law institutions to deliver justice and accountability
- Integrated UNCT data collection and analysis on civilian protection to support early warning, conflict prevention and peace implementation.
- Complement and support work of OHCHR Office

Supporting the peaceful transition
- Support political stability
- Support the census processes, constitution-making, and electoral processes
- Support institutional reforms and the promotion and protection of human rights
- Support the implementation of the peace agreement
- Strengthen the protective environment in conflict / post conflict areas
- Support the achievement of peaceful coexistence and reconciliation between communities
- Support to the establishment of a national architecture for development planning & aid effectiveness
- Support international resource mobilization and national socio-economic reforms
- Support to the mobilization of economic & development assistance and the coordination of peacebuilding assistance

Sudan undergoes a peaceful transition which is gender and youth responsive

UN and international assistance is coordinated

Progress on the 2030 Agenda is made

The lives, rights and welfare of all Sudanese citizens are protected and promoted

Guiding documents
- Constitutional Declaration
- Security Council res. 2579 (2020)
- Mission Concept
- UN Integrated Strategic Framework
- UNDAF

UNITAMS Resources
- Programmatic funding
- UNCT Resources

Supporting the Political Transition
- Support the conclusion of an inclusive peace process
- Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements
- Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic

Support international resource mobilization and national socio-economic reforms
- Support the mobilization of economic & development assistance and the coordination of peacebuilding assistance

Supporting peacebuilding response
- Conduct peacebuilding rapid country needs assessments
- Mobilize capacity building funds through the Multi-Partner Trust Fund
- Develop Quick Impact Peacebuilding Projects in priority areas
- Promote public-private partnerships and private sector development
- Provide analysis, policy support, and technical guidance for economic development to all persons in need
- Support IFIs and ECA in their advice on fiscal and monetary issues
- Provide policy advice and guidance on employment,
CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

YOUTH INCLUSION

The strategy for implementation of youth inclusion throughout the SPPSP is mainstreamed. This reflects the holistic and integrated approach to youth inclusion that informs the programmatic framework. Beyond mainstreaming youth issues, the approach to youth inclusions seeks to strengthens localization of the Youth4Peace agenda, including through implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2250 (2015). The SPPSP recognizes that adolescents and youth should not be defined as one homogenous category despite the existence of common identities, needs, and priorities – since there are unique dimensions to being young that expose young people to distinct challenges and opportunities based on heterogeneity, diversity, and gender differences. Operationalizing the SPPSP will further be guided by the YPS Programmatic Handbook, working with young people as agents of change. UN agencies will therefore continue to work with Governmental counterparts to strengthen the participation and inclusion of young people and to mainstream and institutionalize their engagement within the TGoS. The SPPSP seeks to be aligned with National Youth Policy under development by the Ministry of Youth and Sports and will be informed by the Secretary-General’s 2018 Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security – aimed at investing in the upside of youth participation and avoiding harmful stereotypes and policy panics around youth exclusion.

To ensure these ambitions are operationalized within the United Nations, the UN Joint Task Force on Young People (co-lead by UNFPA and UNDP) provide strategic advice, knowledge and review of programme design and implementation on all aspects of the SPPSP – noting in particular that partnerships and joint efforts through shared leadership and responsibility are crucial in working with and for young people.

HDP NEXUS APPROACH TO PROGRAMMING

The Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) will continue to provide multi-dimensional humanitarian response to people in need and will ensuring principled, inclusive, safe, and dignified assistance to the most vulnerable people, including strengthened accountability towards affected communities. Humanitarian mechanisms, including the Humanitarian Country Team and Inter Sector Coordination Group, will align resilience and durable solutions to support and establish a sustainable process of recovery that will reduce humanitarian needs over time and enable development programming in the medium – long term.

Following the recommendations of a recent workshop on the UNAMID State-Liaison Functions, a good premise for nexus programming is the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC) with it noted that sub-national coordination mechanisms are needed to create synergies between humanitarian interventions, development and peacebuilding programmes.

The police framework guiding nexus programming and the New Way of Working (NWOW) was outlined in the Secretary-General’s Report for the World Humanitarian Summit and the Agenda for Humanity, and will focus on joint assessment, data and analytics, to define collective outcomes across the Nexus – and build on comparative advantages of humanitarian and development actors.
ENVIRONMENTAL MAINSTREAMING

Sudan’s commitment to promote the environment and fight climate change provides an opportunity to integrate environmental sustainability and climate resilience into democratic reforms and UN support to this effect. Climate change has an inordinate and detrimental effect on women so the focus should be on support to national initiatives to enhance environmental governance, strengthening the resilience of communities, and women, against climate change, and contribute to the protection and restoration of the fragile biodiversity through nature-based solutions. Environmental sensitivity is a cross-cutting issue for the UN in Sudan and the four pillars of Security Council Resolution 2579 (2021).

Through the regular meetings of the UNCT, the Programme Management Team, and the Information Management Working Group, consideration will be to UNCT programming to take into consideration emerging risks arising from climate change, climate variability, and changes in biodiversity – with UNEP as the quintessential knowledge partner on these issues. On-going cooperation with humanitarian partners further seeks to improve oversight of the environmental impacts of conflict; integrate natural resource and environmental issues into post-disaster or conflict assessments and planning to minimize possible negative environmental impacts of humanitarian and early recovery operations.

MAINSTREAMING GENDER EQUALITY WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT

The Security Council has made gender equality expertise in peace operations a priority. UNCSCR 1325 requires field operations to include a gender component and for gender perspectives to be integrated into all aspects of peace and security efforts. Subsequent WPS Resolutions have strengthened this mandate. The proposed gender equality goal of the mission is ‘to support the Sudan transitional government to realize its commitments to gender equality and the empowerment of women in all political, peacebuilding, rule of law and economic reforms efforts.’ This will be achieved by working with UN agencies, CSOs and national counterparts across the remit of the SPPSP and beyond. The work on gender equality and women’s empowerment is further underpinned by the Secretary-General’s Report on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding (A/65/354–S/2010/466) on women’s participation across all aspects of peacebuilding.

To foster institutionalization of gender equality and the Women, Peace and Security mandate within UN in Sudan the SPPSP adopts the following principles:

(a) prioritize the generation and use of sex and age disaggregated data and gender analysis as part of planning and design of all mission and UNCT interventions;

(b) build on achievements, experiences and lessons learned from past efforts in fostering gender equality and women’s empowerment in Sudan and best practices globally;

(c) guarantee that a gender inclusive perspective is integrated across all mission functions; and

(d) Strengthen, and build a body of knowledge, on gender inclusivity, gender equality and women’s empowerment in partnership with INGOs; NGOS and UNCT partners to support the mainstreaming of S/RES/1325 (2000) across all aspects of programming related to SPPSP.

The SPPSP includes gender-targeted results areas on Women, Peace and Security, Gender-based Violence (GBV) and Harmful Practices with accompanying outputs and indicators. Other outcome areas are mainstreamed with analysis and targets, throughout the document contributing to advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women. The indicators support tracking and measurement of investments (using the gender marker tool) and results towards set targets. SPPSP management arrangements and implementation mechanisms will ensure that gender is
mainstreamed across all UN interventions be they at the federal, state or local level, that gender expertise informs programming, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda is implemented. SPPSP is to be reviewed and validated on an ongoing basis in partnership with UN Women, UNFPA, the Gender Advisors in UNITAMS and Office of the Resident Coordinator, the UN Gender Thematic Working Group and relevant women’s groups and civil society partners.
PILLAR I: POLITICAL TRANSITION, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

BACKGROUND

Signed on 17 August 2019, the Constitutional Charter established a transitional government for an interim period of 39 months, consisting of a Sovereign Council as a collective Head of State, a Council of Ministers, and a Transitional Legislative Assembly. The Constitutional Charter provided for a Sovereign Council of 11 members (9 men and 2 women), including 5 civilians selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change (an alliance of political parties and civil society groups representing revolutionary forces), 5 military members selected by the Transitional Military Council and another civilian selected by joint agreement. The Sovereign Council was to be chaired by a military member for the first 21 months and then by a civilian. In October 2020, the Constitutional Charter was amended to incorporate the Juba Peace Agreement. As a result, the transitional period was extended by resetting the clock to start from the date of signature of the Juba Peace Agreement (3 October 2020) and the Sovereign Council was expanded to 14 members, including three representatives of the signatory armed movements.

The Constitutional Charter puts a strong emphasis on fundamental rights and freedoms. It affirms the principles of justice and equality for all Sudanese citizens, and states that all people, bodies, and associations, whether official or unofficial, are subject to the rule of law. The Declaration further stipulates that any war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of extrajudicial killing committed since June 1989 do not have a statute of limitation. It promotes an array of human rights principles – for example, no one may be arrested, detained, or deprived of freedom without legal procedures defined by law, and all forms of torture and inhumane treatment are banned; accused persons are guaranteed the right to a fair trial and to legal representation before the courts; slavery and human trafficking are prohibited, and the state must guarantee the protection of women’s rights and gender equality, including a stipulation that 40% of the Legislative Assembly’s members must be female.

A key governance task to be taken during the transition is the conduct of a credible census. The adoption of a new Permanent Constitution (following an inclusive and participatory constitution-making process and a National Constitutional Convention) and the subsequent holding of credible and inclusive elections, could mark the end of the transition period, while the medium- to long-term political and governance reforms initiated during this period will have to continue.

An overarching challenge facing the political transition is that public expectations surrounding the dividends of change are high, especially among young people and women who were at the forefront of the revolution, whereas, after thirty years of dictatorship, mismanagement and destruction of the social fabric, the reforms required to achieve democratic transformation, economic recovery, and comprehensive peace will be a long-term process. Women’s participation and youth inclusion are therefore an important measure of success. Another key parameter is to advance the aspects of good governance to address corruption – one of the main grievances of the popular protests – and provide checks and balances through separation of powers to address corruption among government officials.
**THE MANDATE**

Closely reflecting the principles and objectives of the Constitutional Charter, the first strategic objective of both UN Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021) mandates UNITAMS and the UNCT to (1) assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; (2) support peace processes and implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and future peace agreements; (3) assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas; and (4) support the mobilization of economic and development assistance, and coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance.

Within Pillar 1, UNSCR 2579 prioritizes (a) support to the political transition, through good offices; (b) technical assistance to the constitution drafting process, the establishment and functioning of the Transitional Legislative Assembly, the population census and preparations for elections, in support of national efforts; and (c) support the implementation of the human rights, equality, accountability and rule of law provisions of the Constitutional Charter, in particular those provisions that guarantee women’s rights, and future peace agreements. Because of concern that the census should not be politicized, this element of the mandate is tackled under pillar 4.

Three particular priorities are highlighted for UNITAMS support under Pillar 1 in the current mandate period, namely support for: inclusive implementation of the power-sharing provisions of the JPA, including through facilitating the participation of civil society, women, youth and internally displaced persons, refugees and members of marginalized communities; support for the Constitution drafting process, including facilitating the engagement of civil society, and providing technical and logistical support to the establishment of the Constitutional Commission and the holding of the Constitutional Conference; and support the Sudanese Police Force and the justice sector through advisory and capacity building support, with the objective of enhancing civilian-led protection, security and the rule of law, a task that cuts across both the first and the third pillars of the mandate.

If Sudan’s political transition is to succeed in laying the foundations for democratic governance, the protection of human rights and a sustainable peace, it will rely significantly on the provision of good offices, based on extensive monitoring and engagement with Sudanese actors across the political spectrum. This core political work of the Mission will be closely coordinated with the African Union (AU) and the relevant states, in particular members of the Friends of Sudan group and Sudan’s neighbors.

**1.1 CONSTITUTION MAKING**

The vision of the UN is to support the adoption of a constitution that is owned by the people of Sudan and considered as legitimate by all. While the constitution must be an expression of the will of the majority, it must also consider the concerns of the minorities. A new constitution would regulate many of the root causes of conflict and instability in Sudan, including how power, resources, and territory are distributed and shared and how the laws and institutions that are integral to equality, justice, and the rule of law are designed and governed. The process of constitution making cannot be considered in isolation from other developments in the transition, rather the process of constitution making is an essential part of the broader strategy of transitioning the country out of conflict and towards a peaceful constitutional democracy as defined by the Sudanese.

However, what must not be forgotten is that the process of constitution making is as important, as the document itself. It is the process that brings together not only decision-makers, politically active representatives, civil society including women, youth, but also ordinary citizens in society – including marginalized or disadvantaged groups - and allows them collectively to participate in shaping and owning the content of the constitution. The constitutional framework will also define the electoral
framework as well as the structure and system of government, in addition to providing a framework for the federal system and related constitutional matters including potential sub-national level elections and constitutions.

Given that the constitution describes the structure of government and provides the social contract or the set of rules by which the country and citizens engage and by which the country should be governed, any new constitution would need to set out the rights of citizens (both individually and collectively) and provide for checks and balances between the branches of government. As such, the constitution making process would create a shared vision on the way forward for Sudan. A key benchmark to ensure progress towards sustainable peace in Sudan, therefore, is a constitution making process that results in the adoption of a new constitution that enjoys broad-based legitimacy and is gender inclusive.

To achieve this, the Constitutional Charter (article 38.1) lays out that a mechanism to prepare to draft a permanent constitution for the Republic of Sudan. It provides for the development of a new constitution through two mechanisms – the Constitution Commission and the Constitutional Conference - with the former responsible for the constitution making process and preparing a draft of the text. The Constitution Commission would oversee the process of constitution making and ensure the principle of equality, e.g. ensuring gender, racial and religious equality and broad-based inclusivity. Moreover, as per the JPA, small conferences would also be held in the Two Areas and the East to prepare and draft the constitutions within the framework of preparations for the national constitutional conference. The Two Areas also provide for provincial transitional constitutions pending the adoption of the permanent constitution. In parallel, Sudan is also to hold a national conference with broad-based consultations to address the system of government. The conference and related consultations are to be organized by the Ministry of Federal Government and the outcomes of this national conference on the System of Government will be fed into the Constitution making process, as relevant.

Institutional Entry Points

The Ministry of Federal Governance oversees the sub-national governance architecture, while the National Committee for the Governance and Administration Conference – currently chaired by Sovereign Council member Mohamed Al-Taishi – oversees the roadmap for preparation of recommendations on the System of Government to the constitutional conference(s).

As an integrated mission, support by UNITAMS for constitution making in Sudan would need to encompass support to the process from both a political and technical standpoint. Efforts will need to be grounded in the principles of inclusion, participation, transparency and national ownership and timeliness.

Furthermore, UNITAMS would need to coordinate and manage the efforts of all international actors supporting the constitution making process, civic education, and effective public participation, and manage the diverse agendas to avoid unnecessary tensions.

Mechanisms will need to be created for all Sudanese people, including conflict affected populations, to share their views in a meaningful way. All Sudanese will need to be able to participate in the constitution making process and have opportunities to formally present their views, either orally or in writing, to the Constitutional Commission. Significant steps will need to be taken to mitigate or remove legal or social barriers to participation, especially for women, youth, minorities, persons with disabilities and other historically marginalized groups. To ensure transparency, the Sudanese would need to have access to sufficient information to allow them to meaningfully participate in the constitution-making process and to hold officials accountable in the constitution-making process. To be deemed legitimate the constitution making process will need to have national ownership.
Ongoing UN Programmes

Based on all the above, the first step must be the development of a roadmap for the constitutional process which enjoys legitimacy and broad-based buy-in, to guide the way forward. This will need to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are consulted, and their feedback considered, with women, youth, grassroots communities, and other excluded groups empowered to participate. At the request from the Ministry of Justice, UNITAMS and UNDP are already supporting the process of providing a draft legal framework for a constitutional process, for establishing the Constitutional Commission and mechanisms for conducting consultations with stakeholders, and for providing a mechanism for consensus building on contentious issues arising amid the process.

Programmatic Needs

Going forward, key processes of the constitution-making process will need to include:

1. The drafting and adoption of enabling legislation for the establishment of a constitutional process and a Constitutional Commission. Interim benchmarks for completing the constitution making process would need to include: (1) the promulgation of an agreed upon framework for the constitution making process (ideally reflected in a law or decree) and the subsequent creation of the Constitutional Drafting and the Constitutional Conference Commission (“Constitutional Commission”). (2) Developing a business plan for the establishment of a secretariat/administration to support the work of the commission including broad based consultations. The business plan would assist in developing a budget to raise funds for implementation. (3) Ensuring the effective participation of the public in the constitution-making process with a strong focus on the inclusion of women, civil society, and broad geographic scope including the various states and region including population areas outside of main cities. Given the unique characteristics of the Two Areas and the East, this would potentially entail two small conferences being held in both the Two Areas and the East. (4) The completion of a draft constitution by the Constitutional Commission before the end of the transitional period. (5) Having the Constitutional Commission document and publishing the constitution for a review process and ensuring widespread political deliberations take place on its recommendations. (6) The conduct of a Constitutional Conference and adoption of the new constitution before the end of the transitional period. All of the above will entail the provision of technical assistance and support to the institutional capacity building of law-making institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Constitution Making</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1.1A:</strong> A constitution that is owned by the people of Sudan and considered as legitimate by all, meets internationally recognized standards and consistent with Sudan’s international human rights treaty obligations, and promotes good governance, fundamental rights of all Sudanese, gender equality, and the rule of law, is adopted.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1.1B:</strong> An inclusive and transparent constitution-making process with the meaningful participation of women, youth and marginalized groups, in line with the Constitutional Charter, JPA and Sudan’s international human rights treaty obligations is followed.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UN Partners:</strong> UNITAMS, UNDP, UNESCO, UN Women, UNFPA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TGoS Partners:</strong> Ministry of Justice, (when established) Constitution-making Commission and potentially the Transitional Legislative Council</td>
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<td><strong>Related SDGs:</strong> All Goals</td>
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<td><strong>Key relevant provisions of national documents:</strong> Constitutional Charter: arts. 7(9), 7(10), 38(3)(c), 67(k)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 UNITAMS benchmark under Strategy Priority 2
**Outputs**

1) Roadmap for Constitution-making process developed, and progress tracked
2) All relevant stakeholders consulted on the draft Constitution and their feedback considered.
3) Women, youth, grassroots communities and excluded groups’ empowered to meaningfully participate in Constitution-making processes
4) Constitution drafted based on a new system and structure of government providing the framework for the new electoral law
5) Public awareness raised and ownership of new Constitution, and its rights and responsibilities

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<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Constitution drafted through an inclusive, transparent, and participatory process.</td>
<td>Baseline: Constitutional drafting process yet to commence (2021) Target: Constitution drafted with meaningful participation of women, young people and civil society, and people with disabilities and disadvantaged groups. (2022) Data Source: UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; Media reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. 40% of women constituting the Constitution-making body and its secretariat; number of women engaged in the constitution-making process.</td>
<td>Baseline: Constitutional drafting process yet to commence (2020) Target: 40% (2022) Data Source: UNITAMS reporting; UN Women and other UNCT reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Degree to which Constitution-making body meets with representatives of all states of Sudan including citizens in cities and also the countryside.</td>
<td>Baseline: Constitutional drafting process yet to commence (2020) Target: Constitution-drafting body meets with representatives of all regions of Sudan. (2022) Data Source: UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. # of gender equality provisions discussed by Constitution-making Commission and political parties and adopted in the Constitution.</td>
<td>Baseline: 0 (2020) Target: 5 (2021) Data Source: UN Women reports; International IDEA reports; UNITAMS and UNDP reports; Media reports; Constitutional Commission reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Degree to which the Constitutional-making Commission and its offices in the states are established and functional to help ensure broad based consultations.</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: Established and fully functional Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. # of young men and young women in constitution-making body and its secretariat tracked</td>
<td>Baseline: Not tracked. Constitutional drafting process yet to commence (2020) Target: Tracked (2022) Data Source: UNITAMS reporting; UN Women and other UNCT reports</td>
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4 UNITAMS benchmark indicator
5 UNITAMS benchmark indicator
6 UNITAMS benchmark indicator
7 Adapted from UN Women programmatic indicator
1.2 ELECTIONS

Recognizing the importance of citizens’ participation in decision-making and political processes, and committing to transparency, accountability, rule of law and human rights, Sudan’s transitional government is committed to ending the transition by the holding of inclusive and credible national elections. The Juba Agreement also holds the possibility for elections to sub-national bodies and offices following further conferences related to the system of government. The national elections are to take place after the conduct of a national census, which is to also be done during the transitional period.

While Sudan had an electoral framework prior to the revolution with an election law developed in 2010, the transitional government has made clear an intention to establish a new, refreshed framework. This will include the establishment of electoral management bodies and an electoral law that provides for the delimitation of electoral boundaries (if so indicated by new governance arrangements), the registration of voters and the conduct of elections. The Agreements commit the transitional government to ensuring that this framework is inclusive and provides for the full participation of women, IDPs, refugees and people with disabilities in the electoral and political life of Sudan.

The UNITAMS mandate provides for the provision of UN electoral assistance and a framework has now been established for the provision of integrated electoral assistance to be provided by UNITAMS and relevant UNCT agencies, under the guidance of the DSRSG. UN work in the electoral area will evolve along with the development of the new constitution and related discussions on the structure of government; as such it will both support immediate electoral actions during the transitional period and also lay the groundwork for sustainable electoral events after the end of the transition at both national and (as required) sub-national levels.

Ongoing UN Programmes

In response to requests from the Transitional Government, initial UN electoral assistance – being delivered by UNITAMS and UNDP – is focusing on the legal framework for an electoral management body and then supporting the establishment of such body. The scope of further assistance can then be determined in consultation with the electoral management body and other relevant stakeholders but is likely to include:

- provision of advice on electoral systems, methods for the inclusion of and meaningful participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups in the electoral and political sphere and related issues to the constitutional drafting process.
- support for the development, in a consultative manner, of an inclusive legislative framework for the registration of voters and the conduct of elections.
- continued capacity development of the electoral management body and related institutions.
- advice and assistance to electoral management bodies and related institutions on voter registration, the conduct of elections, electoral information and other related areas.
- advice and assistance to media bodies on their role in democratic electoral processes.
- establishment of a basket fund under UNDP to assist with the material needs of electoral management bodies and other institutions supporting electoral processes.
Programmatic Needs

UNITAMS is also taking the lead on the coordination of international electoral assistance, in support of the Transitional Government; some assistance providers are already active in Sudan.

The integrated electoral support will also incorporate and support work already ongoing in the areas of women’s political participation and civic education. Strong synergies can be realized also with UNCT work on rule of law and judicial institutions, ensuring capacity for effective electoral justice actions when needed.

Other measures would include support to the constitutional drafting process as it relates to elections. Work will also be needed across Sudanese society to orient and raise awareness on electoral and related issues. Part of this effort may entail advocacy for experience-sharing and lessons learned exercises with other relevant countries in the region or beyond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME 1.2: Inclusive and credible elections are held in a peaceful manner at the end of the transitional period with the meaningful participation of women and youth as candidates and voters. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Partners: UNDP, IOM, OHCHR, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNITAMS, UN Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGoS Partners: Ministry of Justice, future Electoral Management Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related SDGs: Goal 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key relevant provisions of national documents:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Charter: arts. 19, 38(3)(d), 67(k)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPA: National Issues: 1.12, 13; Darfur: Ch.1: 10; Two Areas: Ch.2: 58.5, Ch.3: 10.14, 11.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Joint electoral needs assessment undertaken to determine the scope of UN electoral support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Electoral management body established by law and capacitated (and equipped) to plan, manage and implement credible and inclusive electoral events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Inclusive legal framework for voter registration, elections developed and disseminated, following broad consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Participation of women, youth and previously marginalized groups in electoral processes is enhanced/improved/deepened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Sudanese institutions and civil society are equipped to provide civic and voter education and awareness raising campaigns at national and sub-national levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Strategy for prevention of electoral violence and response to hate speech (including through social media) developed and implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Establishment of a security framework that is well understood and practiced by the SPF and which provides clarification of the role of the police during elections in order to prevent violence and conduct investigations on electoral and related offences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Degree to which electoral management body formed can meet international standards. 9</td>
<td>Baseline: New electoral management body to be formed. Target: Electoral management body able to deliver electoral processes that meet international standards. Data Source: Assessments by civil society groups as well as international and domestic observation groups with interim assessments as required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Based on UNITAMS benchmark under Strategy Priority 2
9 Adapted from UNITAMS benchmark indicator
### 1.3 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION

One of the key elements of the democratic transition is checks and balances and the separation of powers. This was one of the key demands of the revolution, and the Constitutional Charter articulated the formation of a 300-person Transitional Legislative Council to oversee the executive. With no Transitional Legislative Council yet in place, efforts to ensure accountability and provide checks and balances to the power of the executive are significantly impaired. A key focus going forward will therefore be to push for and strengthen the capacity for democratic oversight, the legislative capacity and service delivery at every level as well as to build the capacity of the new legislative committees, at both the federal and state level in governance reform.

Under the previous regime, the governance was characterized by weak administrative capacity, centralized decision making with limited oversight, accountability, and transparency. As a result, service delivery was weak, and increased economic and social grievances that triggered the revolution. For the success of the transition, it will be important for the population feel the dividends of the revolution, in terms of their access to political as well as economic and social rights. The Constitutional Charter sets out, in Article 7 (1) the expectation that government agencies are required to address the root cause of the conflicts in Sudan by “treating its effects, taking into account the provisional preferential measures for war-affected regions, underdeveloped regions and the most affected groups”. For this to be achieved, core government functions will need to be built up, and a human rights, and a gender-responsive, approach to development and poverty eradication integrated into national efforts, including through the implementation of sustainable development goals and laws, policies and practices and effectively combat discrimination in all its forms.

Such national efforts will help address differences in access to development between the centre and the periphery. Significant amounts of work will be needed with both national and state-level
institutions, to build the capacity to develop medium- and long-term policies, to establish and build capacity that can adequately redress inequalities through effective public administrations as well as accountable democratic oversight. This will entail both capacity and institution building of core government ministries and the commissions and bodies created under the JPA and well as working at the sub-national level, as it is likely that the autonomous areas and regions may be created after the governance conference. Significant investments to create civil service capacity where none existed previously as with the creation of autonomous regions and where significant responsibilities will be devolved to states with limited capacity. In addition, a framework or system for communication and coordination between the relevant ministries and the state-level, and between local government departments in different parts of the country with their respective ministries will be necessary to enhance the linkages.

**Institutional Entry Points**

Key bodies with whom work must commence are the Civil Service Reform Commission, the Anti-Corruption and Public Funds Recovery Commission and the Gender Women and Gender Equality Commission. Addressing deep-seated grievances will almost certainly entail reaching out to the National Commission for Nomads, Herders and Farmers. It may also entail work with the Refugee and IDP commission, and the future gender commission, to ensure these categories are meaningfully included and participate in planning efforts. Capacitating and institution building the various commissions created in the Constitutional Charter will be a fundamental component, together with the Translational Legislative Council, of ensuring the institutions are in place to ensure oversight of the executive.

However, another key aspect of good governance will be addressing corruption, one of the main grievances of the popular protests. Under the previous regime, lack of effective checks and balances and separation of powers fueled widespread corruption among senior officials – pervading sectors as diverse as public procurement, natural resources management and public administration and that political patronage at all levels of government was widespread. As widespread as it is, corruption takes various forms, including petty and grand corruption, embezzlement of public funds, and a system of political patronage. Under popular pressure, some sporadic initiatives had been taken. These included the adoption of a law establishing an Anti-Corruption commission in 2016, without producing an actual impact and as a result, Sudan still performs poorly on the main indicators measuring corruption and anti-corruption with it noted that in the transitional period, anti-corruption elements have become a priority for the caretaker institutions. The transitional government is prioritizing anti-corruption reforms and public funds recovery, among other key priorities, as mechanisms for rebuilding peace and trust among the Sudanese people. However, Transitional authorities have not adopted any coherent policies in this field and the country still lacks an anti-corruption strategy. Partially as a result of the fact that Sudan’s anti-corruption agenda being led by the Ministry of Justice, anti-corruption efforts to date have mostly focused on introducing certain legal and institutional reforms, with the attorney-general prioritizing investigations of corruption cases related to the former regime officials with those steps by and large, isolated, fragmented and generally ineffective. This undermines its independence and effectiveness despite legal guarantees stipulated by Sudanese laws and establishing and capacitating the newly proposed commission with adequate resources that would enhance its oversight and investigative capacity will be imperative.

**Guiding Documents**

Good governance and rule of law provisions are an area that is enshrined throughout the provisions in both the Constitutional Charter and the Juba Peace Agreement. Key elements of the Constitutional

11 Indeed, on the “Corruption Perception Index” for 2020 on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), Sudan scored 16 over 100 compared to a regional average of 32.90 and a global average of 43.16.
Charter that relate to good governance include provisions which highlights the need for the Anti-Corruption and Public Funds Recovery Commission; as well as the Civil Service Reform Commission in addition to the Transitional Legislative Council [Constitutional Charter chapter 12, part (5)]. Capacity building the respective Commissions (Gender; Nomad, Herders and Farmers as well as with Refugee and IDPs) will need to take place to help mainstream gender in legislation, budgets, and policy initiatives, and to ensure marginalized groups are able to engage and participate meaningfully in transition process and to buttress efforts of the Gender Equality Commission.

Programmatic Needs

It is of note that good governance and anti-corruption efforts are facilitated by the fact that Sudan already is a State Party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), signed 2005 and ratified in 2014, as well as the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating corruption, which it signed 2008 and ratified 2018, and the Arab Convention Against Corruption signed in 2010 and ratified in 2012. The main legal instruments are the law on illicit enrichment (1989), the access to information law (2015) and several articles of the penal code and the law governing the work of the Audit Bureau; however, even those laws suffer from major gaps, both in text and in implementation. This is in addition to the absence of other legislation, such as whistle-blower protection, conflict of interest management, non-conviction base forfeiture and other measures required by the UNCAC.12 This is not to mentioned that the implementation of existing legal frameworks is widely contested.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Good governance and Anti-Corruption**

**OUTCOME 1.3:** Governance institutions are set up based on the Constitutional Charter and discharging their mandate in line with international standards and norms.

**UN Partners:** UNITAMS, UNDP, UNESCO, UN WOMEN, UNFPA, UNICEF, OHCHR


**Related SDGs:** Goals 5 and 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**

Constitutional Charter: arts. 7 (8), 23 (2), 48, 56 (3), 58, 67 (c)

JPA: National Issues: 1.19, 1.23, 1.26, 1.28, 7.1, 7.4, 9.3; Darfur: Ch.1: 17, 19, 25.3, Ch.3: 10, Ch.5: 2.4, 2.7.6, 2.7.7, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 9.1.2, Ch.6: 8.11, Ch.7: 10.1.3, Ch. 8: 30.8.9; Two Areas: Ch.2: 8.11, 37.1, 57.4, 58.3, Ch.3: 9.9, 10.7, 50.6, 72.4, 84.2.2, 84.2.4, 87, 90, Ch.4: 15; Eastern: Ch. 1: 2-4, 34; Northern: Gen Principles: 9, Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 4


National Plan on the Protection of Civilians (NPPoC): 2, 3, 5

**Outputs:**

1. Transitional Legislative Council formed and functional
2. Full and meaningful participation of women ensured in the transition.
3. Civil society, youth, refugees, IDPs and members of marginalized groups engaged to participate meaningfully in the transition.

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12 It should be noted that Sudan was reviewed by the peers in 2016 in the framework of the UNCAC Review Mechanism, but the review report does not seem to have been completed yet. For more information, please visit the following link: [https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/country-profile/countryprofile.html?%2FCountryProfileDetails=%2Funodc%2Fcorruption%2Fcountry-profile%2Fprofiles%2Fsdn.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/country-profile/countryprofile.html?%2FCountryProfileDetails=%2Funodc%2Fcorruption%2Fcountry-profile%2Fprofiles%2Fsdn.html).
4. Government officials and Parliamentary representatives capacitated to mainstream gender and Human Rights in legislation, budgets, and policy initiatives
5. Anti-corruption legislation and policies drafted, and institutions with an anti-corruption mandate equipped and capacitated to fulfil their roles.
6. Accountability, responsiveness, and community engagement of the executive at national and sub-national levels strengthened.
7. Public officials' capacity in policy development and administrative management, including in public finance management and gender responsive budgeting at national and sub-national level increased.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Transitional Legislative Council established and functional, with functional committee structure in place.</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: TLC established and fully functional with committee structure in place. Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Degree of establishment and functioning of Civil Service Reform Commission established and functional.</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: Established and fully functional Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Degree of establishment of an impartial, professional and representative civil service.</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: Established and fully functional Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Degree of establishment and functioning of Anti-Corruption and Public Funds Recovery Commission</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: Established and fully functional Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. # civil servants receive training and, of the civil servants that are trained in policy development and administrative management – disaggregated by age and gender</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: Not established Data Source: Civil service commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. # of pieces of anti-corruption legislation and policies drafted and under implementation</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: 5 Data Source: Official gazette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. the legislative council and lawmaker’s awareness and capacity on international human rights instruments is enhanced.</td>
<td>Baseline: Not established (2020) Target: Enhanced Data Source: OHCHR Country programme 2020/2023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4 PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE: CIVIL SOCIETY, YOUTH INCLUSION AND MEDIA SUPPORT

A fundamental component of a robust democracy is that young people and civil society are able to meaningfully participate in and inform decision-making processes and engage in realizing the objectives of the Constitutional Charter and that the media fulfill its watchdog function. This section of the SPPSP focuses on the role of young people, civil society and that of the media.
Sudan has a young demographic structure, with about two thirds of the population below the age of 24 years. Young people – and young women in particular – were the backbone of the Sudanese revolution, and the establishment of the transitional government now provides opportunity to support and invest in young people as key agents for change in the integrated areas of peace and security, humanitarian action and sustainable development.

However, a combination of internal and external factors has, and continues to, influence and disrupt the growth and development of adolescents and youth in Sudan, prolonging the transition into adulthood in a stage of ‘waithood’. It has also shaped the interplay of young people’s exposure to diverse forms of violence, injustice, and exclusion. Even as the majority of the population are young people, there are few opportunities to take part and engage in political processes. Young women in Sudan face multiple forms of discrimination based on both their age and gender. While young Sudanese men grow out of age-based marginalization, patriarchal structures continue to limit young women’s participation. This is particularly the case in institutionalized platforms at all levels of governance and in peace processes – where young people are not yet treated as equal counterparts and their voices, aspirations and priorities are neither heard nor valued. The poor representation and exclusion in decision-making is maintained through a discriminating environment at all levels (e.g., policies, socio-cultural norms, stereotypes of young people etc.), that also excludes young people’s participation in civic, political and economic life. At the same time, youth activists are distancing themselves from established political parties, given that these are generally dominated by the elderly with visions often at odds with those of youth. Youth political participation therefore goes through informal channels instead of established political processes. These circumstances are at odds with the requirement of broad-based peacebuilding efforts and the principles of inclusive participatory democracy. Unleashing young people’s potential through participation can be a game-changer for Sudan – and a necessity for a sustainable transition and realizing demographic and peace dividends, including gender equality, in the long term.

The media have an important role to play in ensuring inclusive and participatory democracy – involvement of the broader public and the free exchange of ideas. At present, capacity for ensuring broad-based political participation through the media remains poor. In 2021, Sudan was ranked 159 in press freedom by Reporters Without Borders – a significant improvement over previous years. Internet penetration remains low at 28.6 percent with 7.1 percent of the population being Facebook users, while 7.76 percent use Twitter – a popular service among young people during protests. Although the National Intelligence and Security Services no longer conducts censorship and harassment outright – influence over newspapers and news coverage continue to be exercised by members of the former regime. Reporters Without Borders highlight that Cyber Jihadist Units continues to operate and to spread false information on social media seeking to undermine the transitional government. In 2019 hundreds of journalists protested against involvement of intelligence services in radio and tv broadcasting. Anecdotal reports from start-up companies suggest that, following the transition, forming new media outlets is subject to restrictions and is de-facto limited to the government, established political parties and existing companies. In addition, ‘women journalists occupy few media management positions and are often the targets of harassment and violence’. Supporting the media will be a critical task to ensure broad-based participation in political processes and realize the rights outlined in the Constitutional Charter – guaranteeing press freedom and Internet access and combatting misinformation.

Media also plays a critical role – through TV and Radio – to enable rural areas in all states of Sudan to follow and take part in political processes at national and local level.

The inclusion of youth and capacity of the media sector goes hand-in-hand with the capacity of civil society actors to engage in formal as well as informal political processes. The most quintessential actor remains the professional associations who led the uprising, the organization under the Forces of Freedom and Change umbrella – along-side of which a range of civil society actors, local as well as
national, would need support and capacity development to take part in formal political processes and which need to continue to be able to play an active role in civil society.

The inclusion of women in political processes is outlined in SPPSP section on Women, Peace and Security, and acknowledges the specific barriers to participation of young women in decision making. Elements of the broad-based political participation are also captured under the section on elections.

**Guiding Documents**

Youth inclusion is cross cutting-issue in both Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021) with a strong reference to the need to ensure that young people participate meaningfully in the peace process. The JPA recognizes the important role of youth in the revolution and their role in ‘the prevention and resolution of conflicts, in transitional justice processes and in peace-building, and the imperative of their equal participation and full engagement in all efforts for the maintenance of international peace and security, including justice and reconciliation’\(^{13}\). The JPA includes references to training and capacity building of youth and, in the section on East Sudan, there is a reference to ensuring that a certain percentage of youth is included in the authorities\(^{14}\). The JPA reflects Security Council 2250 (2015) on Youth Peace and Security, which states that youth are negatively affected by conflict and – although they are at risk of becoming actively involved in conflict – they can contribute towards preventing conflict and sustaining peace, and should be supported to this effect. The most recent Security Council Resolution on YPS, UNSCR 2535 (2020), specifically requests the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys to pay particular attention to the inclusion of young women.

The preamble of the Constitutional Charter “Recognizes the role of young people in leading the revolutionary movement) and in “Strengthening the role of young people of both sexes and expand their opportunities in all social, political and economic fields” (under Chapter 2, paragraph 7(8) although the age-aspect is not mainstreamed throughout the document.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Youth and Sports are currently in the process of developing a new National Youth Policy that will be ready 2022. This policy will be developed by diverse key stakeholders and disciplines in order to make sure that young people’s needs and priorities are well-reflected to build upon strategic interventions by the government and stakeholders. It is of note that the Juba Peace Agreement recognizes young people as important stakeholders to engage with and supporting their meaningful participation in the peace processes and implementation of JPA, and that the Three-Year Program for Stability and Economic Development stresses the importance of including youth.

The Secretary General’s Call to Action for Human Rights (2020) also contains priorities guiding inclusion and on ensuring robust civic space for everybody; and ensuring a safe digital world for public participation.

**Institutional Entry Points**

Within the Transitional Government the issue of youth inclusion will need to be mainstreamed, although a particular focus will need to be on working with the Ministry of Youth and Sports and with each of the central level and state level governments in order to raise awareness about the need for inclusive and participatory governance. Within the UN, efforts to comply with Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015) are centered on a UN Joint Task Force on Young people. With a view to ensuring meaningful civic and political participation and leadership as drivers for change, efforts are currently ongoing to localize a Youth4Peace agenda and potentially create a Youth, Peace and Security coalition. In so

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\(^{13}\) JPA Darfur CH3:10
\(^{14}\) JPA Eastern CH1:4
doing the UN works with a variety of NGOs including, but not limited to, the Sudanese Population Network (SPN).

Reforming the media landscape in Sudan is critical for widening civic space in consultation with civil society, particularly media practitioners. A key entry point on which to capitalize by UNCT and civil society is the establishment of the Advisory Committee for Media Reform on 10 December 2020. The Committee is mandated to provide recommendations for reforming the country’s legal, policy and institutional media framework to comply with relevant international human rights standards.

**Ongoing UN programming**

Within the United Nations, the UN Joint Task Force on Young People conducted a mapping of UN agencies’ activities related to the priority areas in Youth2030 in 2021. Regarding the four pillars in SPPSP, a diverse set of activities are taking place working with and for young people in Sudan for systematic and their meaningful civic and political participation and leadership as vital key drivers and agents. Activities include capacity building for young people to acquire education, skills and tools (UNFPA, UNDP, IOM, UNHCR); community mobilization and awareness-raising (UNWomen, UNHCR, IOM, WHO, UNFPA); conducting forums to promote engagement and participation (UNFPA, UNICEF); establishing safe platforms and committees e.g. formally recognized platform through Youth parliament (UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR); strengthening collaborations e.g. youth networks (UNHCR, UNEP, UNFPA); and supporting youth-led initiatives (UNFPA, UNHCR). There are also cross-cutting activities such as youth’s engagement in peace processes and stabilization activities (UNDP) e.g., to reach unserved areas (WFP), and conducting conflict-sensitive community based participatory planning e.g., natural resource management processes (WFP). As well as youth engagement in local government and political and electoral participation (UNDP). OHCHR Country Office’s works on the civic space to enable youth, and marginalized groups to participate in public sphere. Activities include building the capacity of youth artists including women on the protection of artistic and cultural expression as well as on the right to participate in public affairs.

**Programmatic Needs**

Within the UN in Sudan, efforts are continuing to ensure that subgroups within youth are disaggregated – reflecting the diverse needs and priorities of all youth as a heterogenous group. Emphasis will be needed on ensuring the participation and inclusion of civil society and youth in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. Efforts to continue to localize Youth4Peace agenda including UN Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) in combination with YPS Programmatic Handbook. Responding to the YPS Handbook, the Youth Working Group makes sure to update strategies/policies accordingly and potentially create a YPS coalition (see other countries e.g., Jordan and Iraq). This entails a strengthened national capacity in generating data and socio-demographic analysis on young people and their needs and priorities for evidence-based policies and programming. Establishment of Youth Advisory Panel with youth (diverse demographic and socio-economic characteristics). Follow the motto working WITH and FOR young people and include them whenever it is possible. This principle applies in particular to ensure the inclusion of non-elite young people and to empowering young women – who are often marginalized in multiple ways, for instance by being part of rural populations, or living in hard-to-reach areas.

An investment is needed in young people’s capacities, knowledge, and leadership to become drivers and key actors in promoting peace and a culture of tolerance, dialogue and gender equality. There is also the need to create a joint vision on the way forward and focusing on acquiring experiences, tools, and skills to engage in formal platforms, especially within politics which needs to take place simultaneously while addressing the limiting environment and the informal and formal barriers (policies, age discrimination, negative notions of young people etc.) that continues to exclude youth’s
meaningful engagement and participation. Specific investments are needed to empower young women and to promote their participation.

Advocacy efforts are needed and strengthening the capacities of government, civil society and communities in order to work to change the environment and political culture within political parties by creating seats for young people in different processes e.g., more space within parties or establish ‘youth-wings’ connected to established parties. All of the above will entail enhancing the already existing interlinkages between actors and disciplines e.g., Peacebuilding, socially constructed notion of masculinity – often toxic in nature – and its impact on young men, violence against women and girls and making the investments in youth experts.

In addition to work conducted with young people, the UN in Sudan is working to establish a joint programme on widening civic space - combining activities related to legal-reforms; capacity development government to engage with CSOs; and develop capacity of CSOs to engage in political processes.

On the issue of media and freedom of information – pertinent work is led by UNESCO and focuses on reforming legislation; implementing the UN Action Plan for Safety of Journalists; training of security officers on freedom of expression; and training for journalists on elections. This line of work is informed by the Media Reform Roadmap developed in 2020 – in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture and Information and Media / Journalist Community. Work on media is also being led by OHCHR in building capacity of journalists on monitoring violations against media practitioners and press freedom such as training on the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred. Another key need is responding to protection needs of media practitioners and civil society in connection to their work. OHCHR continues to encourage civil society more broadly to engage with international human rights mechanisms to support their human rights advocacy.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Inclusive Participation (Youth, Civil Society, Media)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME 1.4: Young people and civil society make meaningful contributions to decision-making processes and engage in realizing the objectives of the Constitutional Charter.¹⁵</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Partners:</strong> UNITAMS, UNDP, UNESCO, UN WOMEN, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partners (TGoS and other):</strong> Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Digital Transformation Agency, Transitional Legislative Council (once established), the Constitutional Commissions including the Women and Gender Equality Commission; Ministry of Culture and Information; media outlets and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related SDGs:</strong> Goals 5 and 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
| Constitutional Charter: arts. 7 (8), 23 (2), 48, 56 (3), 58, 67 (c) |
| JPA: National Issues: 1.19, 1.23, 1.26, 1.28, 7.1, 7.4, 9.3; Darfur: Ch.1: 17, 19, 25.3, Ch.3: 10, Ch.5: 2.4, 2.7.6, 2.7.7, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 9.1.2, Ch.6: 8.11, Ch.7: 10.1.3, Ch. 8: 30.8.9; Two Areas: Ch.2: 8.11, 37.1, 57.4, 58.3, Ch.3: 9.9, 10.7, 50.6, 72.4, 84.2.2, 84.2.4, 87, 90, Ch.4: 15; Eastern: Ch. 1: 2-4, 34; Northern: Gen Principles: 9, Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 4 |
| National Plan on the Protection of Civilians (NPPoC): 2, 3, 5 |
| **Outputs:**
| 1) Civil society, refugees and IDPs, persons with disabilities and members of marginalized groups engaged to participate meaningfully in the transition process. |

¹⁵ Adapted from two UNITAMS benchmarks under Strategic Priority 1.
2) Journalists and media standards that support accurate report, combat misinformation, and encourage free flow of information adopted and disseminated.
3) Media Laws are updated to reflect the ambitions of the Constitutional Charter and compliant with Sudan’s international human rights obligations.
4) Civic space for civil society organization supported – through legal reforms and technical assistance to CSOs.
5) Safety of Journalists in Sudan strengthened in accordance with UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity.
6) Meaningful participation of youth in transition processes supported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. % of young men and young women’s participation in decision making positions in all bodies and localities, and in legislative council and state governments,17</td>
<td>Baseline: 0 (bodies yet to be established (2020) Target: 40% (2024) Data Source: TGoS reports, UNITAMS and UN Women reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. % of young men and young women as participants in transition negotiations,18</td>
<td>Baseline: 0 (bodies yet to be established (2020) Target: 40% (2024) Data Source: TGoS reports, UNITAMS and UN Women reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Press freedom ranking of Sudan improved</td>
<td>Baseline: 157 Target: TBD Data Source: Reporters Without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Civic space enhanced</td>
<td>Baseline: Not available Target: TBD Data Source: UNCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Young people have received training on good governance, citizenship, roles and functions of democratic processes, tolerance, dialogue, peacebuilding, conflict resolution and prevention, leadership skills</td>
<td>Baseline: Not Available Target: TBD Data Source: UNCT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5 HUMAN RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Despite constitutional safeguards, during the previous regime human rights were systematically violated. Violations were particularly rampant in areas of conflict and in areas where cases of arbitrary and unlawful killings, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence were commonplace and where perpetrators enjoyed full immunity. During that period, the Sudan National Human Rights Commission was established by presidential decree although it had a legal basis in the National Interim Constitution of 2005 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, the lack of political will to empower the institution + despite the support previously extended in the form of institution building - has meant that the Human Rights Commission’s ability to investigate human rights complaints and exercise its proper mandate has been limited. The transition opened the possibility of an empowered Human Rights Commission (required in the Constitutional Charter) that is independent and has a broad and strong mandate to promote and protect human rights. This will require significant

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16 Indicators on media, youth and civil society to be developed.
17 Adapted from NAP 1325 p. 23. Note that no M&E framework has yet been established for NAP 1325.
18 Adapted from NAP 1325 p. 23
additional resources from the international community, not least as the Commission board members have been dismantled and replaced by new appointees.

One other important aspect to move forward on relates more specifically to women’s rights. Since the revolution, the Public Order law has been abolished. Female genital mutilation has been criminalized at the federal level and the requirement that a mother require the permission of a father in order to travel was forgone. However, the implementation of a vision for reforming the laws that govern the public and private sphere of women remains pending and more needed to be done to fully ratify CEDAW.

Work undertaken in this area will cut across the pillars of the mandate, and the SPPSP results frameworks, and will include but not be limited to the results framework for governance and human rights institutions. Efforts to mainstream human rights mean it will also need to include elements related to legal and judicial reforms.

Guiding Documents

The Constitutional Charter stipulates that any war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of extrajudicial killing committed since June 1989 do not have a statute of limitations. It promotes an array of human rights principles – for example, under the declaration, no one may be arrested, detained, or deprived of freedom without legal procedures defined by law and all forms of torture and inhumane treatment are banned – accused persons are guaranteed the right to a fair trial and to legal representation before the courts. Slavery and human trafficking are prohibited, and the state must guarantee the protection of women’s rights and gender equality. The Constitutional Charter of 2019 asserts in several articles the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of gender, even though it does not clearly distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination.

Meanwhile Sudan has signed and ratified some important regional and international human rights conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), although implementation has been inconsistent and laws still exist that contravene international legal obligations, in particular that relate to gender equality and the rights of women. Also, the ratification of key conventions is still outstanding, including the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Sudan has signed, but has not ratified, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women (Maputo Protocol). Legislation to enable Sudan to accede to CEDAW and other international conventions remains pending.

Ongoing UN Programming

In September 2018, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted 39/22 requesting OHCHR and the Government of Sudan to agree on the modalities and mandate for the establishment of a country office. By September 2019 a Host Country Agreement, and resolution 42/35, were signed paving the way for a fully mandated OHCHR office in Sudan, with sub-offices in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and East Sudan. With the establishment of the OHCHR office, the UN Sudan has enhanced tools to promote human rights. Moving forward, progress toward the roadmap based on legislative milestones and political benchmarks of the transition process will need to be tracked in such a way that it encompasses the following elements:

First, advancing sustainable development through human rights, to ‘leave no one behind’ and to address the root causes of inequality, the following interventions are proposed: (i) Support to integrate human rights into national efforts to implement the SDGs and other development and poverty eradication efforts to promote economic and social rights (ii) Support to develop laws, policies and practices that combat discrimination effectively in all of its forms, including through the creation of a functional, representative and impartial civil service; (iii) Enhance the capacity of human rights
institutions to develop medium and long-term policies to address inequalities and (iv) Protect the economic and social rights of people affected by decision, particularly victims and those who face discrimination to ensure that they are considered fairly in development strategies and poverty eradication efforts.

The goal of such work is to assist efforts to bring Sudan’s domestic legislation in full conformity with Sudan’s international human rights obligations. This would also entail the development of a strong institutional capacity to deliver on the protection of human rights such as ensuring that the National Human Rights Commission becomes fully compliant with the Paris Principles and developing its effectiveness and independence. It will entail the provision of technical expertise to ensure that the legal and institutional frameworks mandated and regulating the National Human Rights Commission are developed in accordance with international standards. Work would be needed to ensure the implementation of the Universal Periodic Review recommendations to prevent human rights violations and protect human rights. It will entail justice systems investigating and prosecuting gender related crimes more effectively and decision making, policies and actions becoming more transparent. Work on transitional justice is further documented in that section of the SPPSP.

Institutional Entry Points

The role of the National Human Rights Commission, like the Transitional Justice Commission and the already established Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in Darfur, will be critical for protecting human rights in Sudan, including in relation to addressing allocations of atrocities committed by the security forces and other duty bearers. The Commissions role in receiving and investigating complaints of human rights abuses will need to be supported extensively and commission members will need extensive capacity building and technical support in order to work effectively, investigate and advocate for human rights, including with regard to treaty body and Universal Periodic Review reporting.

Programmatic Needs

Work on the peace and security pillar aims to prevent violations and strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights, interventions supported by the UN and its partners would need to: Integrate human rights information and analysis into early warning and analysis systems to inform national decision making, strategies and operations to prevent, mitigate or respond to emerging crises. To integrate human rights prevention into strategies to prevent and respond to conflict. Enhancing participation and protecting civic space will be a final area of focus in a series of initiatives related to participation. This will entail supporting civil society movements and actors (including youth movements, women, and professional associations) as well as building their capacity to advance the human rights agenda. By implementing work in this area there would be the development of stronger laws, policies, and practices to protect civic space and to make the environment for civil society increasingly safe and enabling complementing work underway to enhance inclusive and participatory governance and outlined in that section of the SPPSP.

A final area of work from the human rights perspective will need to be advance the human rights of women. To move forward on this, the Constitutional Charter creates a Women and Gender Commission tasked to monitor progress made by the transitional government to promote GEWE. Work will be needed to analyze gaps in the protection of women’s right and to engender laws. Work will also be needed on advocacy and sensitization of women’s rights and to support the establishment of the Gender Commission. Work will also be needed to support gendered institutional development across all ministries and the National Bureau of statistics.

Delivering on the commitment of an empowered Human Rights Commission resourced to investigate human rights violations, hold state actors accountable and steer the human rights agenda in the
country will require significant additional resources from the international community. Each of the commissions created by the Constitutional Charter and the Juba Peace Agreement will need to be supported extensively and commission members will need extensive capacity building and technical support in order to work effectively, investigate and advocate for human rights, including with regard to treaty body and Universal Periodic Review reporting. Other areas of focus will need to be institution building rolling out of the OHCHR presence and ramping up with to protect civic space and stepping up the work of other UN agencies funds and programmes to deliver on human rights commitments.

In January 2021, the TGoS established its National Mechanism for Reporting and Follow-up (NMRF), a standing mechanism composed of 18 members including relevant ministries and governmental bodies, the judiciary, the Public Prosecution and the legislative power. The mechanism aimed to pursue a more coherent and coordinated engagement of Sudan with international and regional human rights mechanisms and follow up on their outcomes in consultation with Civil Society and the National Human Rights Institution (NHRI). Such emerging mechanisms can play a critical role in reinforcing a State’s human rights protection system and to strengthen national human rights-based governance. Throughout 2020 and 2021, OHCHR-Sudan has extended its support to the TGoS to create and build the capacity of the NMRF particularly in relation to engaging with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). OHCHR, along with the UNCT, will continue providing technical assistance to the NMRF to develop it into a functioning body in line with International Standards, especially in building its reporting capacity and its ability to use human rights indicators to track the implementation of recommendations from regional and international human rights mechanisms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Institutional reforms and Human Rights</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OUTCOME 1.5:</strong> Human rights institutions are set up based on the Constitutional Charter and discharging their mandate in line with international standards and norms.20</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UN Partners:</strong> UNDP, UNODC, OHCHR, UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TGoS Partners:</strong> Ministry of Justice, Supreme Judicial Council; Constitutional Drafting and the Constitutional Conference Commission, Legal Reform Commission, Human Rights Commission, Land Commission, Transitional Justice Commission, Women and Gender Equality Commission, Transitional Legislative Council</td>
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<td><strong>Related SDGs:</strong> Goal 16</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key relevant provisions of national documents:</strong> Constitutional Charter: Chs. 12 and 14; Arts. 3 (2), 5 (3), 7 (5), (12) and 15, 15 (6), 38 (5), 67, 70 (3) JPA: National Issues: 1.14, 1.15, 1.22, 1.31; Darfur: Ch. 1: 12, 13, 33.1.4, Ch. 3: 1, 5, 8, 9, 15, 22.1, Ch. 4: 1, 3, 4, Ch. 5: 2.2, 2.5, 4.1.11, 8.6.8, Ch. 8: 18.10, 29.5.7; Two Areas: Ch: 2: 8.8, 8.13, 8.14, 10.9, Ch. 3: 65.2, 86.2, 88, Ch. 4: 30.10; Eastern: Ch.1: 5, 7; Northern: Gen Principles: 7, Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 7; Tamazuj: 20.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs:</strong> 1) Sudan follows up on Universal Periodic Review recommendations and the human rights dimensions of peacebuilding is considered as appropriate by the Human Rights Council 2) Independent new commissions under the Constitutional Charter established equipped and capacitated 3) Capacity of the National Mechanisms to Report and Follow-up on UN Human Rights Mechanisms (NMRF) and civil society to engage with UN human rights mechanisms and to follow up on their recommendations increase. 4) Capacity of key stakeholders including the Human Rights Commission, Ministry of Justice, Security Forces and Corrections Service to comply with human rights standards and gender equality enhanced</td>
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</table>

19 Decision of the Chief of the Government n°25 dated 20 January 2020
20 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark under Strategy Priority 3.
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<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
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</table>
Target: Established and fully functional  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| b. Extent to which the National Human Rights Commission has been established and works in conformity with Paris Principles. | Baseline: The current NHRC is weak in terms of effectiveness.  
Target: Meets Paris Principles standards as a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI)  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| c. Degree of establishment and functioning of the Legal Reform Commission. | Baseline: Not established (2020)  
Target: Established and fully functional  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| d. # of CSOs coming into civic space and exercising their mandate | Baseline: TBD  
Target: Expanded operations and activities of CSOs  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| e. Degree of establishment of Specialized Centre on IHL and IHRL | Baseline: TBD (2020)  
Target: Established and fully functional  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| f. % reduction of cases of human rights violations and abuses including women and child rights | Baseline: TBD (2020)  
Target:  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| g. # of human rights investigations and reports published/issued on compliance of IHL and IHRL | Baseline: TBD (2020)  
Target:  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| h. # of other products on human rights violations and abuses, human development, and situations such as code cables etc. | Baseline: Not established (2020)  
Target:  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |

21 Note indicators for the Constitutional Drafting and the Constitutional Conference Commission is placed under Outcome 1.1, the Women Gender Equality Commission under Outcome 3.2, the Refugees and IDP Commission under Outcome 3.14, the Land Commission under Outcome 3.12, Transitional Justice Commission under Outcome 1.5, and Legal Reform Commission Under Outcome 1.6.

22 The TLC does not have a UNITAMS benchmark indicator, but this proposed indicator uses similar language to that used for other UNITAMS benchmark indicators on commissions.

23 Similar to other UNITAMS benchmark indicators on commissions.

24 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
1.6 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Years of conflict, violence, and oppression have shaped Sudan’s history leading to deep divisions along, and across, communities without a common understanding of the past. Large-scale and recurring atrocities against civilians included systematic conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and violence which took the lives of 300,000 persons and caused the displacement of 2.5 million people. Crimes and gross violations of human rights remained mostly unpunished, victims were left without fora for reconciliation or remedy in which to seek reparations. This led society, and in particular victims’ groups, female activists, and youth to call for justice and ending impunity. Expressions of this demand were witnessed in the positive welcome received by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) in Darfur by victims during her last visit. Demonstrations in the capital requesting justice for crimes by the former regime, war crimes, and violence against protesters is another form of expression.

Despite the Constitutional Charter and the Juba Peace Agreement defining transitional justice as a priority for the TGoS, and a precondition for peace, political stability and democratic transformation, victims are still waiting for clarity on Sudan’s approach to transitional justice. However, the overlap of a post-conflict setting and a post authoritarian setting, both of which require different approaches, and require simultaneously re-establishing the rule of law, make the development of such a policy more complex. The limited success of the various investigative committees established by the Attorney-General to prosecute the leaders of the former regime, and others State, and Non-State, actors involved in past human rights violations and abuses since 1989, underlines the importance of reforming Sudan’s weak justice sector in order to ensure a successful transitional justice process. Investigations often lack the basics such as human, logistical, and financial resources, technical and legal expertise and experience limited cooperation from other relevant state actors and public bodies, including in the provision of evidence. While the weak justice system is comprehensively reformed, traditional, and customary mechanisms may be included in the transitional justice processes, in so far as they are compliant with international standards and norms.

Transitional justice processes and mechanisms are a key component of the United Nations framework for strengthening the rule of law. Applied to Sudan, this mandates that a transparent, credible, and participatory transitional justice response must include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to facilitate accountability, the right to truth, reparations, institutional reform, and national reconciliation in conformity with international standards. Sudan’s Transitional Justice Commission should develop a holistic and comprehensive victim-centered strategy for transitional justice that ensures accountability, reconciliation, and the meaningful participation of victims in any process that addresses abuses of economic social, and cultural rights (ESCR), inequalities, and discrimination. If the transitional justice process is not inclusive it risks eroding social cohesion and exacerbating conflict drivers.

A conflict- and gender-sensitive and rights-based approach to transitional justice aimed at consolidating and sustaining peace will need to restore trust and reconcile Sudanese communities. The process should be based on the understanding that public awareness and a knowledge about past crimes, free debate about the past, a human-rights based approach to reparations for all victims, and an end to the culture of impunity, are all preconditions for any meaningful reconciliation process and necessary for the consolidation of the rule of law, peace, security, and social and economic development. Effective transitional justice programmes utilize coherent and comprehensive approaches that integrate the full range of judicial and non-judicial processes and measures, including truth-seeking, prosecution initiatives, reparations programmes, institutional reform including vetting processes, or an appropriately conceived combination thereof.
Guiding Documents

The Constitutional Charter, the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC), and the JPA all set parameters for accountability of crimes committed in Sudan since 1989. They call for the establishment of institutions to implement the transitional agenda with a focus on human rights. Security Council resolution 2579 (2021) mandates UNITAMS to support Sudan in the implementation of these documents.

The Constitutional Charter provides that justice, equality, the rule of law, accountability, and restitution are core principles of the State and bars amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killings, and violations of human rights and of international and humanitarian law committed since 30 June 1989. According to the Constitutional Charter, priorities of the transition include the protection and promotion of human rights, the restoration of the rule of law, as well as legal reforms. It envisages the creation of a Transitional Justice Commission. The Constitutional Charter also highlights the importance of peace negotiations with the aim of “achieving a just and comprehensive peace, ending the war by addressing the roots of the Sudanese problem, treating its effects (…)”. As part of the issues outlined in the protocol on a Comprehensive Peace, the Constitutional Charter envisages “start[ing] to implement transitional justice and accountability measures for crimes against humanity and war crimes, and present[ing] the accused to national and international courts, in the application of the no-impunity principle”. It also stipulates that the essential issues for peace negotiations should include transitional justice, reconciliation, and restitution of victims.

The JPA Protocol on National Issues calls for a holistic National Transitional Justice Process. For Darfur, the JPA Protocol on Justice and Accountability in Darfur stipulates that ‘Justice and accountability, reconciliation and transitional justice’ are ‘requirements to ensure sustainable peace and security. The protocol provides for the establishment of a special criminal court for Darfur crimes and Truth-seeking and reconciliations mechanisms [Darfur Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission]. The Protocol also creates a comprehensive regime for the consideration of land ownership and hawakeer (lands traditionally used by a particular tribal group), with a strong emphasis on issues affecting internally displaced persons and refugees in Darfur. It also provides for cooperation with the ICC including the transfer of the accused to the Court.


While an agreement on a comprehensive transitional justice process in Sudan remains pending, the JPA establishes a specific transitional justice process and mechanisms for Darfur as a component of the Peace settlement. To ensure coherence and the unity of the transitional justice process in Sudan, the JPA Protocol on National Issues recalls the Constitutional Charter’s commitment to set up the Transitional Justice Commission, which is meant to develop a comprehensive transitional justice process for all Sudan including in conflict areas. On 24 April 2021, the Joint Council adopted the Transitional Justice Commission (TJC) Act. However, the Act is yet to be signed and published in the Official Gazette.

In addition, the relationship between the Doha peace agreement’s provisions on transitional justice institutions and those of the JPA needs to be clarified. The former needs to either be revised in line with the JPA or dissolved and re-established.
Institutional Entry Points

The independent TJC is expected to bring together civil society, victims’ groups, women, youth, experts, and other stakeholders in consultations to define the transitional justice approaches for the country and prepare a comprehensive victims-centered transitional justice law. As envisaged by the Constitutional Charters and the TJC bill, the TJC has the following competencies: (1) lead the consultations on the transitional justice approach for the country; (2) map human rights violations; (3) draft the Transitional Justice Law outlining the requisite transitional justice mechanisms; and (4) supervise and coordinate transitional justice mechanisms. According to the TJC Act, national consultations on transitional justice shall include five pillars (Accountability, Truth, Reparation, reconciliation, and guarantee of non-recurrences (institutional reform). In addition, it would include victims, affected communities, and traditionally excluded groups namely victims of GBV violations.

The Special Court for Darfur as envisaged in the JPA and other transitional justice mechanisms for Darfur as provided in JPA protocols, including those related to land issues, and security institutions.

The Committee for Dismantling of June 30, 1989, Regime and Recovering of Public Funds and sub-committees: The committee is expected to work during the entire transitional period and vet the public service sector, the justice sector, and public independent institutions among others, investigating and prosecuting corruption offenses that occurred under the former regime. The committee’s mandate contributes to address popular demands for righting social and economic wrongs and ensure include social and economic justice within the scope of the transitional justice process.

Other entry-points include the Ministry of Justice, notably the Department of Legislation – drafting legal instruments related to the transitional justice process; the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office along with customary laws and mechanisms to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts are key actors.

Civil society - including victims’ organizations, non-governmental organizations, youth (notably youth cyber activists), and women groups, but also religious and community leaders, Trade Unions, and social movements (Resistance Committees) - are a determining factor in the fight against impunity, including in the struggle for recognition and in campaigns for non-recurrence. Legal aid providers among civil society are particularly important in Sudan, because of the reliance of the prosecution on them in complementing their work.

Ongoing UN Programmes

As OHCHR is scaling up its presence in Sudan, including integrating with UNITAMS as Human Rights Joint Office, it offered technical expertise on lessons learnt and on applicable international standards and practices in transitional justice. OHCHR provides expert advice on matters relating to all aspects of transitional justice including, truth-seeking, accountability and reparations with an aim to support accountability, reconciliation, and genuine participation of victims and civil society in these processes.

In 2020, jointly with UNDP, OHCHR has provided technical advice to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) on the draft law establishing the Transitional Justice Commission (TJC). OHCHR and UNDP also played a key role in supporting the meaningful participation of civil society in the drafting process through the facilitation of public consultations. OHCHR and UNDP will continue to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice to develop a transitional Justice legal framework that reflects victims’ expectations. UNDP’s support aims at giving a voice to victims by making consultation processes as inclusive as possible. UNDP also provides expert advice to the various drafting processes by bringing best practices from other countries, while also taking into consideration the difficult political and economic context in which the transitional justice process is being established. Through the UNDP Rule of Law Programme, UNDP, in collaboration with the OHCHR and international NGOs experts in
Transitional Justice will also support the National Commission and provide capacity building and technical support to it once it becomes operational.

In Darfur, UNWomen and UNDP are working to address reconciliation at multiple levels, with an emphasis on vulnerable groups (women, children and minorities amongst others). To ensure that all groups participate effectively in these processes, by establishing Peace, Justice and Reconciliation Centers (PJRC), especially in areas of return and conflict areas to enable traditional leaders to effectively conduct dispute settlement processes, reconciliation, psycho-social support, and paralegal organizations to provide legal counselling and awareness raising on rights.

Programmatic Needs

The legislative and institutional framework for transitional justice still needs to be built. Legal uncertainties on amnesties must be clarified in line with the international standards and norms, including the Geneva Conventions. Current transitional justice institutions in Darfur have not produced results. While one accused in the ICC Sudan case has been transferred and will be tried soon, the political will to transfer remaining suspects still needs to be demonstrated.

Training needs persist for civil society organizations (CSOs). These still need to strengthen their capacities and competencies on transitional justice principles and to facilitate dialogue with State institutions, including the TJC – and any other process leading up to the delineation of mandates and responsibilities. Radio broadcasts are needed involving CSOs to sensitize the audience to the range of transitional justice mechanisms available and to discuss their possible application to the Sudanese context by giving space to victims to express their needs to shape emerging thinking on transitional justice. Finally, there may need to be a public perception study to understand transitional justice perceptions and the needs of the public in Sudan, with a special emphasis on women, children, and vulnerable groups.

The UN in Sudan will work on assisting the Sudanese society, the Government agencies, and other relevant actors to design and engage in a victim-centered transitional justice response that will enhance peace, enable reconciliation and the non-recurrence of violations. To this aim, support will need to be provided to enhance the mandate of the new Transitional Justice Commission by extending technical support to Mapping Human Rights violations, conducting Public Consultations, providing expertise in the drafting process of the TJ Law and future legislation as well as its mandate to accompany the establishment of TJ mechanisms including in Darfur and the Two Areas. OHCHR will strive to ensure that the TJC fully integrates gender and ESCR in all its work and outcomes. OHCHR and UNDP will provide technical support to enhance the capacity of existent judicial and non-judicial mechanisms that are dealing with justice and are a remedy for past human rights violations as well as other expected mechanisms to ensure they are delivering in accordance with international standards. Intensive and continuous efforts will need to be dedicated to building civil society and victim groups’ capacity to participate meaningfully and monitor the transitional justice process particularly amongst groups that are traditionally marginalized, as well as with SGBV, and CRSV, victims. OHCHR and UNDP will engage with the local community leaders and other stakeholders to reach out to victims at grassroots levels to enhance their voice and meaningful participation to the transitional justice consultations.

Ahead of the formation of the Transitional Justice Commission, capacity building for civil society organizations will continue to be organized with the aim of strengthening their capacities and competencies on transitional justice principles and facilitate the dialogue with national and State-level institutions, including the Commission. The ongoing programme will support the Commission, if asked, to organize a broad-based consultation on transitional justice. Based on an initial needs assessment conducted with the Commission’s members and staff, in coordination with OHCHR and international NGOs experts in Transitional Justice, a series of training programmes will be provided on measures of holding national consultations, designing the Commission strategic plan and its Workplan
as well as its operational structure – with a special focus on how to integrate gender issues throughout the implementation of its mandate.

### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Transitional Justice

| OUTCOME 1.6: | Survivor-centred and gender-responsive accountability and transitional justice mechanisms are established and discharge their mandate in line with the Constitutional Charter, the JPA and international norms and standards.  

**UN Partners:** UNITAMS, OHCHR, UNDP, UNWOMEN, UNICEF, UNCHR, ICC...  

**TGoS Partners** Transitional Justice Commission, Ministry of Justice, the Dismantling Committee, the Darfur transitional justice mechanisms*, the Attorney General Offices, the Judiciary, rural and customary Courts, National Peace Commission*, Legal Reform Commission*, National Human Rights Commission*, Justice sector reform commission*, Women and Gender Equality Commission*; land commission*, Transitional Legislative Council*, and Civil society Partners: national and international CSOs as key partners in all phases of the transitional justice process.

| Related SDGs: | Goals 16 and 10.  

| Key relevant provisions of national documents: |  

Constitutional Charter: Arts. 38 (5), 68 (7), 69 (12)  
JPA: Protocol on National Issues: 1.22, 19; Darfur Protocol : Ch.3: 2, 7, 10,20.1 22.4.5, 23, 24.1, 25.1; Track 2 (Blue Nile and SK): Ch. 1: 18.10, Ch.2: 8.6, 8.8, Ch. 3: 9.6, 10.8, 85; Eastern Track: para 6, 9,60,64.  
Dismantling committee’s Act.  
Penal Code: Art 38(1)  
NPPoC: 1A, 7

| Outputs |  

1) Transitional Justice Process is set up and its implementation has started.  
2) Civil society has enhanced capacity and effectively contributes to and monitors the transitional justice process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
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</table>
| Proposed a. Transitional Justice Commission is established in line with international standards and norms and operational. | Baseline: Legislation adopted but not enacted; institution not established (2020)  
Target: Established and fully functional  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| b. Number of sexual and Gender based violence and ESC rights abuses processed. | Baseline: Medium Gender and ESCR integration to transitional justice process is limited.  
Target: Gender and ESCRs are fully integrated into transitional justice process. |
| c. Level of engagement and quality of contribution of the civil society to the transitional justice process. | Baseline: Very low level (civil society and victims organizations capacity to contribute and monitor the transitional justice process is very limited in terms of HR knowledge and networking, monitoring and advocacy capacities) |

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25 UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 6.  
26 Some key governmental partners are yet to be established. To distinguish they are marked with (*)  
27 Adapted from JPA National Issues: 19.1. The Transitional Justice Commission does not have a UNITAMS benchmark indicator, but this proposed indicator uses similar language to that used for other UNITAMS benchmark indicators on commissions.
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<td><strong>Target:</strong> High level (Civil society and victims’ organizations actively engage and contribute to the transitional justice process.)</td>
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</table>
| **d. Extent to which Survivors of sexual and gender-based violence meaningfully participated in transitional justice process in a safe manner.** | **Baseline:** very low level  
**Target:** high level of participation. Survivors of sexual and gender-based violence engage and contribute to the transitional justice process. |
| **e. Degree of establishment of the Court for Darfur Crimes**                                              | **Baseline:** Not established (2020)  
**Target:** Established and fully functional  
**Data Source:** Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments. |
| **F. Degree of establishment and functioning of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in Darfur** | **Baseline:** Existing Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission  
**Target:** Established and fully functional  
**Data Source:** Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments. |
| **g. # and % of women in the TJ Commission.**                                                             | **Baseline:** N/A  
**Target:** 40 %  
**Source:** UNITAMS |
PILLAR II: SUPPORT TO PEACE PROCESSES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

BACKGROUND

On 3 October 2020, Sudan’s Transitional Government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a broad alliance of armed and other movements, and Minni Minawi’s Sudan Liberation Movement signed the Juba Peace Agreement, an important step towards achieving the just and comprehensive peace which the Constitutional Charter highlights as the top priority of the transitional period.

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) is based on the vision of a New Sudan, respect for the diversity of the Sudanese people and the principle of equal citizenship without discrimination. There is a focus on the concerns of historically marginalized populations in Sudan’s conflict zones and disadvantaged areas. A complex and ambitious political framework document, it is wide-ranging in scope and consists of five geographical tracks (Darfur, the Two Areas, East Sudan, the North, and the Centre) and a national issues track. It addresses the root causes of Sudan’s crises such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice. It provides for significant devolution of power and resources to the regions, including autonomy for the Two Areas, restoration of a single Darfur region and a National Governance Conference to define the powers of the regional system of governance across the country.

It also seeks to address the consequences of conflict, through humanitarian aid, the safe, voluntary, and dignified return and resettlement of IDPs and refugees in their places of origin or other preferred location, the eviction of illegal settlers, transitional justice and the development and reconstruction of the conflict-affected areas. The JPA provides for other transitional justice mechanisms, including a Special Darfur Court, truth and reconciliation mechanisms and use of traditional justice mechanisms. On transitional justice, the government has pledged to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court and ensure that those subject to arrest warrants “appear before” the Court. Those involved in the 1989 military coup are being tried in a national court in Sudan; however proceedings are moving slowly, and several judges have resigned or have been dismissed. There has been no progress so far on cases of genocide or war crimes.

The JPA provides for the establishment of a single, national professional army, that is non-politicized and reflective of the diversity of Sudan, and with a new military doctrine based on the Constitution. There are also detailed transitional security arrangements, including the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and ceasefire monitoring mechanism, integration of individual members of armed groups into the national security forces, DDR and the creation of a Joint Security-Keeping Force between government security forces and the armed movements to help protect civilians in Darfur.

As with other aspects of the transition process, the expectations surrounding peace dividends are high but implementation of the JPA has been moving very slowly. As with many of the institutions provided for in the Constitutional Charter (Transitional Legislative Assembly and 11 independent Commissions), most of the institutions and mechanisms required to implement the JPA have yet to be established.
While representing a milestone in the Transitional Government’s commitment to ending decades of civil strife, the JPA is not fully comprehensive as it does not include two other important armed movements: the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Abdel Wahid Nur and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdel Aziz Al Hilu, who declined to take part in the negotiations that led to the JPA and wanted to pursue their own peace tracks. SPLM-N/Al Hilu signed a Declaration of Principles with the Chair of the Sovereign Council in March 2021 and is now engaged in peace talks in Juba to negotiate a Framework Agreement. Abdel Wahid Nur is asking for a Sudan-Sudan dialogue. It is of note that in the East, the legitimacy of the JPA is also being called into question.

**THE MANDATE**

UNSCR 2579 (2021) mandates UNITAMS and the UNCT to support peace processes and implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and future peace agreements.

Under Pillar II, it prioritizes (a) good offices and support to ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government of Sudan and Sudanese armed groups, including supporting the meaningful participation of civil society, women, youth, refugees and IDPs and members of marginalized groups; (b) scalable support to the implementation of the JPA, if so requested by the parties to the JPA, and any future peace agreements, including Title 2, Chapter 8 of the JPA, to the power-sharing provisions of the JPA, the provisions of the JPA concerning land ownership and usage, accountability and transitional justice, in particular the provisions of chapter 3 of the JP, and including for acts of sexual and gender-based violence, to DDR, safe and effective management, storage and security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles, and taking into account the different needs, experiences and safety of female and male ex-combatants, including children, as well as the monitoring and verification of possible ceasefires with particular focus on Blue Nile and South Kordofan (the Two Areas) and Darfur.

Two specific priorities highlighted in UNSCR 2579 (2021) for UNITAMS’ support during the current mandate period SC resolution 2579 (2021), are (i) ceasefire monitoring in Darfur in line with the role envisaged for the United Nations and the JPA; and ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the armed groups, including through the technical, administrative and logistical assistance in coordination with other partners.

**2.1 SUPPORT TO THE PEACE PROCESSES**

When the Constitutional Charter was signed it outlined the vision of a comprehensive and inclusive peace. The signature of the Juba Peace Agreement, in October 2020, was but a milestone in the Transitional Government’s commitment to a broader more comprehensive peace, ending decades of civil strife, not least because two of the most two powerful armed groups, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North Abdelaziz El-Hilu faction (SPLM-N El Hilu) and the Sudan Liberation Movement Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLM/AW) had yet to sign.

The signature of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on 28 March 2021 by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N El-Hilu is demonstrative of an expressed intention to continue and increase development and humanitarian cooperation between the SPLM-N Al Hilu and the Government of Sudan. This was welcomed in Security Council resolution 2579 (2021) which also urged those who have not yet engaged in the peace negotiations to do so immediately, constructively and without preconditions. Negotiations with Abdelaziz El-Hilu recommenced in Juba in May 2021, under the auspices of the South Sudanese mediation with UNITAMS facilitation and provision of substantive and
technical support, and observed by the Troika with a view to signing initially a Framework Agreement. UNITAMS, UNDP and UN Women also facilitated the participation of Sudanese women gender observers in the talks as well as group of women’s rights advocates to engage with the parties. If, and when, negotiations begin with Abdul Wahid then, it is assumed that the integrated mission, UNITAMS, would be expected to provide scalable support to these processes. The Mission is using its good offices mandate, to support negotiations ongoing between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese armed groups.

Guiding Documents

Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Charter stipulates that during the transitional period, state agencies shall work on performing the following duties: (a) Achieving a just and comprehensive peace, end the war by addressing the roots of the Sudanese problem and handling its effects, taking into account the provisional preferential measures for regions affected by war and underdeveloped regions, and treat issues of marginalization and vulnerable groups and the groups most harmed. (b) Prioritize working on completing the comprehensive peace agreement and applying UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the relevant African Union resolutions regarding participation of women at all levels in the peace process and apply regional and international charters regarding women’s rights. It also committed to stopping hostilities in disputed regions and build a comprehensive and fair peace process by opening corridors for delivery of humanitarian assistance, and release prisoners and persons convicted because of the war, and exchange prisoners; and to (f) Issuing a general amnesty for rulings issued against political leaders and members of armed movements because of their membership therein.

Informed by the mandate, the goal of the Mission and its UN partners is to ensure that ongoing and future peace processes are advanced and their inclusivity is strengthened with particular focus on the meaningful participation of civil society, women, refugees and IDPs and members of marginalized groups. As an integrated mission, UNITAMS support to the peace process, currently comprises standby capacity for technical and mediation support to the parties and South Sudanese mediation, in areas as diverse as governance, gender inclusion, and security arrangements and security sector reform. UNITAMS is also continuing to expand its field presence throughout Sudan which will help to respond to requests for facilitating resolution of local conflicts and addressing tensions. Work is also ongoing with the support of WFP, UNDP and UN Women to provide administrative and logistical support to the talks including through providing flights in and out of Juba and Kauda to facilitate political consultations as well as to enhance women’s involvement. In addition to its ongoing effort in supporting South Sudanese Mediation on the Al-Hilu track, WFP continues to provide many forms of logistical and substantive support through providing flights in and out of Juba and Kauda to facilitate political consultations and establishing a presence in the SPLM-N Al-Hilu area.

Programmatic Needs

Going forward support provided would be contingent on requests by the parties but might encompass support to the mediation, support and technical advice made available to the parties, secretariat, and limited logistical and operational support. UNITAMS continues to expand its capacity to respond to requests for facilitating resolution of disputes and addressing tensions. It will need to continue to provide support for the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in the formal delegations and as civil society participants, and to strengthening the inclusivity and broad-based support for the negotiations is essential for its legitimacy.

Going forward, support to the peace process might entail support for the inclusion of other marginalized voices, particularly youth, as these will be a priority. This approach falls squarely in line with the Constitutional Charter, which calls for an inclusive, and gender-sensitive process, recognizing particularly the role of women as peace actors. In complex mediation efforts that span various stages
of political negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement, the SRSG and the Mission will also need to be equipped to provide with a range of tools and resources to advance discussions on technical issues and offer mediation support. Expertise would need to be channeled by the integrated mission to negotiations in Juba, or in any third location if required and to provide technical support and assistance to both parties in the negotiations.

Child protection plays a crucial role in peacebuilding and is essential to ensure sustainable peace, there is an added value of including child protection issues such as children’s release from the armed forces or groups, and their reintegration into civilian life, in the current ongoing peace processes and ensure that mediators, facilitators and guarantors take these issues into consideration at all stages of negotiations.

THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Support to ongoing peace processes

OUTCOME 2.1: Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and non-signatories are inclusive, with UN support as requested, to reach a comprehensive and sustainable peace across Sudan.28

UN Partners: UNITAMS, UNDP, UNHCR, PBF, UNWomen, WFP
TGoS Partners: GOS, SPLM-N Abdelaziz al-Hilu (in future potentially also SLA-AW)

Key relevant provisions of national documents:
Constitutional Charter: ch.15 on Comprehensive Peace Issues
NAP 1325: Objective 1; Participation: Goal 1 - Ensure the effective participation of women in the political and legislative process

Outputs:
1. Support to the conclusion of an inclusive peace process
2. Consultative processes of the peace talks are fully inclusive to include all segments of society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Degree of benefit to the peace process of UN, UNITAMS and its UNCT partners expertise and experience.29</td>
<td>Baseline: Peace agreement and peace process require data and assessments (2020) Target: Peace process and implementation of peace agreement have benefited from UN, UNITAMS and its UNCT partners expertise and experience (2021-2022) Data Source: Feedback from parties to peace agreement and process; project closing evaluations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Degree of participation in ongoing peace talks with SPLM-N and, if/when they start with the SLA-AW.</td>
<td>Baseline: First round of discussions completed with women’s participation; peace talks SLA-Abdul Wahid have not yet started. Target: Inclusive and Participatory agreements signed Data Source: UNITAMS reports/code cables; Progress reports; Media monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Levels of public support for implementation of peace agreement(s), gender and age disaggregated.</td>
<td>Baseline: Unknown levels of popular support for peace agreement and peace process (2020) Target: Increasing levels of public support for the peace process and implementation of peace agreement(s), gender and age disaggregated (2021-2022) Data Source: Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. # of groups across political and societal spectrum have engaged</td>
<td>Baseline: no participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 4.
29 Derived from target language in PBF ‘Support to the Sudanese Peace Process’ under Outcome Indicator 2c. The PBF results framework does not articulate Outcome indicators but does provide baselines, targets and some data sources.
with SRSG, including women’s rights groups and youth groups, on ongoing support to the peace processes.

Target: Fully inclusive discussions that respond to requests for engagement from women’s rights groups.
Data Source: UNITAMS reports/code cables; Progress reports; Media monitoring

f. # of parties agreeing to guarantees in pre-negotiation and committing to extending such agreements into actual settlement.
Baseline: No guarantees agreed
Target: # of guarantees provided
Data Source: South Sudan mediation and UNITAMS observers at the peace talks

2.2 STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS TO IMPLEMENT THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT

The JPA’s implementation architecture is composed of a vast array of Commissions, Committees, Funds and other Mechanisms. Because it was negotiated in different geographical tracks as well as a national issues track, references to implementation mechanisms are sometimes duplicated at national and regional level. The JPA mechanisms are in addition to the 11 independent Commissions to be set up under the Constitutional Charter.

The ambiguity within the Constitutional Charter on where authority to lead on the peace process sits and the various high-level decision-making bodies within the Transitional Government – the Sovereign Council, the Council of Ministers, the Transitional Partners Council and the High-Level Committee to follow up implementation of the JPA – mean that it is not immediately clear where decision-making authority regarding JPA implementation sits. The complexity of the structure means that coordination between the mechanisms and with key line ministries is critical but will also be a challenge.

However, the National Issues Protocol of the JPA makes clear that the Peace Commission is the body that will be tasked with implementing the JPA. The law establishing the Peace Commission is expected to clarify how the Peace Commission will coordinate with other JPA implementing mechanisms. This law was adopted by the Joint Councils on 24 April 2021 but has not yet been signed by the Chair of the Sovereignty Council General Abdel Fatah Burhan or officially published. Once this happens, the Peace Commission (which currently consists of only one person, the Peace Commissioner, and an office) will get a budget and be able to start recruiting staff. Simply establishing the JPA mechanisms will take a lot of time and staffing them will require significant human and financial resources.

The UN and the wider international community should encourage the Transitional Government to sequence and prioritize establishment of the JPA implementation and monitoring mechanisms and provide financial and technical support to those deemed most important. Whichever is the mandated body to lead the prioritization process, it would need to take account of the contribution of JPA mechanisms to security and the protection of civilians, in order to address the needs and demands of conflict-affected communities and contribute to the wider goals of the Revolution. This process should aim to produce a sequenced, prioritized, and costed implementation plan, taking account of the availability of funding. This will need to be a living document, which is regularly reviewed and revised.
The UN and the wider international community should also encourage the Transitional Government to ensure that the composition of these mechanisms reflects Sudan’s diversity and includes the full and meaningful participation of women (40%) and youth, in accordance with the Constitutional Charter and the provisions of the JPA.

The following are the most important mechanisms mentioned in the JPA:

**The overall peace architecture**

- **The Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism.** If this is set up as an independent and credible body with a full-time chair and a competent secretariat, it could significantly bolster international support and generate greater momentum behind JPA implementation.
- **The Peace Commission.** A fully configured Peace Commission will be the main body tasked with implementing the JPA and could be the focal point for developing a prioritized, sequenced and costed implementation document.

**Security arrangements**

- There is a key role for UNITAMS in the Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements in Khartoum (on which the UN has a seat), and the Permanent Ceasefire Commission in El Fasher and its subsidiary bodies in all Darfur states (which UNITAMS will chair). Establishment of the transitional security arrangements in Darfur is urgently needed to designate and oversee the assembly areas for the forces of the armed movements and to contribute to protection of civilians. The Joint Military Ceasefire Committees in Damazine and Kadugli will be chaired by South Sudan but Yasir Arman (SPLM-N/SRF) has indicated that UN training would be welcome.
- The UN also has a role in helping the National DDR Commission (once it has been restructured with the inclusion of JPA signatories) to develop a sequenced DDR plan based on a comprehensive needs’ assessment. “A UN third party” is supposed to be represented in a Darfur Regional DDR Commission to help develop and implement DDR plans for Darfur. International partners, including the UN, will also be represented in the two DDR committees in the Two Areas, in accordance with the Juba Declaration.

For more on this refer to the Security Arrangements results framework at the end of this SPPSP document.

**Mechanisms and processes which directly improve the lives of conflict-affected populations**

It will be particularly important to take action to set up the Commissions that will address the root causes of conflict, including inequalities in development between Sudan’s regions and bring tangible benefits to conflict-affected communities. This will build confidence among the Darfuri population and enhance the legitimacy of the government as well as building a sense of buy-in to the JPA. It will also put wind in the sails of all those who want to move forward with implementation. The safe, voluntary and dignified return/reintegration of IDPs and refugees with access to services and sustainable livelihood opportunities is also crucial to address the consequences of decades of conflict. These are long-term processes but setting up the mechanisms needed and launching the processes associated with them will send strong signals of commitment to change and peace.

Beyond the essential provision of security, there are several key processes, all of which will require the creation of functioning Commissions and support from the UN or wider international community, including technical advice in drafting the necessary legislation and strategic plans, capacity-building and awareness-raising and dialogue at the community-level. Some of these mechanisms/processes are not only necessary in themselves to address root causes of conflict but will help to create a conducive environment for other longer-term goals and JPA provisions.
Land reform

The JPA recognizes that ownership and usage of land are key drivers of conflict. Throughout the JPA, there is a strong commitment to addressing land issues, environmental protection and the expropriation of land under the previous regime. The JPA recognizes the traditional ownership of tribal lands through the Hawakeer system, which acknowledges customary land rights as well as safeguarding the rights of nomads to use traditional grazing routes. The Darfur track provides for establishing the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, the Darfur Land Court and community land review committees as well as a Nomads and Herders Commission to organize migration routes and develop the nomads and herders sector.

Land reform is also prominent in the Two Areas track with the establishment of Land Commissions in Blue Nile and South Kordofan and a process of land review, with the participation of local communities. The Land Commissions in Darfur and the Two Areas will work in coordination with the National Land Commission. In addition, the Two Areas track provides for sub-commissions of the National Commission for the Development of the Nomads, Herders and Farmers Sector in Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

The East Sudan agreement track provides for an East Sudan Land Commission to review land settlement and registration laws. The Northern track agreement provides for a mechanism to address the issue of expropriated lands.

Voluntary returns/durable solutions

The Juba Peace Agreement treats durable solutions as a key priority for building peace and recognizes the right of IDPS and refugees to return to their places of origin, habitual residence or to be resettled in their preferred location, while also paying attention to compensation, reconstruction and development needs. To support this, it provides for the establishment of an IDPs and Refugees Commission and a Compensation and a Reparations Fund in Darfur. The Two Areas track also provides for a National Commission for the Voluntary Return and resettlement of IDPs and Refugees, with branches in the Two Areas. The Northern track puts a lot of emphasis on resettlement and compensation for people forcibly displaced by dam construction.

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

At the national level, the JPA provides for holding a Conference for Reconciliation and Social Healing. The Darfur track includes comprehensive commitments to transitional justice, including cooperation with the ICC, establishing a Special Court for Darfur and a Truth and Reconciliation Committee as well as the use of traditional mechanisms and memorialization of victims. The Two Areas track provides for establishing branches of the National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission in Blue Nile and South Kordofan and commits to the hosting of reconciliation conferences to heal the wounds of war and rebuild the social fabric. Decades of war have left deep trauma and bitterness at the individual and community level. Starting the transitional justice processes in Darfur and the Two Areas could start to rebuild trust and send a strong political signal of the Government’s commitment to implementing the JPA, addressing the root causes of conflict and making a break with the policies of the previous regime.

Decentralization and governance reform

Decentralization of power through a federal system of governance is fundamental to addressing the root causes of conflict and could promote more locally representative, accountable and responsive governance. It is one of the highest political priorities of the SPLM-N/SSRF and SLM/MM. The JPA provides for the restoration of a Darfur region and autonomy in the Two Areas with extensive devolution of powers but is silent on how decentralization will be applied in other parts of Sudan.
JPA provides for a series of conferences to finalize the details of how decentralization and the new federal regional system will be implemented. These include the Eastern Sudan Conference and Conferences on the status of the national capital and North Kordofan. The status and borders of West Kordofan and whether the provisions of the JPA Two Areas track will be applied there must also be decided.

The most crucial mechanism will be the National Governance Conference, which is currently due to be held in September 2021, preceded by consultations at locality and state-level. Given its significance to both the JPA and the Transition, the UN and the wider international community should prioritize providing technical and financial support to the process, encouraging wide consultations with local communities and civil society, and local governance reform in such a way that does not lead to the creation of a new set of regional and local elites. Support to this process should take account of the need for it to feed into an inclusive participatory permanent constitution-making process, with the meaningful participation of women, as well as the inclusion of youth. Given plans for the extensive devolution of powers and competencies to state and regional governments, support to governance reform should also contribute to strengthening the capacity of sub-national governance bodies that will impact most on the lives of citizens by delivering services and building peace.

More on this issue is contained within the SPPSP section on governance and decentralization.

Wealth-sharing/fiscal decentralization

Economic marginalization has been one of the drivers of conflict. The JPA provides for measures to address the need for reconstruction and development in the conflict-affected zones, including the retention of 40% of revenue from natural resources in Darfur and the Two Areas and 30% in Eastern Sudan. It also provides for fiscal decentralization, including the establishment of the National Revenue Fund and the National Commission for the Division, Allocation and Monitoring of Financial Resources and Revenue, which will ensure that funds are transferred to the states and regions, particularly the war-affected areas, based on equitable criteria.

The Darfur track agreement provides for the establishment of a Darfur Peace Support and Sustainable Development Fund to fund implementation of the JPA in Darfur, with the stipulation that the Government should contribute $750 million a year to this fund for 10 years. The Two Areas track provides for the establishment of a National Fund for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of War-Affected Areas, with branches in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The Eastern track provides for auditing and restructuring the East Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund, with an initial allocation from the Government of $348 million and for holding an Economic Conference on Eastern Sudan. The National Issues Protocol refers to the establishment of a National Committee to address the issues of housing and services for the Kanabi communities.

Religious freedom

Because relations between religion and state are seen by many as a major driver of conflict, particularly in the Two Areas, the National Issues Protocol and the Two Areas track of the JPA provide for “the complete separation of religious and state institutions to ensure that religion is not exploited in politics” and the establishment of a National Commission on Religious Freedom to address the issues of religious diversity in Sudan, with branches in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. This will be important to address historic and ongoing violations of freedom of belief, including confiscation of church land by the state, harassment of Christian community leaders by the security services, and interference in the administration of churches. Since the Revolution, there have been further incidents of attacks on churches in areas such as Blue Nile.
Constitution-making process

The National Issues Protocol of the JPA provides for the holding of constitutional conferences in the regions as part of the permanent constitution-drafting process. The Two Areas track refers to holding small conferences in the Two Areas in preparation for the National Constitutional Convention. Additional detail is contained within the Constitution-making section of the SPPSP.

Institutional Entry Points

The Juba Declaration of 11 September 2019 (which is part of the JPA) stipulates that the UN and other international partners “must be engaged in all stages of peace making and peace building”. Title 2, Chapter 8, article 35 of the JPA refers to the role of guarantors and witnesses from the international community and the UN in ensuring implementation of the security arrangements agreement in Darfur.

The JPA contains specific references to “a UN third party” or international involvement in relation to the following mechanisms:

- The Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism: “Guarantors and any other components agreed to by the Parties”. UNITAMS now invited to be a member.
- The Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements: (UN third party to be a member. (Decree now issued naming UNITAMS as a member).
- The Permanent Ceasefire Committee in Darfur, the sectoral committees and the field teams: UN third party to chair. (Decree now issued naming UNITAMS as chair).
- National DDR Commission and the Darfur DDR Commission. UN third party and UN agencies to help develop DDR plan.
- Darfur and Two Areas Commissions for the Voluntary return of IDPs and Refugees. The Darfur track provides for cooperation with UN third party and UN agencies to ensure proper protection and dignified treatment during the returns and resettlement process; and financial, technical and material support for voluntary return of IDPs and refugees in Darfur, including restoration of property. The Two Areas track refers to cooperation with UNHCR and IOM in the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin and to the UN and Friends of Sudan as a source of funding.
- Truth and Reconciliation Committee in Darfur.: Provision of financial and technical support for the work of the TRC.
- Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission. Provision of funding from the international community for its operations.

The JPA also refers to international support or involvement in relation to:

- Humanitarian aid in Darfur
- Cross-line and cross-border humanitarian assistance in the Two Areas
- UN agencies to help develop a plan for demining in the Two Areas
- A humanitarian conference for all conflict-affected areas
- International financial assistance for the National Fund for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of the War-Affected Areas and its regional branches
- International monitoring of elections
- Full cooperation with the ICC
- Sudan Partners Conference to support the transitional period and peace
- Technical support from the International Atomic Energy Authority to investigate the burial of nuclear waste in the Northern region

Ongoing UN programmes

UNDP has been supporting the Peace Commissioner, including with dissemination of the JPA, and is planning to support the development of a “National Peace Strategy”. UNITAMS and UN HQ has started
to recruit staff to the Permanent Ceasefire Committee in Darfur and its subsidiary bodies. The Peacebuilding Fund provides support for the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) Secretariat and could be scaled up if the MEM is set up as a capable and credible body.

Programmatic Needs

Technical, financial and capacity-building support for many of the JPA implementation and monitoring mechanisms listed above should be factored into project proposals in the relevant fields by UNITAMS/UNCT. It is important that support for these mechanisms is prioritized to kickstart the process of JPA implementation and encourage national ownership.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Structures and Mechanisms to Implement the Juba Peace Agreement**

**OUTCOME 2.2:** Structures and mechanisms to implement the Juba Peace Agreements established and functioning.\(^{30}\)

**UN Partners:** UN Sudan

**TGoS Partners:** NCCUN, Relevant line ministries

**Related SDGs:** Goal 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**

JPA: National Issues: 21; Darfur: Ch. 8: 11, 13.1.3, 13.1.13, 18.1, 18.12, 21.4, 22, 23, 24.6, 25.2, 25.6; Two Areas: Ch. 1: 21,22, Ch. 3: 102, 111, Ch.4: 36, 43, 46, 52.1.1, 58.1.2, 96.3, 98.2.1; Tamazuj: 20.12

**Outputs:**

1. National Peace Architecture, including the Peace Commission, DDR Commissions at sub-national levels, Compensation and Reparations Fund in Darfur and other infrastructures for peace, established and equipped with peace agreements implemented in an equitable manner to effectively address regional disparities.
2. Broad based consultations with signatories of JPA, women peace actors and other stakeholders to develop a Roadmap, deliver on JPA governance and constitution making benchmarks and implementation prerequisite for National Peace Architecture held.
3. National Strategy for Peace developed, with involvement of range of stakeholders including women and civil society, with an emphasis on gender equality, and social inclusion.
4. Peace Commission and other commissions, institutions, and CSOs comprising National Peace Architecture capacitated to fulfil their roles.
5. Advocacy, sensitization, and communications campaigns to enhance popular understanding and support for peace agreements conducted.
6. Sudan integrated into sub-regional peace architecture

**Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| a. Degree to which National Peace Commission established and functional.\(^{31}\) | Baseline: Not established (2020)  
Target: National Peace Commission established and functional  
Data Source: UNITAMS |
| b. Degree to which Compensation and Reparations Fund in Darfur established and functional.\(^{32}\) | Baseline: Not established (2020)  
Target: Compensation and Reparations Fund in Darfur established and functional.  
Data Source: UNITAMS to provide |
| c. Degree to which Ministry of Peace and Human Rights or body with similar | Baseline: Not established (2020)  
Target: Ministry or body with similar functions established and functional. |

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\(^{30}\) Derived from draft SPPSP Outcome under Pillar 2.

\(^{31}\) UNITAMS benchmark indicator.

\(^{32}\) Based on JPA: Darfur: Ch. 4: 12. This commission does not have a UNITAMS benchmark indicator, but this proposed indicator uses similar language to that used for other UNITAMS benchmark indicators on commissions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>functions established and functional.</th>
<th>Data Source: UNITAMS to provide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| d. % of representation of women in staffing of Commissions and other structures, and participation in all mechanisms and processes of peace agreements. | Baseline: The Constitutional Charter and Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) commit to no less than 40% representation of women (2020) 
Target: Staffing of Commissions and other structures, and participation in all mechanisms and processes of peace agreements, achieves 40% representation of women. (2020-2022) 
Data Source: Staffing records of Commissions, etc; records of meetings of mechanisms and processes; UNITAMS reports. |
| e. % of national civil service and justice institutions staff that are drawn from Two Areas and Darfur. | Baseline: TBD 
Target: TBD 
Data Source: TBD |
| f. Level of balance of regional representation at Governance Conference to define powers and responsibilities in the new regional system and to review administrative borders of the regions. | Baseline: No Governance Conference (2020) 
Target: Balanced regional representation at Governance Conference to define powers and responsibilities in the new regional system and to review administrative borders of the regions. 
Data Source: UNITAMS to provide |
| g. Level of Sudan’s cooperation with its neighbours and degree of participation in all sub-regional initiatives for conflict prevention and response. | Baseline: Establishment of national peace architecture would benefit from further sub-regional integration (2020) 
Target: Sudan cooperates closely with its neighbours and participates fully in all sub-regional initiatives for conflict prevention and response (2022) 
Data Source: Project and public records; project closing evaluation |

### 2.3 MONITORING AND EVALUATION MECHANISM OF THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT

The Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) is one of the strategically most important mechanisms of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) because it is the main oversight body for the whole peace agreement and the only one in which a significant number of international partners will be involved. Provided it is set up as an independent, credible and capable oversight mechanism, with a full-time chair and efficient secretariat, the MEM will generate greater momentum behind implementation, resolve deadlocks, provide more transparency and help to bolster international

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33 Based on JPA: Two Areas Track: Political Issues Implementation Matrix, at # 27. This Ministry does not have a UNITAMS benchmark indicator, but this proposed indicator uses similar language to that used for other UNITAMS benchmark indicators on commissions.  
34 Derived from target language in PBF ‘Support to the Sudanese Peace Process’ under Outcome Indicator 1c. The PBF results framework does not articulate Outcome indicators but does provide baselines, targets and data sources.  
35 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.  
36 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark indicator.  
37 Derived from target language in PBF ‘Support to the Sudanese Peace Process’ under Outcome Indicator 3c. The PBF results framework does not articulate Outcome indicators but does provide baselines, targets and some data sources.
support for implementation. If an effective Mechanism is established, it could have a decisive impact on the success of JPA implementation.

The value of the MEM could be further enhanced if it has a permanent presence on the ground in areas of implementation, particularly in the conflict-affected zones. It could also benefit from active participation by Sudanese civil society organizations that are already on the ground in the areas covered by the JPA regional tracks. Civil society participation could be a source of supplementary information to be fed into the formal monitoring system, or as an integral part of the MEM.

Guiding Documents

There are two references to the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism in the Juba Peace Agreement.

Title 1 Article 21 (1) of the JPA states that “The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the final peace agreement. The mechanism shall be composed of representatives of the signatory parties, the mediator, the guarantors and any other components agreed to by the Parties”.

Title 8 (Final Provisions) of the JPA further states that “in the event of any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall endeavor to resolve it amicably through consultations based on good faith, and if the Parties are unable to resolve the dispute amicably, it may be referred to the High Mechanism for Implementation of the Peace Agreement for the concerned Track, if any, then to the Peace Commission, them to the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism, and finally to the competent court”.

Institutional Entry Points

One of the benchmarks in Annex 1 of the UN Secretary-General’s report of 17 May 2021 to the UN Security Council was the establishment and functioning of an inclusive and effective MEM. The UN signed the JPA as a witness on 3 October 2020. On 13 April 2021, the SRSG received a letter from the Chair of the South Sudan Mediation Committee inviting him to nominate a representative of UNITAMS to take part in the MEM so that it could start to monitor implementation of the Agreement and advise the Parties to resolve their differences amicably. Twenty-two other organizations and countries received a similar invitation. On 28 May 2021, the SRSG received another letter from the Chair of the South Sudan Mediation Committee informing him that, in the light of positive responses from a number of countries, he had asked the Sudanese authorities to issue an order for the formation of the mechanism and proposing that the first meeting should be held in Khartoum on 9 June. This meeting did not take place as agreement has not yet been reached on the Terms of Reference of the Mechanism.

Ongoing UN programmes

UNITAMS has provided technical advice to the Sudanese authorities and the Chairman of the South Sudan Mediation on lessons learned and best practice from previous oversight mechanisms and on how to ensure that the MEM is set up as an independent and credible oversight body, with access to a wide range of data sources and with a full-time Chair who can engage regularly with the Parties to promote their full compliance with the Agreement.

Programmatic Needs

Once established, the Mechanism will need an operating budget and set-up costs for renting an office and accommodation in Khartoum, plus office equipment and vehicles as well as support for an independent Secretariat to support the activities of the Mechanism in discharging its tasks and responsibilities. This will involve the secondment of expert staff to the Secretariat, access to research capacity and a travel budget for field trips.
If the MEM is able to set up a permanent presence in areas of implementation, particularly in Darfur, it would also need set-up costs and an operating budget for these sub-offices. The results framework for this outcome is encompassed within the results framework for the Juba Peace Agreement implementation mechanism.

Results Framework for the MEM is captured under Structures and Mechanisms for the Implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement.

### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism established for JPA implementation, with JPA mechanisms and structures in place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME 2.3:</th>
<th>An inclusive and effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism regarding implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement is operational and enabled to function.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Partners:</strong></td>
<td>UNITAMS and UNCT Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TGoS Partners:</strong></td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related SDGs:</strong></td>
<td>Goal 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key relevant provisions of national documents:
- JPA: National Issues: 21; Darfur: Ch. 8: 11, 13.1.3, 13.1.13, 18.1, 18.12, 21.4, 22, 23, 24.6, 25.2, 25.6; Two Areas: Ch. 1: 21,22, Ch. 3: 102, 111, Ch.4: 36, 43, 46, 52.1.1, 58.1.2, 96.3, 98.2.1; Tamazuj: 20.12

### Output:
1. Mechanisms for coordination, reporting, monitoring and evaluation of peace agreement implementation established, and staff trained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Degree to which Monitoring, and Evaluation Mechanism of the Juba Peace Agreement is established and operational</td>
<td>Baseline: No mechanism. (2020) Target: Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism of the Juba Peace Agreement is established and operational. Data Source: UNITAMS to advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Degree to which Parties remain committed to the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and all its protocols</td>
<td>Baseline: UNITAMS to confirm Target: Parties remain committed to the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and all its protocols. Data Source: UNITAMS to advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Level of satisfaction of Parties, Guarantors and Witnesses to the Juba Peace Agreement with the way in which it is implemented</td>
<td>Baseline: Agreement yet to be implemented. (2020) Target: Parties, Guarantors and Witnesses to the Juba Peace Agreement express high levels of satisfaction with the way in which it is implemented (2020) Data Source: Project and public records; project closing evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. % of public satisfied with peace agreement implementation</td>
<td>Baseline: Negative public perceptions of implementation of previous peace agreements. Target: 70% public satisfaction with peace agreement implementation. Data Source: Prospective Studies/Project Focus Groups (in accessible target areas)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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38 This thematic intervention focuses on the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism under the JPA.
39 UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 5.
40 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
41 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
42 Derived from target language in PBF ‘Support to the Sudanese Peace Process’ under Outcome Indicator 3a. The PBF results framework does not articulate Outcome indicators but does provide baselines, targets and some data sources.
43 Derived from target language in PBF ‘Support to the Sudanese Peace Process’ under Outcome Indicator 3b. The PBF results framework does not articulate Outcome indicators but does provide baselines, targets and some data sources.
2.4 TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Nine months after the signature of the Juba Peace Agreement, there is an urgent need to stand-up the significantly delayed security arrangement mechanisms of the Darfur and Two Areas Tracks. Establishing effective security arrangements will help to facilitate a greater degree of security and stability through a more coordinated command, control and management of combatants. Without improved security, it will be difficult to deliver other central commitments of the JPA, such as land reform, transitional justice, return of IDPs and refugees, and development.

Given the ongoing violence, human rights violations and threats to civilians and communities in Darfur, the implementation of the agreed security arrangements must be a priority. Compliance with their commitments by all signatories, especially with regards to the steps that need to be taken on the ground, is key to the sustainability of the process. Essential first steps include setting up the ceasefire monitoring mechanisms; designating and establishing assembly areas for combatants from the armed movements; verifying the names of combatants against manifests submitted by the movements; registering, classifying and storing weapons; and commencing the DDR process as well as the parallel integration of former combatants into the national security forces and institutions. Lack of progress on implementation of security arrangements will create a bottleneck for other reforms, including for the DDR planning process.

Setting up assembly areas requires advanced planning of subsequent steps following the registration process, including DDR and integration. This will entail sensitization measures to manage unrealistic expectations of the assembled groups such as automatically receiving benefits and compensation under a DDR programme. Ongoing recruitment further complicates this challenge. It will be important to know what former combatants are going to do once they are in the assembly areas, even if they are going to be there for a short period of time. Keeping them occupied will be very important. This should be considered as part of the planning for the activities envisaged during the disarmament and demobilization phase of the DDR process. The activities should be carefully planned and should be linked to the permitted acts of the ceasefire (building roads etc.) and should entail a plan involving the communities in the proximity of the assembly areas. The use of community violence reduction activities as mitigation measures in the vicinity of the assembly areas is highly recommended.

The JPA Title 2, Chapter 8, article 30.9.4 makes clear that “the Government of Sudan should provide the necessary non-military logistical support and assistance”, while “the UN third party should undertake the logistics for the disarmament and demobilization processes, including the establishment of assembly areas”. However, the Sudanese Armed Forces point to a shortage of resources needed to support former combatants in the assembly areas.

The JPA also commits to establishing a joint Security Keeping Force in Darfur to fill the security gap created by the departure of UNAMID. This force will be composed half of government security forces (SAF, RSF, police and GIS) and half of the signatory Darfuri armed movements. It was originally to have been a force of 12,000, half of whom would come from the police, but the target figure has since been increased to 20,000. Following a serious security incident in El Geneina in April 2021, the Security and Defence Council decided to start by deploying an initial contingent of 8,000. While the Government is planning on moving forward with the operationalization of this force, it is not yet clear what arrangements have been made for the selection and vetting of former combatants from the signatory armed movements or for training.

Given the history of conflict between its constituent elements, establishing an effective joint force to protect civilians will be very challenging. It will also be a big challenge for communities to accept protection from some of the constituents of the force that, until now, have been perceived as the perpetrators of violence. It is intended that the new Joint Security-Keeping Force will have its own uniform. However, in order to build confidence in the new force, it is crucial that the force is seen as well-disciplined and that all its components are properly trained, including in international human rights law and practices.
rights law, international humanitarian law and protection of civilians and gender-sensitivity training, before they are deployed to the field. If the deployment of the Joint Security-Keeping Force in Darfur is seen as a success, it could be an important precursor for wider efforts on reforming and modernization of the security forces, as provisioned in the JPA.

Finally, in regard to signatory movements, the Third Front/Tamazuj, was a last-minute addition to the JPA and signed a bilateral security arrangements agreement with the Transitional Government. Third Front/Tamazuj is composed of militias from the border region with South Sudan. A collection of factions that operate largely autonomously, Tamazuj has grown significantly in size since the JPA was signed. A Joint Force (composed of government security forces) was announced by the Transitional authorities in June to address certain problems caused by Tamazuj.

The security situation in Darfur is further complicated by the continuing presence of a number of other armed actors who are not signatories of the JPA, including tribal militias (heavily armed by the previous regime), the Awakening Forces commanded by Musa Hilal and the SLA/M of Abdul Wahid al-Nour. The JPA security arrangements, including the monitoring mechanisms, do not cover the actions of these groups. However, the JPA commits the Government to controlling and disarming or combating “allied” armed groups and “illegal” or “irregular” forces, as well as “foreign” armed elements. These efforts are fundamental to long-term stability in Darfur but could lead to further confrontations and conflict. Similar to the proposed measures around assembly sites, community violence reduction activities may be an effective tool to address the potential threats posed by these armed groups.

Whereas the Darfur security arrangements apply to five separate armed groups, the Two Areas Track applies to only one, SLMN-N/NSRF, making command and control and organization simpler. The SPLM-N/NSRF troops have historically been organized under more traditional military structures. In the security arrangements for the Two Areas/SPLM-N/NSRF Track, the Joint Military Ceasefire Committees in Khartoum, Damazine and Kadugli are to be chaired by South Sudan, with some technical and financial support to the integration and DDR processes from the international community.

Guiding Documents

The JPA provides for the establishment of:

- A Joint High Council for Implementing the Final Peace Agreement, headquartered in Khartoum and chaired by Burhan, with the RSF Commander, Ministers of Defence and Interior, SAF Chief of Staff, Director-General of the Police, Director-General of GIS, Head of SA MI and leaders of the armed movements.
- A Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements based in Khartoum, including representatives from the JPA parties, a “UN third party”, the South Sudan Mediation, Chad and the African Union. This body is supposed to refer any disputes over ceasefire violations that it cannot resolve to the Joint High Council.
- A Permanent Ceasefire Committee in El Fasher, Sectoral Committees in each of the Darfur states and Field Teams, all to be chaired by a “third-party UN representative”, with membership from the JPA parties, South Sudan and Chad.
- A Joint Military Ceasefire Committee for the Two Areas, two military committees based in Kadugli and Damazine and Military Field Committees, all to be chaired by South Sudan as the Mediator state.
- A High Committee and Sub-Committee (based in Babanusa) for the Third Front/Tamazuj agreement which does not have any third-party involvement.

Decrees were issued by the Chair of the Sovereign Council in early July 2021 setting up the Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements, the Permanent Ceasefire Committee and the Sectoral Committees in Darfur. The most urgent priority now is to ensure that the monitoring structures are functional and able to operate as soon as possible, that the assembly sites are set up in a safe and sustainable manner (including command and control and weapon storage), that the Ceasefire
monitoring teams are established and active, and that the Joint Security-Keeping Force is formed in Darfur, all in a manner to prioritize and guarantee increased protection of civilians.

Further down the line, the UN and international partners are also expected to support the DDR process in Darfur and the Two Areas.

**Institutional Entry Points**

The JPA provides for a “UN third party” to chair the Permanent Ceasefire Committee in El Fasher and its subsidiary bodies in the Darfur states and to have a seat on the Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements. The SRSG has indicated to senior members of the Government, the leadership of the Sudan Revolutionary Front and SLM/MM that UNITAMS is ready to play this role. The Chair of the Sovereign Council has just issued a decree setting up these bodies.

UNSC Resolution 2579 of 3 June 2021 renewing the UNITAMS mandate stated that UNITAMS should provide support to ceasefire arrangements and monitoring mechanisms as set out in Title 2, chapter 8 of the JPA. It also stressed that, over the next year, UNITAMS should prioritize support to ceasefire monitoring in Darfur, in line with the role envisaged for the UN in the JPA.

**Ongoing UN programmes**

UNITAMS and a security expert from the Mediation Support Unit has held a technical meeting with representatives of the 5 Darfur armed movements to explain how the UN can support the security arrangements, and particularly the ceasefire monitoring mechanism.

UNITAMS and a member of the Standby Team of Mediation Advisers have also held workshops with Darfuri civil society representatives to hear their views on the JPA and security arrangements and held a workshop with women on security arrangements.

The Police Assistance Unit in UNITAMS is working with the Sudanese Police Force to provide technical advice on SOPS for the police component of the Joint Security-Keeping Force.

Now that decrees have issued establishing the Joint High Military Committee on Security Arrangements, the Permanent Ceasefire Committee and Sectoral Committees in Darfur, UNITAMS is planning to hold a workshop with the JPA signatory parties, South Sudan, Chad and the AU to discuss how to operationalize the ceasefire monitoring mechanism.

A UNDP project with the Peace Research Institute in the University of Khartoum and Peace Research Centres in regional university to establish an early warning system and a Conflict Response Dashboard will help to support the ceasefire monitoring mechanism in Darfur.

UNICEF and partners working on issues related to children monitor the armed-children release and provide them with civilian clothes and civilian integration program, including medical screenings, counselling and psychosocial support as part of the reintegration programme, which is implemented by UNICEF and partners.

**Programmatic Needs**

- Personnel for Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism in Darfur: A multi departmental planning process, under coordination of the East Africa Division of DPPA-DPO and UNITAMS has been underway. In order to achieve an interim operational capacity deployment of an Advance Team (AT) consisting of key personnel has been envisaged under the Chair of the PCC. The AT will help set up the Permanent Ceasefire Committee, including a Secretariat, in El Fasher and its subsidiary bodies. This will require a number of personnel, including a senior retired military officer to chair the Permanent Ceasefire Committee and
other military officers (or retired officers’ men and women) to chair the sectoral committees in Darfur state capitals and the field teams.

- Civilian technical experts for the Secretariat of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee in El Fasher.
- Set-up costs for Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism in Darfur: UN personnel assigned to this role will also require offices (men and women), office equipment, accommodation, and vehicles.
- Technical advice and training on ceasefire monitoring for the JPA parties and international representatives (Chad, South Sudan) deployed to the Permanent Ceasefire Committee and its subsidiary bodies in Darfur and, if requested, to members of the Joint Military Ceasefire Committees in the Two Areas.
- Technical advice and training on gender and inclusion for the ceasefire monitoring structures for the JPA parties and international representatives (Chad, South Sudan).
- Logistical support for the disarmament and demobilization processes, including establishing the assembly areas in Darfur.
- Technical advice from UN experts for the Joint Military Ceasefire Committee for the Two Areas (if requested by the JPA parties).
- Community violence reduction measures, other POC-related activities and initial reconciliation and transitional justice measures should be considered in the proximity of assembly areas and possibly in dealing with security risks emanating from non-signatory armed movements.

2.5 REFORM, DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNISATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND OTHER SECURITY SERVICES

The reform, development and modernization of the military establishment and other security services is key to a successful democratic transition. The Prime Minister’s initiative of June 2021 highlighted “reform of the security and military sector” as the top priority for achieving a political settlement in Sudan, stressing that is a precondition for resolving the issues of the economy, transitional justice and building a civil state.

The reform process requires a holistic approach including Rule of Law, human rights, judicial reform, prison reform, security sector governance reform, legislative reform and the drafting of a new permanent constitution as well as economic reform to bring military-controlled state or para-statal companies engaged in non-military business activities under civilian oversight. Some of these components are covered elsewhere in the SPPSP.

This process also requires the Sudanese stakeholders to explore development of a National Security Strategy, which could start with a base-line assessment of the existing security sector and identifying a potential road map for reforming, developing and modernizing the military establishment and other security services, which will, inter alia, involve an assessment of functions and costs. Based on global good practices, such a process should take into account the resources available and the importance of ensuring civilian oversight, accountability, transparency and protection of civilians.

Civilian actors need to be empowered to be more influential stakeholders in these discussions through a National Security Strategy and Policy Dialogue. This calls for a greater debate not only among different components of the military establishment and the armed groups but also between civilian stakeholders on what a reformed and modernized security sector would look like. The Prime Minister’s initiative emphasized the importance of involving civilian and political as well as military actors in this process.
However, this will be a long-term process and the road map to the desired end state may face several challenges of both a technical and political nature. While a downsized security sector and reduced military spending could serve as a peace dividend, the security sector is likely to increase in absolute size in the short term as the JPA signatories are formally integrated into the national armed forces before it can be “right-sized”. In conjunction with the development of a National Security Strategy, the overall size and structure of Sudan’s future security sector need to be defined prior to the selection of individual combatants for the integration process.

The process of integration, and especially rank harmonization is likely to be a particularly sensitive area. Some actors are likely to favour a top-down approach, starting with the distribution of senior positions in the military and security institutions, whereas others may want to take a bottom-up approach, insisting that senior posts are linked to the size of forces. In either case, it will be important to take account of the real security needs of the country.

There may also need to be a baseline assessment of the large number of small arms and light weapons in-country, together with targeted measures towards strengthening border management and the legal framework of national institutions responsible for weapons and ammunition management in Sudan.

The timing and sequencing of the integration and DDR processes with reform, development and modernization of the military establishment will require careful planning. The implementation matrix of the Two Areas track provides for planning for the reform, modernization and development of the military institution and security services to start within 30 days of signature.

**Guiding Documents**

The JPA defines the objective of this reform process as the creation of a single national professional army that reflects the diversity of Sudan and the interests of all Sudanese, male and female, that is not politicized by any party and that has a new military doctrine based on the Constitution. It states that the SAF, the RSF, other security services and the signatory Darfur armed movements will be part of a single united regular force. It also provides for Sudanese women to play an important and effective role in building the unified regular forces, especially in the technical units.

Whereas the 2019 Constitutional Charter stated that “the task of reforming military bodies is entrusted to military bodies in accordance with the law”, the JPA (which was incorporated into the amended Constitution in October 2020) provides for establishing mechanisms that will allow for some input from civilians and the armed movements, namely:

- The Security and Defense Council will be responsible for approving the general plan for reform, development and modernization of the military institution and security services and monitoring implementation thereof. The Council shall hold periodic meetings to review implementation of the security arrangements agreement and leaders of signatory armed movements that do not have representatives on the Council shall be invited to its meetings.
- The Sovereign Council and Council of Ministers shall monitor implementation of the security arrangements agreement and provide the necessary resources for implementation of the agreed reform, development and modernization plan.
- The Security and Defense Committee of the Parliament shall pay special attention to monitoring implementation of the security arrangements agreement and the reform, development and modernization plan for the military institution and security services.

The JPA also provides for reform and development of the security sector to be one of the agenda items at the National Constitutional Conference and for the constitution-making process to be inclusive and participatory. The constitution-making process will allow for public discussion of this topic.
The Prime Minister’s initiative of June 2021 stresses that reform of the military and security sector is a comprehensive national issue and that political actors and civil society as well as military personnel must participate in the reform vision. It also calls for:

- consensus between the leaderships of the SAF, the RSF and the Government to come up with an agreed roadmap for the RSF’s integration into the single national army
- deep, radical and urgent reform of the police and the GIS (including replacing all the GIS heads of department with people committed to the transition
- limiting military-run companies to those of a military nature
- establishing a National Security Council with balanced civilian and military representation to set the national security strategy
- discussing the future role of the military in democratic civilian life at the National Constitutional Conference.

Institutional Entry Points
UNITAMS is mandated to provide support for implementation of the JPA and the Darfur track of the JPA includes several references to seeking international support for reform, development and modernization of the military and other security services. For example, Title 2, Chapter 8, Article 33.5.14 states that “the government shall invite experts from within Sudan and from abroad to support this process” and Title 2, Chapter 8, article 33.7 of the JPA states that “the Parties shall request technical, material and financial assistance from the international community to implement this agreement on reform, development and modernization”.

The Prime Minister’s Initiative provides a new entry point for UNITAMS as it highlights reforms in security sector as a top priority to open the way towards democratic transition. Nevertheless, given the sensitivity of the issue, UNITAMS’ involvement in The Reform, Development and Modernization of the Military Establishment and Other Security Services will need to be low key and consist primarily of technical advice.

Ongoing UN programmes

- The PAU is providing capacity-building support for the Sudanese Police Force.
- Sensitization of Sudanese security sector counterparts to the UN’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and the need for adequate accountability and disciplinary measures.
- UNICEF is involved in a sensitization programmes in Sudan to disseminate messages on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Small Arms Control. UNICEF provides trainings and have a history of working closely with different military institutions.

Programmatic Needs
UN support for SSR (The Reform, Development and Modernization of the Military Establishment and Other Security Services) could take the form of sharing best practice and lessons learned from the experience of SSR in other countries, technical advice for strategy development and legal reform, facilitation of policy dialogue and capacity-building around security sector governance.

- Technical advice in helping to define a national vision for the Reform, Development and Modernization of the Military Establishment and Other Security Services by sharing international best practice for democratic governance of the security sector with military and civilian stakeholders.
- Providing a platform for inclusive policy discussion.
- Encouraging informed civil society and political debate by holding workshops for relevant civil society organizations and political parties and raising awareness of key reform concepts and governance issues.
• Capacity building for the Security and Defence Committee of the Transitional Legislative Assembly, including technical support in defining key legal principles guiding SSR and reviewing legislation in the security sector (Armed Forces Act, Rapid Support Forces Act, Police Act, National Security Act).
• Technical support to help the parties achieve their commitment to ensure representation of women in structures of the military institution and other security services/security sector and in related decision-making entities, as well as in the reform, development, and modernization of the military establishment and other security services.
• Technical support in drafting a National Security Strategy and helping to organize related consultations with civil society actors.
• Advisory support in developing a new military doctrine.
• Advisory support for the development of a new training curriculum for the new national army in line with the new military doctrine.
• Capacity-building for women in the police and in other security institutions.

THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Reform, Development and Modernisation of the Military Establishment and Other Security Services

OUTCOME 2.5: The security sector is reformed to support the establishment of a permanent, professional, and independent system to improve its capacity, effectiveness, impartiality, inclusiveness, and professionalism, as well as to strengthen the rule of law in Sudan in accordance with international law and best practices.44

UN Partners: UNITAMS, ODA, UNDP
TGoS Partners: Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Sudanese Armed Forces, Police, General Intelligence Service; Security and Defense Council, Joint High Council; (when established) Borders Commission

Related SDGs: Goal 16

Key relevant provisions of national documents:
Constitutional Charter: art. 7(12)
JPA: National Issues: 9.5.4; Darfur: Ch. 8: 7.1.5, 9, 10.4, 33.4, 33.8; Two Areas: Ch. 2: 11-14, 32, Ch. 4: 2, 96
NAP 1325: Relief and Reconstruction: Goal 2

Outputs:
1. Reform, Development and Modernization programme, based on international best practices and lessons learned, designed, and implemented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. Military and paramilitary institutions that are affiliated with the former regime dismantled.45 | Baseline: Institutions remain in place  
Target: 100% of institutions dismantled  
Data Source: TGoS, UNITAMS and UNCT reports; media reports  
To be confirmed by UNITAMS |
| b. # and % of women represented in security governance arrangements including at senior decision-making levels.46 | Baseline: TBD  
Target: TBD  
Data Source: UNITAMS |
| c. Level of development of plans and a mechanism for the reform, modernization, and development of the military institution and security services.47 | Baseline: Plans and mechanism not developed.  
Target: Plans and a mechanism developed for the reform, modernization, and development of the military institution and security services  
Data Source: TGoS, UNITAMS and UNCT reports; media reports |

44 Adapted from JPA Darfur Ch.8: 9.7
45 Derived from JPA Darfur Ch. 8: 33.4
46 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
47 Derived from JPA: Two Areas Track: Security Arrangements, at # 19.
d. Degree of demographic diversity in formations and units of the military and security institutions. Baseline: TBD
Target: Demographic diversity in all formations and units of the military and security institutions. UNITAMS to confirm
Data Source: UNITAMS

Baseline: TBD
Target: A single national professional army is established with a new unified military doctrine that reflects the demographic diversity of Sudan and defends the supreme interests of Sudan composed of all parties to the Juba Peace Agreement.
UNITAMS to confirm
Data Source: UNITAMS

Baseline: TBD
Target: TBD
Data source: UNITAMS and UN Women

2.6 CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT

For the past two decades, Sudan has been on the agenda of the Security Council on issues related to children affected by armed conflict, and since 2003, parties to conflict in Sudan have been listed in the United Nations Secretary-General’s Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC). Through the Security Council Resolution 1612, the United Nations (UN) in Sudan is tasked to monitor and report on grave violations committed against children in armed conflict. In the past decade, UN has verified more than 400 children recruited and used by parties to conflict across the conflict affected areas in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. The CAAC mandate in Sudan is implemented by the Sudan Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR), chaired by UNICEF and UNITAMS.

Guiding Documents

The Government of Sudan signed an Action Plan with the UN to halt and end recruitment and use of children in 2016. Following the compliance of the Action Plan the Government of Sudan was delisted from the Secretary General’s 2018 Annual Report on CAAC. In addition, the UN has signed Action Plans to halt and end the recruitment and use with Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi, Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar and al-Hilu factions and has engaged in dialogue with SLA/AW but an agreement on an Action Plan remain pending.

Following allegations of recruitment and use of children by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the UN Country Team (UNCT) urged the Government of Sudan to put forward strategies that are transparent and accountable for a comprehensive verification, release, transitional care, family tracing and reunification and community-based reintegration of any child associated with armed forces and armed groups across the country. As part of advocacy efforts to improve the treatment of children associated with armed forces and armed groups, a roadmap was developed with the Government of Sudan.

This roadmap is currently being implemented and includes: a) to identify and visit all the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) barracks, training centers and schools to conduct comprehensive verification exercises:

48 Derived from JPA: Ch. 8: 33.4.4.
49 Derived from JPA: Ch. 8: 33.5.1.
(i) awareness raising and training among the troops; (ii) thorough review of troops; (iii) interview and
document all the suspected cases for full compliance with national and international standards on
recruitment in the armed forces including RSF; and b) establish transitional care, family tracing and
reunification for children associated with armed forces and armed groups identified in Sudan and
neighboring countries to provide the accurate responses to children associated with RSF.

Despite these efforts, children continue to be disproportionately impacted by armed conflict in Sudan.
In the 2020 Annual Report, the Secretary General noted in particular the prevalence of killing and
maiming of children by government security forces and armed groups and the recruitment and use
of children by signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. The Secretary General called upon on all
parties to immediately cease and prevent all grave violations against children and to release all
children from their ranks and hand them over to the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) in
coordination with the UN.

Institutional Entry Points

The continued commitment by the Government of Sudan through its roadmap to comply with its
Action Plan, the Juba Peace Agreement and the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians present
an opportunity to continue the engagement with the Government of Sudan as well as Juba Peace
Agreement signatories to protect children affected by armed conflict. This engagement is conducted
in close coordination with the Sudanese Armed Forces, armed groups and signatories as well as
other security forces, including the Rapid Support Forces. Within the government, counterparts include
the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), the National Council on Child Welfare (NCCW) and the
State Council on Child Welfare (SCCW), the Family and Child Protection Units (FCPUs), and the Unit for
Violence Against Women and Children and in addition to civil society organizations.

Ongoing UN Programmes

Ongoing efforts to protect children affected by armed conflict is conducted under the framework of
the roadmap with the Government of Sudan and signed Action Plans. The benchmark and the Action
Plans include a certain number of benchmarks, including communication with the UN through regular
high-level or technical level meetings; the issuance of military command orders prohibiting the
recruitment and use of children; to put in place disciplinary measures against the recruitment and use
of children; the development and implementation of age assessment mechanisms to allow for the
screening of troops in order to identify children under 18 years old; to provide UN access to monitor
and verify troops at recruitment centres and military lodgments; the release and reintegration of
children in their ranks; the establishment of a community-based complaint mechanism for
communities to report on alleged child recruitment; to sensitize all troops on the Action Plan content
and child rights; and, to raise awareness among communities on child protection issues in armed
conflict, including the recruitment and use of children.

Programmatic Needs

Consider the continued verification of grave violations against children committed by all parties to
conflict in Sudan, the UN needs to continue its engagement with the Government of Sudan and
armed groups to protect children in armed conflict. This is translated into the continued support to
implement the ongoing roadmap and Action Plans, and to target children affected by armed conflict
with critical child protection services including Psychosocial Support (PSS) and Family Tracing and
Reunification (FTR). In addition, in order to strengthen resilience and preparedness, child protection
system strengthening, and child protection community-based interventions need to be prioritized.

Children released from armed forces and armed group in line with the Juba Peace Agreement need
to be provided with reintegration support provided by civilian actors. This also includes for children
who self-disengage from armed forces and armed groups. The SPPSP should make adequate provision for children who are transitioning into adulthood during the DDR programme – to ensure their caseload is acknowledged regardless of the administrative challenges this may entail for agencies responsible.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Children In Armed Conflict**

**OUTCOME 2.6:** By 2024, more children and members of communities affected by armed conflict are better protected from violence, abuse and exploitation and benefit from accessible and improved preventive, justice and social welfare services

**UN Partners:** UNITAMS, UNICEF

**GoS Partners:** Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), National Council on Child Welfare (NCCW) and the State Council on Child Welfare (SCCW), Ministry of Interior, High Level and Technical Level Committees for Action Plan implementation, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), National Security, Juba Peace Agreement signatories and civil society organizations

**Related SDGs:** Goal 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
- Constitutional Charter: Arts. 48 (5), 49
- Child Act 2010
- Action Plans for the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict
- Juba Peace Agreement (JPA): Darfur: Ch.1: 31.1.22; Ch. 2: 11, 22.5.8; Ch.4: 10; Ch.5: 2.3; 4.1.11; 5.2; 8.6.9; Ch.8: 18.8; 27.13.8; 29.5.8; 30.2.8; 30.7.3; 30.10.6; Two Areas: Ch.3: 9.55; Ch.4: 30.8; 48; 82; 91.18; Eastern: Ch.1: 7; Tamazuj: 20.8
- National Plan on the Protection of Civilians (NPPoC): Art. 5

**Outputs:**

1. Strategy for the release and reintegration of children associated with armed forces and armed groups developed and implemented. This will also include a Standard Operating Procedures on Release and Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAG).
3. UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict (MRM) is functioning and regular CTFMR meetings are held.

**Activity 4.1** Support the development of a National Policy on the protection of Children in Armed Conflict.

**Activity 4.2** Support establishing functional technical committees for the protection of children in armed conflict.

**Activity 4.3** Support the drafting an adoption of the new Child Act and ensure the reflection of children in armed conflict.

**Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. # of new child protection laws, policies, plans and frameworks that reflects children in armed conflict issues | Baseline: 2  
Target: 4  
Data Source: UNICEF, UNITAMS MoSD and NCCW |
| b. # of CTFMR members documenting and verifying incidents of grave child rights violations in accordance with MRM methodology | Baseline: 1  
Target: 6  
Data Source: UNICEF and UNITAMS |
c. # of high-level CTFMR meetings organized  
Baseline: 0  
Target: 3  
Data Source: UNICEF and UNITAMS

Output 5. Service providers are well equipped with knowledge, skills and capacity to provide specialize justice and welfare services to children in conflict with the law  
Activity 5.1: Support reintegration of children released from armed forces and armed groups.  
Activity 5.2: Support provision of PSS and Family Tracing and Reunification to children affected by armed conflict and other emergencies.  
Activity 5.3: Support prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence and scale up Child and Adolescent Survivors Initiative (CASI).  
Activity 5.4: Support Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) at national and state level.  
Activity 5.5: Support the roll out of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) training manual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| d. # of UNICEF-targeted children in humanitarian situations benefitting from psychosocial support | Baseline: 425,328 (Girls: 48.8%)
Target: 118,509
Data Source: UNICEF, MoSD and NCCW |
| e. # of children who benefited from FCPU services including GBV | Baseline: 175,546
Target: 40,050
Data Source: UNICEF, MoSD and NCCW |
| f. # of UNICEF targeted children in humanitarian situations registered as unaccompanied or separated who were reunified with families/caregivers | Baseline: 26,968 (Girls: 29%)
Target: 16,935
Data Source: UNICEF, MoSD, NCCW |
| g. # UNICEF-targeted children released from armed forces and groups who were reintegrated | Baseline: 47
Target: 300
Data Source: UNICEF, NCCW, MoSD, TGoS, SAF and armed groups |

Output 6: Children and communities are well equipped with life skills and knowledge about the six grave violations with the involvement of Communication for Development (C4D)  
Activity 6.1: Support children and adolescents’ active engagement through Generation unlimited/CASI/UPSHIFT, life skills training and capacity building with more emphasis on girls.  
Activity 6.2: Train and enhance the capacity, skills and knowledge and raise the awareness of community groups (caregivers, adolescents (boys and girls), youth) in C4D approaches and the child protection issues including birth registration, child recruitment and violence against children.  
Activity 6.3: Engaging existing groups (caregivers, adolescents (boys and girls, youth)) in all the child protection activities and campaigns to bringing about change at the community level by them leading in the process of the change.

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50 Baseline derived from UNICEF’s Annual Work Plan 2021-2022.
51 Target represents UNICEF’s target in its Annual Work Plan 2021-2022 which is calculated in relation to UNICEF’s 2021 Humanitarian Action for Children Appeal.
52 Baseline derived from UNICEF’s Annual Work Plan 2021-2022.
53 Target represents UNICEF’s target in its Annual Work Plan 2021-2022 which is calculated in relation to UNICEF’s 2021 Humanitarian Action for Children Appeal.
54 Baseline derived from UNICEF’s Annual Work Plan 2021-2022.
55 Target represents 20 per cent of UNICEF’s target in its Annual Work Plan 2021-2022 which is calculated in relation to UNICEF’s 2021 Humanitarian Action for Children Appeal.
56 Baseline derived from UNICEF’s Annual Work Plan 2021-2022.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>h. # of adolescent girls and boys and community members receiving</td>
<td>Baseline: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevention and care interventions to address child recruitment and the</td>
<td>Target: 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>six grave violations</td>
<td>Data Source: UNICEF, UNITAMS, NCCW and MoSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. # of active community-based child protection networks</td>
<td>Baseline: 934&lt;sup&gt;57&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target: 1,041&lt;sup&gt;58&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data Source: UNICEF, UNITAMS, NCCW and MoSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. # of at-risk adolescents equipped with knowledge and life skills that</td>
<td>Baseline: 145,733 (51.5% girls)&lt;sup&gt;59&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduce their vulnerability and protect them from violence.</td>
<td>Target: 13,602&lt;sup&gt;60&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data Source: UNICEF, UNITAMS, NCCW and MoSD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>57</sup> Baseline derived from UNICEF’s Annual Work Plan 2021-2022.
<sup>58</sup> Target represents UNICEF’s target in its Annual Work Plan 2021-2022 which is calculated in relation to UNICEF’s 2021 Humanitarian Action for Children Appeal.
<sup>59</sup> Baseline derived from UNICEF’s Annual Work Plan 2021-2022.
<sup>60</sup> Target represents UNICEF’s target in its Annual Work Plan 2021-2022 which is calculated in relation to UNICEF’s 2021 Humanitarian Action for Children Appeal.
PILLAR III: PEACEBUILDING, PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND RULE OF LAW

BACKGROUND

Peacebuilding requires further efforts beyond the implementation of peace agreements. Despite the euphoria that accompanied the 2019 Revolution, there is still a trust deficit between the GoS and the population, in particular the IDPs, largely due to the challenges facing the GoS in making the significant changes in Khartoum visible in the rest of the country, notably by turning around the stagnant economy, addressing the high cost of living, providing basic social services and protecting the civilian population from armed attacks, including by state security entities and proxy elements. In terms of peacebuilding, therefore, progress will depend on changing the widespread perception that not much has changed since the Constitutional Charter in August 2019. A degree of frustration among the civilian population remains, especially among the IDPs, in the absence of a workable national policy on return, resettlement and reintegration – in Darfur alone the IDP population is estimated at 1.8 million people and represents 17% of the state’s population; in the Two Areas, which remain largely controlled by non-signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, the situation is equally complex, and access has largely been limited to humanitarian assistance. Host communities are equally frustrated due to the huge presence of IDPs and refugees who have come along with additional needs and with increase competition over limited basic services and economic opportunities.

In Darfur and Two Areas, but not limited to them, there are multiple threads of conflict – including political, tribal, inter-communal (over land, water and other resources), displacement and civic (between the population and local authorities) – many of which intertwine. These form a highly complex and interlinked web of peacebuilding challenges that has the potential to erode gains, leave civilians at great risk of attacks, including sexual violence targeting women and children, by all parties to the conflict. The situation is further compounded by weak governance institutions and impunity for conflict-related violence. Against this background, there are indications that, with the economic, Sudan’s economic challenges could worsen leading to escalation of household poverty, impacting women especially hard, and resulting in a parallel erosion of fundamental rights in an already fragile social protection system.

In response to concerns regarding its capacity to enable a protective environment, in particular for women, girls and boys, in 2019 the GoS adopted a National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC), which tries to capture the different dimensions of PoC and translate them into a blueprint for coherent and mutually reinforcing actions. The NPPOC is focused on nine key areas: the issues of displaced persons and refugees; the rule of law and human rights; capacity-building for members of the regular armed forces and officials of justice institutions; operational deployment of regular army forces and military formations; DDR; combatting violence against women and children; humanitarian action; conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms; issues related to nomads and herders; and reconstruction, development, and basic services.

As regards PoC, peacebuilding and the rule of law, several key objectives of the Constitutional Charter are interlinked (and, in some cases, dependent upon one another) and simultaneous progress is required for the overall political transition to succeed. Progress along all dimensions of the reform process is required for the Sudanese state to strengthen social cohesion and rebuild the social
contract with its population, especially in the conflict-affected areas of Darfur and the Two Areas, but also throughout Sudan more generally.

THE MANDATE

Security Council resolution 2579 mandates UNITAMS through its integrated UNCT partners to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas. The mandate asks UNITAMS to focus in particular on (a) support Sudanese-led peacebuilding; (b) assist, advise and support the Government of Sudan’s capacity to extend state presence and inclusive civilian governance; and (c) assist, advise and support the Government of Sudan to establish a secure and stable environment within which any future peace agreement can be implemented. While enumerating a long list of specific support areas, all interventions represent necessary prerequisites to rebuilding of the social contract, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas, around the three axes of (a) peacebuilding; (b) Protection of civilians; and (c) Rule of Law.

While Darfur and the Two Areas are specifically referenced by the Security Council, peacebuilding needs are widespread throughout the country, with new hotspots emerging and humanitarian crises and inter-communal conflict leaving complex peacebuilding challenges in their wake. As existing needs far exceed available resources, a country-wide conflict vulnerability analysis will be conducted to inform an integrated response strategy to address and contextualize these challenges and to allow UNITAMS, and the UNCT, to focus resources where needed most. Coordination with humanitarian response activities will be pursued during a transition phase where necessary with a focus on nexus programming.

3.1 RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Justice was one of the central demands of the Sudanese revolution. Responsive and accountable governance and justice institutions are the foundations on which the political transition and interlinked peace-making and economic recovery processes will depend. Sustainable improvement of governance and justice sector require a strong political will and long-term reforms, establishing the legislative and institutional reforms framework. These long-term reforms need to be started now. A justice sector reform strategy devised by the government should sequence and outline reform actions for the justice sector long-term.

Closely linked to Rule of Law (RoL) support under Pillar 3, this outcome focusses on building the capacity of core state institutions, while Pillar 3 addresses the necessary conditions to implementation of RoL reforms on the ground. By virtue of the interlinkages between the different pillars, work in this area spans interventions across pillars 1 and 3 and is reflected in several results frameworks including but not limited to the results frameworks on access to justice, legal and judicial reforms and rule of law and respect for human rights.

Rule of law and the institutional capacity to maintain rule of law in Sudan are weak and decades of conflict have witnessed gross violations of human rights and atrocities committed both by the state and armed groups. The Sudanese legal and justice system’s roots go back to 500 years to the Islamic kingdom of Funj. It evolved later during the Turkish rule and Mahadia era, which was following mainly the traditional Islamic system. During the British Rule, the judicial system largely applied the laws of the British Colonies mainly the Indian Penal Code and Land Registration law, after the independence, the first Judicial authority was established in accordance to the 1956 Sudan Constitution. The Bashir regime degraded the system’s independence and output and the challenge of the transitional period is to
turn a justice system modelled to serve a dictatorial regime into an effective, service provider that enjoys the citizens' trust.

As of June 2021, there is no Constitutional Court, the Chief Justice or Attorney-General are only temporarily appointed. The work of the Tamkin dismantling committee in particular in the area of justice is seen as arbitrary and a threat to judicial independence. The Attorney General's Office with 500 Prosecutors, remains under resourced, disempowered and weakly capacitated to deliver on the population's call for accountability. Judicial reform institutions or organs of self-administration have not yet been set up and organic legislation on justice reform is not enacted. The court and prosecution network remains incomplete in conflict affected areas with no existing deployment plan and strategy to secure court and prosecution offices. Access to the formal justice system therefore remains unequal, ineffective and largely outside of the purview of most of the rural and IDP population. The rural courts have been incorporated in the formal justice system and substitute for access to justice in areas outside of reach of the formal system. The quality of their work and human rights compliance varies significantly.

Closely linked to law enforcement is the enforcement of sentences and punishments. Sudanese prisons, headed by the General Administration of Prisons, are under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior are generally in poor conditions. By way of example, 50 percent of prisons in Darfur suffer from overcrowding due to mass arrests, lack of resources, weaknesses in the justice chain and a serious backlog of cases. Prisons lack appropriate infrastructural facilities to ensure secure and humane conditions for inmates. Significant support will be needed to meet the minimum standards required under the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules).

Guiding Documents

Documents guiding the work on legal and justice reform are the Constitutional Charter, the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians, and the National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security (NAP 1325). A justice sector reform strategy devised by the government should sequence and outline reform actions for the justice sector long-term.

The Constitutional Charter states that rule of law will be upheld by the transitional authority and that ‘all people, bodies and associations, whether official and/or unofficial, are subject to the rule of law. In chapter 1, article 5, it states that Rule of Law will be upheld by the transitional authority and that “all people, bodies and associations, whether official or unofficial are subject to the rule of Law. It also contains more detailed articles on interim arrangements in appointment of highest office holders, while otherwise not changing the set-up of the judiciary.

Building on the commitments enshrined in the Constitutional Charter, the National Protection of Civilians Plan (NPPOC) states that access to justice and rule of law shall be guaranteed and emphasizes the need to restore the citizens’ trust. The NPPOC stipulates that criminal justice will be improved through capacity enhancement of the judiciary and police institutions.

The Juba Peace Agreement’s (JPA) various protocols affirm that the imperative of institutional, legal, justice sector and security reforms will be undertaken to uphold the rule of law. The JPA acknowledges that Rule of Law is necessary to protect civilians and is the basis of a democratic state. Its National Issues (article 11.1) points to the need for reform of the justice system to enhance its professionalism, independence and prestige. Articles 44 – 47 of the Two Areas protocols call for a judicial authority to be established in the state/region and that the judiciary in the state/region shall apply national as well as state/regional legislation. The Two Areas protocol on public prosecution notes that an independent entity for public prosecution shall be established in the state/region in accordance with national standards. Given the overwhelming focus of the JPA on Darfur, the Darfur Protocol touches extensively
on issues related to the judiciary and rule of law. The Parties agree to undertake institutional reforms in the judiciary to appoint/accommodate 20% of men and women from Darfur.

UNITAMS and the UNCT have formed a rule of law and human rights working group to pool resources of all UN entities dedicated to rule of law and ensure delivering as ONE on the rule of law file covering various areas of dedicated expertise ranging from juvenile justice to forensic investigations. That joint support is well placed to cater to various demands of the government.

The Framework of Cooperation on Sexual Violence in Conflict lays down Sudan-UN collaboration areas of legislative reform, investigation, prosecution, and protection of victims and witnesses among others (para. 4(4)).

Institutional Entry Points

A strong focus of rule of law reforms in the transitional period must be on the justice sector and on policing to restore citizens’ trust and enable effective legal remedies for rights violations. Imminent actions set forth in the Constitutional Charter are legislative reviews and reforms, the formation of commissions according to the Constitutional Charter, set-up of justice reform institutions and improvement of court and prosecution offices. Institutions need the capacity to plan and implement strategic reforms to transform into effective, accountable, gender-responsive and people centred rule of law institutions.

The legislative frameworks in particular family law and penal legislation need to be reviewed on discriminatory, outdated norms taking into consideration ratified treaties and conventions as well as human rights international standards including on women’s rights.

The Transitional Government has expressed a desire to reform the national prison system. While these reforms are of a long-term nature, immediate steps such as the development of a comprehensive reform plan must be taken to ensure the creation of a professional prison corrections system. This will entail working with the Sudan Police Force as the prison system in Sudan is a department of the Sudan Police Force under a unified command.

Ongoing UN Programmes

UNITAMS and UN agencies, including but not limited to, UNDP, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNODC, UNOCT, UNICEF, UNWOMEN, UNFPA and UNHABITAT, have formed a working group developing programming jointly and pooling resources. Of all the tasks in Sudan’s transition to the rule of law and to support the transitional government to achieve its transitional agenda, the priority is the building of democratic institutions and promoting peace and stability.

It addresses first and foremost support to Governance, rule of law and human rights related reforms as well as the transition processes as laid out in the 2019 Constitutional Charter and the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. This work is complemented by the OHCHR focus on laws policies and practices to increasingly address prevent and reduce human rights violations as well as its focus on strengthening national mechanisms to provide redress to victims and accountability for human rights violations; to investigate and prosecute gender-related crimes more effectively and to ensure decision making policies and actions are more transparent and the public has access to information for accountability purposes. Within this framework IOM supports the development of a system to manage and regulate migration.

Through that support, the UN Sudan seeks to assists the Transitional Government in its broader goal of strengthening the rule of law and ensuring and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms with a focus. The programme will need to be implemented both at the national and state levels. The interventions at the local level will be concentrated in select localities according to the geographic
vulnerability index elaborated by UNDP and an access to justice survey to be conducted at the beginning of the project implementation phase.

Programmatic Needs

From the rule of law perspective, an immediate focus will be on legal and judicial reform and an extension of state authority to the locality level. In line with the mandate under Security Council resolution 2579 (2021), an immediate focus will need to be on working with Sudan Police Force and the justice sector, through advisory and capacity building support with the objective of enhancing civilian-led protection and, security and the rule of law. Additional support would be needed to staff and support the requisite commissions overseeing the judicial reforms in Sudan.

Identified joint priorities adopted by the UN Human Rights and Rule of Law Working Group are the cognizant that impactful justice reforms will require political will, which is yet to be demonstrated through the consolidation of the legal and institutional framework of the justice sector. Going forward, project support should be based on conditions, rather than constituting a response to shopping lists presented by the Government of Sudan. The UN ROL group is therefore working on developing a list of standard TPs, that will be kept updated, to be used by UN principals in high-level meetings.

Documents guiding all work on legal and justice reform are the Constitutional Charter, the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians, and the National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security (NAP 1325). A justice sector reform strategy devised by the government should sequence and outline reform actions for the justice sector long-term. In the absence thereof, work by the UN Sudan is focusing on a number of different areas as they relate to rule of law and access to justice.

Legal vs Institutional Reforms

- UN ROL/ HR support is currently focused more on support to legal reforms than on institutional reforms. With the establishment of Constitutional Commissions and the fix-term appointment of the Chief Justice and the Attorney General focus should shift to institution building.
  - Selection and appointments of judicial office holders must be based on procedures as outlined in the Constitutional Charter and the organic laws. The Constitution and revised judicial laws must be better aligned with international standards and norms.
  - Safeguarding judicial independence and promoting human rights and gender equality must guide all UN ROL interventions.

- Vetting of justice sector actors requires a careful approach. UNITAMS and OHCHR are providing best international practices to the transitional government to help improve the dismantling process.

Access to Justice

- Access to justice coupled with security concerns for justice officials and institutions in conflict-affected and/or remote areas remains of concern. The UN must continue UNAMID/UNCT’s work on extension of judicial institutions to all localities of the country.
  - UNITAMS police unit is working with the Ministry of Interior on developing capacities to secure judicial premises. UNCT partners may flag difficulties in this regard with the unit.
A justice sector development plan from the judiciary and the Attorney General on extension of the court/AGO network would be helpful as a guiding document.

Coordination at the national level and at the State- and local level

- The UN should support national coordination mechanisms of ROL stakeholders and interfaces between local, State-level and national-level ROL stakeholders.
- Programmatic interventions should consider that the powers between state-level and national-level stakeholders will be revisited in the Constitution-drafting process.

Previous and ongoing assessments

- The group will share assessments on justice sector issues, in particular, the UNFPA 2018 Gender Justice study (updated in 2021); the UNICEF Assessment of Child Protection Units; the UNDP Questionnaire for ROL Program; MOJ Assessment/Draft Strategy (to be shared by UNDP).
- Upcoming assessments are the UN WOMEN’s Assessment of the Legal Framework form a Gender Perspective (validation expected soon); and the UNODC Prison Assessment, building on PRI assessment.

Accountability

Prioritizing the set-up of commissions

- Support to the establishments of commissions according to the Constitutional Charter is a priority. Many commissions also relate to accountability issues including those on anti-corruption and transitional justice.

Prioritizing the strengthening of the Attorney General’s Office

- The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) was only separated from the Ministry of Justice in 2017 and is still building its capacity (currently only 500 prosecutors). Strengthening the Attorney General’s resources is a priority and capacity building support should be tied to structural justice reform measures empowering, capacitating and resourcing the office.
- Stronger investigative capacities and trial skills of prosecutors are required. Collaboration of prosecutors with the police in investigations should be strengthened.
- Investigative committees of the AGO did not yield results. OHCHR is conducting a mapping of investigative committees and their results.

Work on the legislative framework

- The current legislative process’ legitimacy is reduced absent a Legislative Council.
- Tracking the status of draft laws proved challenging as certain steps in the legislative process remain unclear. Examples are the laws on the TJ, AC, Peace Commissions which have been adopted by the Sovereign Council are held up in the MOJ with final editing before being signed by the President of the SC and published in the Official Gazette. Supporting consultation of laws and inclusive processes are key elements of UN support in legislative drafting processes. But selecting CSO representatives and other participants in consultation processes can be challenging. Ensuring balanced geographical representation can be difficult. The working group will share lessons learned.
- Revisions of the legislative framework are required for institutional, procedural and substantive laws. The working group will keep each other informed on what type of legislative support is provided by agencies.
- Ensuring gender justice, accountability for SGBV, improving policing violence against women and the adoption of the EVAW law are priority areas.
- Other areas of key importance are addressing amnesties, pardons and immunities in laws as well as the overall security sector reform issues.
- Witnesses and victims’ protection legislation is yet to be developed.

Work at the State-level, focus Darfur:

- Lessons learned from the UN’s joint work in Darfur include joint programming and the implementation of joint programs.
- Extension of courts, prosecution offices and police stations presence in conflict affected and remote areas remains a problem. Hence, supporting the extension of institutions and the presence and security justice officials in these areas remains relevant.
- Rural Courts can substitute for the absence of formal courts, but the quality and extent of their work needs to be further researched and documented.
- Development plans for AGO/ judiciary should clarify State actions in this regard and the use of mobile courts could be explored.
- There is a need for area-based nexus programming and to focus beyond infrastructures.

### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Legal and Judicial Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME 3.1A:</th>
<th>Justice institutions are set up based on the Constitutional Charter and discharging their mandate in line with international standards and norms.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Partners:</strong></td>
<td>UNDP, UNODC, UNITAMS, OHCHR, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNWOMAN, UNHCR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TGoS Partners:</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Judiciary, Prosecution, Bar associations, MoI, Prisons, Police.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related SDGs:</strong></td>
<td>Goal 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
- Constitutional Charter: arts. 7(5), 11(1)(e)-(f), 28, 29, 38(5)(a), 67(d),
- JPA: National Issues: 1.16, 11.1, 14.2.1; Darfur: Ch. 1: 14, 27, 28, Ch. 3: 13, 19, Ch.4: 19; Two Areas: Ch.2: 8.12; Northern: Gen Provisions: 20,
- NAP 1325: Participation: Goal 2
- NPPoC: 7

**Outputs:**
- 3.1A.1 Public oversight, accountability, responsiveness, and community engagement of law enforcement authorities enhanced
- 3.1A.2 Human rights-compliance, gender-sensitivity, age-sensitive, effectiveness, presence and accessibility of justice and law enforcement institutions at national and sub-national level increased
- 3.1A.3 Compliance with gender and human rights standards by informal justice providers increased
- 3.1A.4 Government officials and Parliamentary representatives capacitated to mainstream gender in legislation, budgets, and policy initiatives
- 3.1A.5 Ability of women, youth and marginalized groups to access justice enhanced
- 3.1A.6 Capacity of civil society organizations in advocacy, policymaking and monitoring/reporting strengthened
- 3.1A.7 Anti-corruption legislation and policies drafted, and institutions with an anti-corruption mandate equipped and capacitated to fulfil their roles

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61 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark under Strategy Priority 3
Thematic Intervention: Rule of Law and respect for human rights enhanced

**Outcome 3.1B**: National, state and local institutions are more effective to carry out their mandates efficiently including strengthened normative frameworks that respect the rule of law and human rights and fundamental freedoms and ensure effective service delivery; and community level protection capacity is increased and supported to promote and protect the rule of law and human rights.

**UN Partners**: UNDP, OHCHR, FAO, UN Women, UNITAMS, IOM, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF

**TGoS Partners**: Ministry of Justice, Judiciary, Prosecution, Ministry of Interior, Police, Commissions (when established) according to the Constitutional Charter

3.1A.8 Capacity of key stakeholders, including the Human Rights Commission, Ministry of Justice, Security Forces and the Corrections Service to comply with human rights standards and gender equality enhanced.

3.1A.9 National capacities to prevent and respond to all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and provide effective protection to women and girls strengthened.

3.1A.10 Critical legislative initiatives in gender justice (e.g. implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 through the National Action Plan on 1325, ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s rights on the Rights of Women in Africa supported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
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</thead>
</table>
Target: Established and fully functional  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| b. # of emblematic cases on serious human rights violations, past abuses and corruption tried in accordance with international standards and norms.63 | Baseline: Around 50 special investigative commissions have been established by the Attorney General’s Office, but none have produced tangible results so far.  
Target: TBD  
Data Source: OHCHR |
| c. High Judicial Council is established with composition, competencies and powers defined under law.64 | Baseline: Not formed; UN is providing expert advice to the draft law  
Target: Functional High Judicial Council with composition, competencies and powers defined under law.  
Data source: |
| d. Safeguards on judicial independence from the Sovereignty Council and the Transitional Legislative Council and the executive branch enacted.65 | Baseline: Judiciary lacks independence (2020) and highest office holders are appointed by the Sovereign Council, the Dismantling Committee, an executive body also dismisses judges and prosecutors.  
Target: Judiciary independent according to international standards and has adequate financial and administrative support.  
Data Source: Constitutional and legal provisions; international and civil society assessments of judicial independence. |

62 The Legal Reform Commission does not have a UNITAMS benchmark indicator, but this proposed indicator uses similar language to that used for other UNITAMS benchmark indicators on commissions.

63 Derived from Constitutional Charter Art. 28 (1)

64 Derived from Constitutional Charter Art. 29 (2)

65 Derived from a combination of a UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 6 and UNDAF outcome 4. This has included adding “rule of law” to the text.
Responsive and accountable governance institutions are the foundations on which the political transition rests. Rule of Law and Human rights interventions within pillar III of the SPPSP focus on the necessary conditions to implement RoL reforms at the locality and/or community level.

Key relevant provisions of national documents:
- **Constitutional Charter**: arts. 5, 7(5), 38(5)(c), Ch. 14, 67(h), 67(j)
- **NPPoC**: 1A, 2, 3, 5
- **JPA**: National Issues: 1.14-1.17, 1.22, 1.31; Darfur: Ch.1: 12-16, 33.1, 14, Ch. 3: 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 22, 23.9, 25.4, 27.2; Ch.4: 1-6, 10-12; Ch.5: 2.2, 2.5, 4.1.11, 6.1.1, 8.6.8, Ch. 8: 9.7, 18.10, 27.13.9, 27.14, 29.5.7, 33.5.15, Two Areas: Ch.2: 8.2, 8.4, 8.8, 8.9, 8.12-15, 8.17; Ch.3: 2, 4, 10.9, 11.36, 65.2, 65.4, 76.1, 86.2, 88; Ch.4: 30.10, 91.19, 92; Eastern: Ch.1: 5, 7; Northern: Gen principles: 4, 7, 11, 20, Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 7; Tamazuj: 20.10
- **NAP 1325**: Prevention: Goal 2, Protection: Goal 1
- **National Policy on Violence against Women 2016-2031**

### Outputs:
- 3.1B.1 New commissions under the Constitutional Charter established, equipped and capacitated.
- 3.1B.2 Reporting, oversight and accountability mechanisms for law enforcement institutions enhanced
- 3.1B.3 Capacity of civil society organizations to protect and promote human rights and reinforce accountability for human rights violations strengthened
- 3.1B.4 Justice and security institutions’ capacity to protect human rights, provide redress for gender-based violence and apply the rule of law enhanced
- 3.1B.5 Police capacity to engage with and respond to community concerns enhanced
- 3.1B.6 Proportion of women recruited and promoted to rule of law institutions increased
- 3.1B.7 Rural courts’ capacity to fairly and effectively mediate conflicts related to land and other conflict drivers assessed and systematic reforms to improve them commenced
- 3.1B.8 Compliance of international standards and norms with women’s rights increased.
- 3.1B.9 Prison training centre established and prison conditions more compliant with the Nelson Mandela Rules and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules)
- 3.1B.10 Research and analysis of needs, capacities and entry points for strengthening protection of rights undertaken.

### Indicators
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Extent to which institutions have capacity to support fulfilment of nationally and internationally ratified human rights obligations.</th>
<th>Baseline: Partially. Target: NHRI meet all 4 criteria. Data source: International treaty body annual reports.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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67 UNDP Country Programme Document indicator.
68 PBF “Building Sustainable Peace and Social Cohesion” Outcome Indicator.
69 As of May 2021, PBF has baseline figures for Tawilla Locality, North Darfur. A full PBF baselining exercise will need to be undertaken for all intervention areas.
c. Percentage of recommendations from the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review implemented.\(^{70}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline: (^{71}) 65% (2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target: 85% (2021) (^{72})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Source: UPR, evaluation reports, United Nations country team reports, national Human Rights Council reports, Ministry of Interior, UN Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed: UN Women to confirm d. Progress in Sudan according to CEDAW(^{73}) and the Maputo Protocol.(^{74})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Women to advise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Access to Justice**

**OUTCOME 3.1C:** Access to justice guaranteed through restoration in confidence in justice institutions, and in the event of dispute, conflict or damages suffered, recourse to those institutions for trial, litigation and adjudication in accordance with the law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Partners: UNDP, OHCHR, UNFPA, UNWomen, UNICEF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TGoS Partners: Ministry of Justice, Judiciary, Prosecution, Ministry of Interior, Police, National Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Related SDGs:** SDG 16

Responsive and accountable governance and judicial institutions are the foundations on which the political transition rests. Access to justice will be key to rebuilding confidence in the transition with RoL reform necessary both at the national at the locality and/or community level.

**Key relevant provisions of national documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JPA: Ch. 3: 5,6; Ch.4: 1, 4; Two Areas: Ch.3: 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAP 1325: Protection: Goal 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPPoC: 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outputs**

- 3.1C.1 Human rights-compliance, gender-sensitivity, effectiveness, presence and accessibility of justice and law enforcement institutions at national and sub-national level increased
- 3.1C.2 Ability of women, youth and marginalized groups to access justice enhanced
- 3.1C.3 Reporting, oversight and accountability mechanisms for law enforcement institutions enhanced
- 3.1C.4 Capacity of civil society organizations to protect and promote human rights and reinforce accountability for human rights violations strengthened
- 3.1C.5 Justice and security institutions’ capacity to protect human rights, provide redress for gender-based violence and apply the rule of law enhanced
- 3.1C.6 Police capacity to engage with and respond to community concerns enhanced
- 3.1C.7 Proportion of women recruited and promoted to rule of law institutions increased
- 3.1C.8 Criminal justice chain infrastructure in conflict-affected areas rebuilt or repaired
- 3.1C.9 Rural courts’ capacity to fairly and effectively mediate conflicts related to land and other conflict drivers strengthened
- 3.1C.10 Women’s equal participation as adjudicators and parties before rural courts increased
- 3.1C.11 Prisons equipped and capacitated to hold detainees in conditions aligned to the Nelson Mandela Rules and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules)

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70 UNDAF 4 indicator.
71 UNDAF 4 baseline, target and data source.
72 Data not available during the reporting period 2018-20.
73 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York, 18 December 1979
74 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
3.1C.12 Research and analysis of needs, capacities and entry points for strengthening protection of rights undertaken

3.1C.13 Awareness and behavioural change campaigns on legal rights, gender-based violence and access to justice implemented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Percentage of citizens who know how to access justice systems and are aware of their human rights. Disaggregated by gender and age.</td>
<td>Baseline: UNDP to provide update; Target: UNDP to provide update; Data source: Perception survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Access to justice services disaggregated by gender, age, geographic location, population group, and kind of violations.</td>
<td>Baseline: UNDP to provide update; Targets: UNDP to provide update; Data Source: Citizen Report Card Survey by UNDP (every two years), UNDP tracking studies, UNAMID, United Nations organizations, rule of law institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. # of women in the justice institutions and law enforcement institutions disaggregated by gender and age</td>
<td>UN Women to advise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

In Sudan’s conflict-affected areas, particularly in Darfur, multiple threads of conflict – including political, tribal and inter-communal – are intertwined. The situation often leads to the violent outbreak resulting in significant displacement of persons with immediate protection needs. In the wake of UNAMID’s withdrawal, there is a heightened risk of further politically motivated and inter-communal violence that has, since early 2020, manifested itself in a series of violent incidents. Across Darfur, the risk of violent conflict persists, and multiple incidents were reported in recent months. Since early 2020, inter-communal conflicts have taken place across the Darfur region resulting in extensive civilian casualties, injuries and mass displacement. The most recent escalations in West, Central and South Darfur are deemed to have caused the displacement of almost 200,000 individuals. Notably, in early 2021, clashes between Masalit and nomadic Arab tribes in El Geneina town left an estimated 137 dead, 221 injured and mass displacement. This complex and interlinked web of peace-making, peacebuilding and protection challenges have the potential to erode the years of progress made by United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and UN protection agencies, to undermine implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and, if it continues to undermine the transition.

The volatile situation and tensions throughout Darfur around root causes of conflict linked to land, water resources and pasture rights, are exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons. The competition for limited resources, is compounded by years of ethnic manipulation along tribal lines of those rights by the former regime, but leaves civilians at significant risk of attacks, killings and sexual violence targeting women and children and men. Local authorities lack capacity, resources and determination to fully engage in the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and so do relevant actors on the ground. The consequences are dire and the situations are of particular concern given the lack of deployment, to date, of joint protection forces and a prevailing impunity. As in other parts of the country, the situation in Darfur is compounded by weak governance and security...
institutions and impunity for conflict-related, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), further complicating the picture.

The Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS) has responded to recent incidents with the deployment of joint government security forces, however the restoration of calm has proven to be volatile. Local authorities in hotspot locations lack the resources to fully enforce the rule of law. The Government’s commitments to protect civilians are enshrined in the ambitious National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC) that was presented to the Security Council in May 2020 following decisions to drawdown UNAMID. The NPPOC establishes a National Mechanism for the Protection of Civilians, including committees at state-level in charge of implementation but these are yet to be fully established and operationalized. While the TGoS has reported making significant headway on aspects of the NPPOC, including the recruitment of an additional police cadre in regions affected by inter-communal conflict; establishing committees to investigate human rights violations, holding workshops on aspects of international humanitarian law, protection of civilians and early warning systems, recent intercommunal clashes in El Geneina and elsewhere have exposed significant gaps in the Government’s capacity to protect civilians.

The Juba Peace Agreement, signed in October 2020 between the Government and the Sudan armed movements, also includes ambitious commitments to protection of civilians. The most important instrument for physical protection of civilians is the 12,000-strong Joint Protection Force (now to be increased to 20,000) composed of both government security forces and the forces of the Darfuri armed movements, who signed the JPA. In the composition, 60% of the forces provided by the Government is expected to be of police and military, while some armed movements’ forces will also be trained as the police. The Joint Protection Force is mandated to “undertake the constitutional, moral and political responsibility of the Government in protecting civilians” and authorized to deploy military and police cadres for any rapid response and deterrence. Abiding by international humanitarian law and international human rights law to end violence threatening life and individuals, the force also mandated to mobilize police forces to secure villages for voluntary return, securing IDP camps, working to disengage parties to tribal conflicts and creating an environment for promoting dialogue and peaceful co-existence between tribes, farmers and herders.

The Government has been slow to implement the JPA’s security arrangements and the National Plan for the Protection of Civilian but, following domestic and international criticism of an inadequate security response to serious violence in El Geneina in early April, steps are now being taken by the Security and Defense Council to deploy the first 8,000 strong contingent of the Joint Protection Force after three months of joint training. However, there is still no clarity about the command-and-control structure, vetting and screening arrangements or the content and delivery mechanism for Protection of Civilians.

Therefore, the purpose of work in which the integrated mission will be engaged in the Protection of Civilians is to: (i) Reduce and prevent the threat to the civilian population particularly internally displaced persons from armed conflict and violence, and to support the expansion of an enabling protective environment by supporting the capacity of the Government of Sudan to implement the NPPOC and JPA. (ii) With a desired end-state that the Government of Sudan to have sufficient capacity and will to prevent, mitigate and resolve conflicts and effectively carry out its responsibility to protect civilians.

**Guiding Documents**

UNSCR 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021) mandates UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT components to undertake PoC. Protections falls under Pillar 1 of the mandate as it relates to state and institutional reform; under Pillar 2 as various areas of protection are included in the JPA; and under Pillar 3 which promotes protection of civilians at the level of implementation.
Protection of women and youth are mainstreamed through the NPPOC. The active involvement in women in positions of influence and decision making within the protection architecture is emphasized as necessary to ensure women’s protection. This is consistent with the National Action Plan (NAP) for UNSCR 1325 Women and Peace and Security. The Juba Peace Agreement is also consistent with the NPPOC, with the Framework of Cooperation of The Republic of Sudan and The United Nations on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence in Conflict (2020) providing commitments to that effect.

Other reference documents are:

- National Plan for Protection of Civilian (NPPOC)
- UN Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021) on Sudan
- DPKP/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations, April 2010
- DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive PoC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations
- UNITAMS Mission Concept
- Concept of operations and Mission framework on PoC
- Role of UN Police in the Protection of Civilians
- Terms of Reference for PoC Working Group and PoC Task Forces
- Sudan Protection Sector Strategy 2020 (Draft)
- UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).
- African Union Policy Framework Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Institutional Entry Points

The Transitional Government of Sudan (TGoS) acknowledges the States’ responsibility to protect civilians and has developed the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC). The NPPOC is the main national entry point for the UN support in Sudan for Protection of Civilians. The Plan is based on relevant aspects of the Constitutional Charter, existing national legislation, the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international refugee law, and the Conventions on the Rights of the Child (CRC). At the sub-national level, Protection of Civilian Committees are being established and they are being encouraged to develop their own action plan for the NPPOC tailored to their specific context.

PoC is therefore primarily the responsibility of the state. In Sudan, decades of conflict have resulted in widespread violence, forced and protracted displacement, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), recruitment of children into armed groups and marginalization of particular social and demographic groups. Discriminatory policies have created unfair distribution of wealth and climate change and the country’s economic difficulties have exacerbated inequalities. The State’s institutional capacity and access to resources to protect its population is weak and external support from the United Nations (UN) and other actors to protect civilians and develop a sustainable capacity for PoC is needed.

Ongoing UN Programmes

UNSCR 2579 (2021) envisages support to the GoS to implement its National Plan for Protection of Civilian, JPA and Constitutional Charter. The Security Council has also requested in resolution 1894 (2009) “that mandated protection activities must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources”. UNITAMS should therefore ensure that all available resources and capacities are used to protect civilians, especially in scenarios where this priority competes with other
elements of the mandate. However, there are significant constraints to what can be achieved, given that these resources and capacities are limited. Furthermore, the Mission frequently faces critical gaps in these resources and capacities that can significantly undermine its ability to deliver its PoC mandate. A cursory analysis of the Mission’s resources and capacities required for it to fulfil its protection mandate reveals the following most critical gaps:

Given all of the above, creating a conducive environment for POC, will necessarily entail additional programming and an increased focus on this issue. Work might entail support to the different Commissions and Mechanisms created in the Juba Peace Agreement and work envisaged in the National Protection of Civilian Plan. It might also, for example, include work with the Commissions for Nomads and Herders and Farmer, to try to prevent friction between farmers and pastoralists; to the Land and Hawakeer Commission to arbitrate disagreements over land rights; and to the IDPs and Refugees Commission to oversee and facilitate voluntary return and resettlement, work to ensure proper protection of returnees; as well as to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee to assess the root causes of conflict and promote reconciliation.

For the UN in Sudan, the protection and promotion of national protection capacity is provided through:

- support and capacity enhancement to national institutions to develop and implement policies at national and sub-national level;
- physical protection through monitoring and deployment of specialist protection units and police and armed forces; and
- the development of preventative measures, such as early warning systems, to mitigate conflict, climate change and natural disaster and to promote local level and/or tradition conflict resolution mechanisms that foster dialogue for peaceful coexistence
- Protection of civilians (PoC) is central to UN interventions. The protection sector is led by UNHCR and other agencies lead specific sub-sectors.

The UN Guidance Note on Protection of Civilians highlights the following activities that could support the NPPOC

### Support to Prevention

- Protection Monitoring
- Early warning and data analysis

### Support to Physical Protection

- Capacity building in International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
- Mine action
- Protection by presence

### Support to the Creation of an Enabling and Protective Environment

- Rule of law and human rights, including institutional and legal reform
- Addressing the issues of internally displaced persons and refugees
- Capacity building in IHRL
- Addressing issues of farmers and nomads
- Combating violence against women and children
- Humanitarian action
- Strengthening conflict avoidance and resolution mechanism
- Reconstruction, development and basic services
- Water and sanitation
Programmatic Needs

Displaced Populations and Refugees: Specific interventions to protect displaced populations and develop durable solutions are included in the NPPoC, Constitutional Charter, JPA and UNSCR 2524. The identification and implementation of durable solutions removes the need for specific protection for displaced groups. UNHCR leads on the protection of displaced populations and works in partnership with other UN entities, relevant authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to protect persons with specific needs, and community-based protection networks. Activities include, but are not limited to, protection through the presence of UNHCR, advocacy, monitoring, support to community protection networks, support to secure legal documentation and address land issues and the provision of humanitarian assistance. UNHCR’s PoC activities are funded through its emergency budget.

Rule of law and Human Rights: Rule of Law (RoL) and human rights in the NPPoC is linked to access to justice, human security and good governance. It affirms the principle of non-impunity, respect for the authority of the state though RoL, asserts that security breaches should be controlled and cooperation with OHCHR maintained. The JPA and UNSRC 2524 stress the importance of RoL and the promotion and protection of human rights according to international humanitarian and human rights law.

Capacity Building for Judiciary, Police and Armed Forces: The NPPoC emphasizes capacity building for the judiciary and police to improve PoC and RoL and to tackle abuses perpetrated by the armed forces. Such interventions are promoted through the JPA and UNSCR 2524 and are part of security sector reform (SSR). The NPPoC also included the need for physical protection provided by specially trained protection forces. Joint protection forces would be deployed to protection hotspots identified by the protection sector. A UNDP concept note from March 2021 proposes that unarmed POC Advisors in cooperation with the Sudan Police force and other Government of Sudan law enforcement agencies, ‘monitor the security situation in IDP camps, return areas and host communities in hotspots, and report security concerns. In consultation with national counterparts, the POC Advisors will also recommend measures to enhance the capacities of SPF and other law enforcement agencies in the field of POC.’

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is included in the NPPoC, JPA and UNSCR 2524. Initial assessments for DDR activities will begin in July/August 2021 and are covered in a separate section on this issue.

UNICEF leads interventions for Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAF) which includes support for children who have been recruited into armed groups and/or experienced abuse from armed groups. The NPPoC stresses the need to support those affected by armed violence and armed groups, particularly women and children. Part of the work that would be undertaken on this field includes work done, by UNICEF, on Children in Armed Conflict.

Combating Violence against Women and Children: The NPPoC states that the TGoS/GoS has zero tolerance for violence against women. A unit in the Ministry of Justice was established in 2005 to combat violence against women and children. There is a NAP for UNSCR 1325. The legal framework and justice sector is being strengthened to address sexual and gender-based violence and includes provisions to criminalize female genital mutilation (FGM). This would involve the gender-based violence protection sub-sector. Women lack access to justice and do not feel empowered to seek justice. This is particularly the case with SGBV. The Sovereign Council has amended the criminal code provisions and banned the practice of FGM. The NPPoC also includes plans to increase the number of women social workers and those working the protection sector.

77 UNDP Sudan Concept Note, Protection of Civilians through Joint Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, March 2021
Child Protection: NPPoC promotes child protection and Sudan has ratified the CRC. The UN operates a child protection sub-sector group and CAAF interventions are also important aspect of programming.

Humanitarian Action: The NPPoC has a broad definition of humanitarian action which includes emergency assistance, protection of humanitarian staff and distribution of humanitarian assistance, sustainable solutions for displaced populations provision of immediate needs and basic services including infrastructure and access to health and education and the establishment of early warning systems to guard against emergencies. The JPA also provides for humanitarian action. Ensuring that access to humanitarian assistance is not deliberately impeded or prevented because of insecurity is part of UNITAMS area of responsibility. However, provision of humanitarian assistance falls under the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) which elaborates its interventions through the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).

Conflict avoidance and resolution mechanisms: To strengthen conflict avoidance and conflict resolution mechanisms, the NPPoC promotes transitional justice, which is also an important aspect of the JPA and UNSCR 2524, and institutional capacity strengthening and community level reconciliation to promote peaceful coexistence.

The UNCT proposes the following to promote conflict resolution and has added, in brackets, the lead UN entities for specific interventions:78

- Identify those affected and determine the damage associated with violent incidents (Protection and Sub Protection Sectors);
- Raise awareness of transitional justice, particularly the AU transitional justice policy (OHCHR);
- Facilitate access to judicial bodies (UNDP, RoL);
- Raising awareness among communities of their legal rights (UNDP Rule of Law, OHCHR and Protection Sector);
- Preventing and combating incitement and hatred (preparing society for reconciliation, coexistence and acceptance of others (PBF agencies);
- Strengthening the role of the Native Administration (UNDP, UNHABITAT);
- Educating citizens to be familiar with the laws and customs of organizing paths (MASARAT) (UNDP, FAO);

See Thematic area ‘RoL and Human Rights’ for more information on judicial reform, transitional justice, reparations and access to justice. See Community Stabilization for local level interventions

**Housing, Land and Property:** Disputes over land ownership have been a root cause of conflict in Sudan and the need to resolve these issues is stated in the NPPoC and JPA. UN Habitat, UNDP and the protection sector propose establishing a conflict resolution mechanism for land and its ownership. Housing land and property (HLP) is a protection sub-sector group

**Nomads and Herders:** The NPPoC aims to combat violence between nomads and herders through agreeing land access and land use, raising awareness, promoting peaceful coexistence and combating climate change and promoting environmental management.

The UNCT proposes the following to address issues of nomads and herders:79
- Mapping routes (FAO, UNDP) and determining the locations of the hostels, the borders of villages, farms, and water sources (FAO, PBF agencies, durable solutions working group (DSWG));
- Activating and strengthening mechanisms for implementing the recommendations of peace conferences related to conflict resolution over water resources (PBF agencies, DSWG);
- Identifying sites with environmental imbalances (FAO, UNDP);
- Sowing weed seeds (FAO);
- Rehabilitation of forests (FAO, UNDP);
- Holding workshops for civil society to raise awareness (Protection and Sub Protection Sectors);
- Distributing educational brochures for pupils and students (UNICEF, Education Sector);
- Activating the role of the media in raising awareness through radio and television.
- Nomadic mobile education (UNICEF, Education Sector):
- Preparing for the implementation of non-formal education programmes for children and adults in nomadic MASARAT (UNICEF, Education Sector and Child Protection Sub Sector);
- Activating basic literacy programs and opening education centers for out-of-school children in nomads’ paths (UNICEF, Education Sector and Child Protection Sub Sector);
- Activating programs to raise the capacities of adolescents and youth in nomadic paths (PBF agencies);
- Adapting non-formal education and eradicating illiteracy in light of the COVID 19 (UNICEF, Education Sector)

See also the thematic area, ‘Environmental Mainstreaming and Natural Resource Governance’ for more information about interventions to combat climate change and adopt community level initiatives to cooperate on environmental management. See also the sections on small arms and light weapons where the issue of small arms for personal protection is a conflict driver is addressed.

Reconstruction, development, and essential services: Reconstruction, development and essential services are included in the NPPoC and fall under the remit of the HCT and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). See also under the thematic area, ‘Community Stabilization.’

Mine Action: Mine action is not included in the NPPoC although it is considered to be a protection of civilians intervention and falls under the protection cluster system. It is necessary to facilitate humanitarian access and the distribution of humanitarian assistance as well as to reduce the risk of death and injuries from explosive hazards. Sudan is a state party to the Anti-personal Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and mine action is included in the JPA and UNITAMS mandate. There is a mine action protection sub-sector group. See also the thematic area ‘Mine Action’ for more information.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Protection Issues/ Protection of Civilians**

| OUTCOME 3.2: | National capacity for conflict prevention and physical protection of civilians, including displaced populations, is enhanced through support to the implementation of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians; and community level protection capacity, including civil society actors and local protection networks, is increased and supported to promote and protect the rights of civilians in need of protection. |
| UN Partners: | UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF |
| TGoS Partners: | Commission on Refugees, Peace Commission |
| Related SDGs: | Direct contribution to SDG 16 and enabler of other SDGs |
| Key relevant provisions of national documents: | NPPoC: all JPA: Darfur: Ch.3: 16, Ch.5: 4.1.11, 5.1, 5.2, 8.6.16, Ch.8: 29.5.11, 29.5.13; Two Areas: Ch.3: 80.1; Northern: Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 3(e) |

80 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 6.
NAP 1325: Protection: all
TGoS pledges at the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2019

**Outputs:**
1. Plan for UNITAMS’ and UNCT’s support to the Government’s National Strategy for the Protection of Civilians agreed with GoS
2. Early warning, monitoring and reporting enhanced amongst the community level actors and protection networks
3. Protection/early warning structures supported at the national level within the Nation Plan protection mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevention</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| a. % decrease in the incidence of large-scale armed violence in Darfur and the Two Areas – especially in Darfur over time | Baseline: Not established  
Targe: UNITAMS to advise  
Data Source: UNCT reports; media reporting; civil society assessments |
| b. Effective local and national mechanisms to mitigate and resolve conflicts have been developed, and the public perceives that the Government has this capacity. | Baseline: Not established  
Targe: UNITAMS to advise  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society reports |
| c. Early warning and early response mechanisms are functional and help identify threats to civilians. | Baseline: Not established  
Target: at least 3 EWM implemented  
Data Source: UNCT reports; media reporting; civil society reports |
| d. Level of functioning of conflict early warning systems and conflict resolution mechanisms to protect civilians and ensure accountability. | Baseline: Commitment of TGoS and the signatories to development of national peace architecture (2020) as currently articulated by the peace agreements in place  
Target: Sudan has conflict early warning systems and conflict resolution mechanisms fully functioning at all levels (2022) to protect civilians and ensure accountability  
Data Source: Integrated tool for PoC |
| **Physical protection**                                                   |                                                                                                        |
| e. % reduction in civilian casualties from armed conflict and violence. | Baseline: Not established  
Targe: UNITAMS to advise  
Data Source: CSO, UNCT and UNITAMS reports |
| f. Cases of forced displacement of civilian populations are reduced.      | Baseline: Not established  
Targe: UNITAMS to advise  
Data Source: GoS reports; UNITAMS, UNCT assessments; media reporting; civil society reports |
| **Creating an enabling environment**                                      |                                                                                                        |
| g. A National Human Rights Action Plan is adopted and there is demonstrable evidence of the National Human Rights Commission meeting the Paris Principles | Baseline: Not established  
Target: HRAP adopted and reports available  
Data Source: GoS reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments, GoS reporting |
| h. Relevant parties support monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangement on conflict-related | Baseline: Not established  
Target: UNITAMS to advise  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments |
sexual violence as set out in SCR 2467 (2019).

| i. A national security policy/strategy is developed and is consistent with international standards and Sudan’s international obligations. | Baseline: Not established  
Target: Strategy developed and plan in implementation stage  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments, GoS reporting |

3.3 LAND REFORM

Land disputes in Sudan are recognized as a root cause of conflict and tribal clashes particularly in Darfur and the Two Areas. In Darfur, most land-related conflicts have been occurring among IDPs, hosting communities, nomads, pastoralists, farmers, and others; the land-related conflict is caused by unstructured land governance, poverty, ethnical identity, exclusion, and environmental issues. Since competition for land and the political power needed to secure land rights is ongoing, recurrent violence such as what is taking place across Sudan will almost continue unless cohesive attempts are made to implement the provisions in the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and its uneven distribution of political power.

The issue is made more complex however, as HLP rights in Sudan are governed by a complex combination of statutory laws, regulations, decrees, and other informal mechanism stemming from statutory, customary, and cultural legal systems. Indebtedness, lack of written legal documentation, lack of awareness of rights and recourse to the legal protection result in insecure tenure and households at risk of eviction. Under the umbrella of UNCT, HLP sub sector is operationalized to tackle HLP issues for Sudan co-lead by UN-Habitat and NRC with the members from FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, OHCHR and RCO. The HLP sub sector highlighted the key challenges on HLP reform:

Accountable and transparent land management system: In Sudan, weak land and natural resource management remain one of the key drivers of conflict, along with social, political, and economic instability. The HLP provisions in the JPA have major implications which attempt to address long-standing disputes but may counterintuitively contribute to the resurgence of violence particularly in Darfur. The looming return of displaced people and refugees in Sudan has exacerbated already existing land rights violations.

Land disputes resolution mechanism: The high prevalence of secondary occupation remains unresolved in Sudan. The occupation of displaced population’s areas of origin across Darfur by different groups has been a major barrier preventing durable solutions. The absence of a clear policy on how the JPA will consider the rights of these secondary occupants, who will themselves become displaced if/when a returns process is implemented, remains a divisive factor. Despite ongoing efforts, tenure security under the formal system is the only one recognized and protected under Sudanese law. The complexities brought by the occupation of community land by non-resident communities and pro-longed displacements continue to complicate land rights of original landowners, the new occupiers and IDPs. Most IDP camps/settlements are located on other people’s lands further execrating land conflicts. Although the circumstances that led to the occupation are different, the

81 Darfur Land Administration Assessment, UNHABITAT, 2020
retrospective decision to return the land back to the rightful tenure holders requires not only a legal but a political decision, which currently does not exist.

Security of HLP: Although the importance of securing HLP is recognized, the actual implementation of the JPA has been delayed. Existing structures are not yet robust enough to address land appropriation, arbitrary grabbing, restitution, or compensation. The Land Commission, for example, entrusted with land arbitration, does not yet have the legal authority to restore and recognize land rights and has struggled to address the scale and complexity of HLP issues. It is also unclear how the JPA creates a pathway for accessing HLP rights in the context of local integration and providing IDPs with formal recognition of the right to the land they have been occupying over the past decades of displacement. Environmental degradation and drought have contributed to a shift in migration patterns that have seen many nomadic groups transition from pastoralism to a semi-sedentary lifestyle. The HLP rights of these communities need to be considered as part of the durable solutions process.

Gender equality: Generally, women have less access, use, control, or ownership over HLP as a result of restrictive customary/cultural practices and gender inequality on issues such as inheritance rights, legal status, and resource distribution. As the number of female-headed households increases, limited access to land greatly affects their access to livelihood opportunities. Women encounter several barriers when enforcing their HLP rights, including lack of awareness of their rights, lack of necessary land documents, and limited resources to pursue their claims. International treaty bodies have emphasized the equitable rights of women, prohibiting discriminatory practices such as unequal treatment of women regarding land rights; and promoting the right of women to own land without restrictions on the grounds of discrimination.

Natural resources, livelihoods, and corporate responsibility: The ongoing environmental degradation, shortage of rainfall, desertification in the northern areas alongside the unused water in the vast valleys, irrational cutting of trees for building and domestic use, primeval subsistence farming, grazing utilizing wide land space with little production have all had a negative impact on the livelihoods of the rural population of Sudan. There is an increasing trend of large-scale, land-based investments by international and national businesses that can lead to forced evictions, expropriation, and other human rights abuses, including the destruction of livelihoods. The state has the duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including businesses. Corporate responsibility includes avoiding infringement on individual rights and addressing the negative impacts, such as remedies for victims.

Guiding Documents

The Sudanese government has the primary responsibility for protecting the rights to housing, land and property. The Constitutional Charter provides for a Land Commission and states that the issue of lands and tribal lands must be addressed in peace negotiations. The JPA recognizes that land disputes are root causes of conflict in Sudan and calls for the protection of land rights, traditional land rights and housing and property rights. The JPA notes that legislative and institutional reform as well as programmes to resolve land disputes and restore or provide compensation for expropriated land, particularly in Darfur and the Two Areas are necessary. It also highlights the need to examine land rights in relation to natural resources and resource extraction. JPA provisions on land issues have significant implications on humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development interventions. These provisions although expected to contribute to durable solutions may themselves become a source of conflict.

The JPA gives IDPs and Sudanese refugees’ the right to return to their places of origin, habitual residence, or to be resettled in a preferred location. Securing HLP is critical for durable solutions for the vulnerable population because it addresses one of the root causes of the conflict. The agreement also gives the right to seek restoration or compensation for any lost or seized house, land and property as a result of the conflict in Darfur, which is essential for transitional justice.

92
The JPA recognizes the traditional ownership of tribal lands through the Hakura system, which acknowledges customary land rights and grazing routes that are traditional for communities in Darfur. The commitments in the JPA to restoring HLP rights for conflict-displaced families represent a critical political opportunity to resolve one of the world’s largest and longest-running displacement and protection crises.

Institutional Entry Points

Following the Constitutional Charter, the Juba Peace Agreement contains provisions to address the land issue. These provisions might be included to return IDPS to land currently occupied by others. However, the JPA calls for the establishment of state level land commissions in coordination with a national level Land Commission to undertake the functions related to (1) the review and design programmes to ‘address land issues in the Two Areas’ [...]; (2) ensure ‘participation of local communities on the basis of state/regional norms, laws, and mechanisms’; (3) ‘Develop policies to regulate possession and use of lands and exercise of rights thereon’; (4) map land usage ‘with the participation of local communities [...]’; (5) ‘Determine procedures for freehold land ownership’; (6) ‘[...] ensure the restitution of ownerships for lands [...] expropriated without consulting stakeholders’; (7) exercise powers delegated by the National Land Commission; (8) Review all land allocation; (9) Review investment projects; (10) Review mining contracts and projects [...]; (11) ensure land owners are sufficiently compensated; (12) Develop policies for the use of agrarian lands and forests. In addition to the national-level Land Commission, the JPA established the ‘Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission (DLHC)’ to ‘hear and mediate claims of property restitution filed by individuals and communities who lost their lands because of the conflict in Darfur’. The DLHC is linked to both the Judiciary – with the establishment of special courts – as well as traditional and local leaders through the formation of local committees to be operationalized.

On land reform, there are four key land administration actors in national level including 1) National Assembly, Legislation Council on land legislations, 2) National Land Commission as executive board, 3) Council for Physical Planning and Development for land use policies, and 4) Judiciary, General Land Register. The JPA attempted to address housing, land and property (HLP) rights; on the other hand, the implementation of the JPA has been delayed including establishment of new National Land Commission that resulted lack of structural coordination and weak institutional capacities in national land actors. In addition, more key land administration actors exist in state level including governors, state ministries, rural courts, native administrations, tribal leaders, and the customary mechanism of dispute resolution (Judiyya).

Ongoing UN programmes

The HLP sub-sector for Sudan is jointly chaired by UN-Habitat and NRC with the members from FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, OHCHR and RCO. The HLP sub-sector is open to UN entities, international organizations, development partners, and international and national NGOs those who engages on HLP issues in Sudan. Moreover, land issues cut across many areas of UN programming as it is indicated to “Guidance Note of the Secretary General ‘The United Nations and Land and Conflict’. This includes work on Protection of Civilians; Rule of Law, Environmental mainstreaming, Natural Resource Governance. UNDP, UN-Habitat and FAO with other UN partners work to support land reform in Sudan which includes legislation, land dispute resolution mechanisms, governance and protection of land tenure rights, urban and regional planning and land productivity management. Interventions to support land reform and dispute resolution are informed by technical standards and relevant international human rights law and humanitarian law, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
At present, a range of UN agencies provide programmatic support to land issues. UNHABITAT supports HLP rights of IDPs, returnees and host communities through sensitization, public consultations, and the registration of land rights in collaboration with the Global Land Tenure Tool Network. UNDP supports equal, undisputed, and legal access to land for livelihoods and support land governance, land dispute resolution mechanisms. FAO contributes to food security and nutrition by increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector. UNEP supports Sudan to develop innovative approaches of co-management of natural resources, based on environmental priorities identified by communities. UNHCR supports refugees, returnees and IDPs in fostering provision of durable solutions for IDPs living in camps and hosting communities in coordination with UN agencies and partners. IFAD focus on increasing agricultural production through environmentally sustainable practices and the distribution of improved seeds and promotes land reform.

**Programmatic Needs**

To initiate and deliver collective support to the Transitional Government of Sudan from UN agencies, NGOs, CSOs, development partners and donors; the following recommendations were made by the HLP sub sector for Sudan.

**Land governance and architecture:**
- Support the Transitional Government to prioritize HLP reform processes that address local grievances and perspectives.
- Support the establishment and strengthening of land governance and transitional justice institutions including restitution and compensation mechanisms outlined in the JPA;
- Develop clear mandates, institutional and administrative frameworks for the existing land governance and administration mechanisms i.e. the National Land Commission, Darfur Land Commission as well as the new institutions developed based on the JPA and the further agreements.
- Monitor implementation of the HLP commitments in the JPA and support independent complaints-handling processes for HLP disputes.

**Mainstreaming HLP good practices, in policy, programming, and investments:**
- Support the development of urban/rural plans, land management information from a HLP lens;
- Protect land tenure and promote HLP due diligence in the context of new displaced settlements, humanitarian, and development assistance, and agricultural or corporate investments. For the latter, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the Context of Food Security should be taken into account;
- Support equal, undisputed legal access to land for livelihoods, investment, sustainable land use management, and communal interest of all communities. This includes supporting efforts to sensitize the Transitional Government, international and national businesses, and displacement-affected communities of their HLP, human rights, and gender equity;
- Support the implementation of the National Plan for Protection of Civilians (NPPOC) and State Level Protection of Civilians Plans in the lens of HLP.
• Ensure that humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development actors systematically consider HLP implications in programming, with a conflict-sensitive approach that is strategically coordinated through the HLP sub-sector.

Inclusive approach and community engagement:

• Strengthen collaborative participatory, transparent, and non-discriminatory dispute resolution mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts over land and natural resources;

• Promote women’s access to their economic and social rights, ensure their participation in the decision-making process in land governance, its mechanisms, and transitional justice institutions and advocate for a legal reform that addresses the institutional discrimination in laws and policies;

• Increase engagement and data to understand displaced communities' durable solutions intentions, be it return, resettle, or local integration.

They relate to capacity support for the Transitional Government of Sudan to analyze, prioritize and sequence reform efforts – building on the processes laid out in the JPA – to strengthen land governance. Strengthened land governance, in turn, requires requisite land tenure systems, transitional justice institutions, and restitution and compensation mechanisms – alongside a clearer delineation of mandates, of institutional and administrative mechanisms. In addition to institutional and legal frameworks, further support is needed to strengthen and expand collaborative dispute resolution mechanisms – that take into considerations of the rights of women and the complex situations of IDPs, refugees and returnees. Agricultural investments also require stronger protection for land tenure while urban planning and land management information is further required to prevent the unplanned and under serviced informal settlements and IDP camps. Overall, UN contributions to the issue of land needs to be guided by sensitive political process and movement – while staying informed by a nexus-approach, that mainstreams the consideration of HLP issues in development and humanitarian analysis, planning and assessment. Below, an outline of potential outputs of the UN can be considered as a basis of future programming needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Land Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME 3.3: Mechanisms for monitoring, prevention, management and resolution of inter-communal conflicts related to land are in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Partners: UN-Habitat, FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, OHCHR, UNEP, IFAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGos Partners: National Land Commission and the Darfur Land and Hawakeer Commission (UN addressed to the Government through UNITAMS by utilizing coordination mechanism such as National Coordination Committee for UNITAMS (NCCUN) to operationalize these commissions; National Judiciary, General Land Register; National Assembly, Legislation Council; National Council for Physical Planning and Development; National Human Rights Commission; State government counterparts; Rural courts and native administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related SDGs: Goals 11, 15, 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85 Developed from UNITAMS outcome under Strategic Priority 7.
Key relevant provisions of national documents:
JPA: National Issues: 7.3; Darfur: Ch.1: 30.1.19, 31.1.25, Ch.2: 2, 8, 9, 18.4, 21.1, 24.3, Ch.4: 11, 12.15, Ch.5: 3, 4.1.6, 4.1.7, 4.1.10, Ch.6: 2-4, Ch. 7: all; Two Areas: Ch.2: 37, 38, 48, 49, 50.2, 53, 57.2, 57.3, Ch.3: 9.4, 9.24, 10.6, 10.7, 10.11, 10.12, 82.1, 84, 99, Ch.4: 42.1; Eastern: Ch.2: 59-62; Northern: Gen Principles: 17, Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 3, 10, 16.7, 20, 28, 38, 40; Central: 4.
NPoC: arts. 2, 7,
Constitutional Charter: arts. 38(5)(e), 68(g)

Outputs:
1) Gender-sensitive and inclusive community-based dispute resolution mechanisms supported with a focus on Housing Land and Property issues
2) Rural courts’ and native administrations’ capacity to fairly and effectively mediate conflicts related to land and other conflict drivers strengthened.
3) Provide institutional support to establishment a Land Commission at national and state-level with the capacity to regulate land management in Sudan and coordinate with other relevant bodies.
4) Support the implementation of necessary legislation for housing land and property rights to register land ownership
5) Support the development of urban plans, land management information and the prevention and elimination of unplanned and un-serviced informal settlements and IDP camps.
6) Monitor implementation of the JPA about its HLP commitments and support independent complaints-handling processes for HLP disputes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. # of inter-community or land disputes mediated by courts, rural courts and state conflict resolution committees | Baseline: Not Available  
Target: to be determined  
Source: UNITAMS |
| b. % of disputes over land identified by the community as affecting the return and integration of forcibly displaced persons, settled through peaceful means (e.g. CBRMs and committees) in target localities | Baseline:  
a) Agricultural land issues reported to community village: b) Satisfied with the outcome of reporting (issue resolved and satisfied about the outcome): PBF/FAO/UNHABITAT to provide  
Target: TBD PBF to advise FAO/UNHABITAT  
Data Source: Household survey from DSWG/JIPS/IOM/SUDIA baseline assessment. |
| c. Degree to which the Darfur Land and Hawakeer Commission is established and functional | Proposed UNITAMS & AFPs to confirm  
Baseline: Darfur Land Commission was also in place; however, the status and the delegation of authorities are unclear (2020)  
Target: Established and fully functional UNITAMS to confirm  
Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UNCT reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments UNITAMS and AFPs to confirm |

86 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.  
87 PBF indicator 3a for “Building Sustainable Peace and Social Cohesion in Tawilla Locality, North Darfur”.  
88 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
3.4 NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE

The majority of Sudan’s people, as well as Sudan’s economy, rely on natural resources. The availability of and access to water, arable land, pasture, and forests are essential for rural livelihoods, agriculture, and livestock. However, Sudan’s natural environment and biodiversity are changing and degrading for various reasons. Water is scarce, the lack of pasture contributes to local conflict, trees are cut down for firewood and charcoal production, and farmland becomes unproductive due to soil erosion and desertification. This situation increases poverty, vulnerability and will impact on the economic growth of the country and drive competition over scarce resources. Some of the causes are driven by unsustainable use of water resources, deforestation, mismanagement of land and overall weak environmental governance, and management of natural resources. In addition, a changing climate in Sudan is making the situation worse, causing shifting precipitation patterns in both quantity of rainfall and in geographical distribution leading to periodical and localized droughts as well as floods, and in the longer-term increasing average temperature which will reduce the viability of rain-fed agriculture and availability of livelihood options.

In Sudan 64 per cent of the population live in rural areas with natural resources being the backbone of the economy. The agricultural sector contributes 39 per cent to GDP and is a source of livelihood for about 65 per cent of the population. At the same time, the country is rapidly urbanizing – driven in part by development centralized around the capital based on a colonial legacy and autocratic governance. These dynamics are compounded by poor environmental governance as laid out in Sudan’s First State of Environment and Outlook Report 2020. Consequently, the Global Adaptation Index rates Sudan as the 7th most vulnerable country and the 14th least ready country to adapt to climate change in the world.

The changing climate in Sudan constitutes risks to sustaining peace in a number of ways. Climate risks can trigger food insecurity, loss of livelihoods and economic productivity, migration of population and livestock and consequential negative or maladaptive measures that could also lead to several security risks such as mobilization towards violence. Management of land resources is challenged by a range of pressures such as population growth, urbanization, exploitation and overuse of land, and by a number of environmental and climate factors such as increasing heat, desertification, soil erosion and land degradation. Due to these pressures, average cereal yields are declining, with sorghum and millet yields having dropped from 350 kg/feddan in the late 1950s to under 200 kg/feddan in 2016/17. To compensate for the falling yields, farmers have expanded land under cultivation at a rate of 3.71 per cent per year. At the same time, land degradation, mainly in the form of soil erosion, is rife, causing siltation of water resources. The expansion of farmlands also feed into the primary source of conflict in Sudan which is arising from land ownership and access to land.

Sudan’s limited water resources also face several threats that include siltation and pollution of major water bodies. The reservoirs of Roseires dam, Khashm El-Girba dam and Sennar dam have lost more than half of their design capacity, and Water withdrawals also continue to increase due to growing population, changing consumption patterns and climate change. The limited availability of water resources also contributes to conflict over ownership and access to wells and limited resources used for agriculture and for livestock. However, in both cases of land and water, these resources can
become part of the solution and potential entry point to create peace by building trust, cooperation and joint management of resources shared among the communities.

Deforestation is also causing loss of biodiversity and is impacting the production of gum Arabic—a critical export good. Overgrazing is a significant problem contributing to desertification with the livestock population exceeding national carrying capacity. At the same time, while the Native Administration Act of 1998, gave power to local communities and traditional leaders to administer policies, including environmental policies, it was not backed by requisite funding, capacity development. It also contained conflicting authority and overlapping institutional roles causing poor policy enforcement.

Pressures on access to water and grazing lands also call into question the interpretation of the country’s statutory and traditional laws. For example, under traditional policies nomads have no recognizable rights to land, but they can access water and other resources through their relationship with farmers. In bad years, nomads would be accommodated under an eat-and-go system which permitted them to utilize farmland for three consecutive years before moving on (Partners for Sustainable Development 2016). However, all policies and strategies developed since independence have been working towards the marginalization of pastoralists. They have led to the expansion of agriculture at the expense of rangeland and livestock routes and led to conflicts between farmers and pastoralists.

Overall—access to natural resources and fair distribution of revenues from resource extractions are part and parcel of the root causes of conflict in Sudan. Regions and states experiencing the negative externalities of natural resource extraction may never see a share of the revenues they generate. However, addressing issues of natural resource and environmental governance can also function as entry-points that bring communities together, reduce conflict-risk and sustains peace.

Guiding Documents

There are numerous instruments in Sudan shaping approaches to adopt environmentally sensitive practices, address climate change and promote and protect the environment. For the UN, Security Council Resolution 2579 (2021) stresses the importance of environmental management. It states the need to address the impact of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters to achieve a stable Sudan—with environmental issues to be addressed under all four pillars of the UN Mandate and the SPPSP.

Juba Peace Agreement contains multiple references to the environment throughout and environmental considerations are littered across various provisions related to responsibilities of government. Article 14.2 of Title 1 on National Issues highlight that “The Parties agree that the government shall commit to establishing the necessary foundations, policies, laws, and implementation mechanisms for addressing and coordinating the environmental sector in order to protect the environment and preserve its overall sustainable balance; to end environmental degradation; to mitigate conflict over resources; and to seek to address the socioeconomic impacts of environmental degradation, climate change, and all environmental causes of conflict as a key and necessary requirement for peacebuilding, maintaining natural resources, and achieving the sustainable development goals. This requires establishing the principle of sustainable institutional and legal reform and professional reform”. The JPA further highlights the need for development of “foundations for sharing wealth generated from oil, natural gas, and other natural resources” and calls for genuine partnership with concurrent powers between states/regions and the national government on management of natural resources—including in exploration, licensing etc. and

89 JPA National Issues 14.2
90 JPA Darfur CH2: 22
provides for the state’s ability to review ongoing and future contract for natural resource extraction. The JPA further stipulates that 40 per cent of revenue from natural resource extraction in Darfur is retained in the region – and provides for 3 percent of revenues to benefit the local populations at the source of extraction. The agreement further highlights the preservation of farmland be secured, including the prevention of over grazing, while providing for ‘alternative policies, legislation, and institutions’ for herders access to natural resources and land.

Other Government documents also emphasize the need for better governance of natural resources and prevention of environmental degradation. Sudan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper highlights the need for an environmental assessment of current concessions on natural resource sectors and commits do address competition over natural resources between farmers and herders. The paper also highlights needs for better tax collection of revenues from natural resource extraction; development of national strategy for desertification and promotes international cooperation in environment and climate change. The Three-Year Program for Stability and Economic Development (2021-2023) describes the preservation and optimal use of natural resources as essential for a sustainable society and economy, for achieving the SDGs and maintaining national security.

The Sovereign Council plans to translate the relevant JPA article into action through the ‘National Green Sudan Programme’ and has approached UNEP for technical assistance. The vision statement notes ‘Environmental and natural resources management is a perquisite for peace building’.

Institutional Entry Points

In 2019, at the request of the Prime Minister, UNEP assembled a working group of environmental experts to support the restructuring and reform of the environment sector and environmental institution. Recommendations laid the foundation for the amendment of the 2001 Environment Act, the legal basis for the establishment of the new Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and the restructuring and reforms of the leading environmental authority in Sudan. On 30 April 2020, the Transitional Supreme Council established a new Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR). On May 21, a Secretary-General was appointed to the HCENR, who reports directly to the Prime Minister of the Transitional Government. Other partners of Khartoum State Higher Council for Environment, Urban and Rural Promotion, along with Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources and, at state levels, the State Ministries of Production and Economic Resources.

Specialized institutions such as the Sudan Meteorological Authority, the Forest National Cooperation and the Wildlife Research Corporation are also key national actors to be involved as relevant. To date, civil society organizations and academia have been important environmental actors and partners and it is important to ensure that they have ongoing technical and capacity to provide evidence, oversight, and advocacy.

Ongoing UN Programmes

Beyond facilitation and production of the first Sudan State of the Environment and Outlook Report (2020); the UN offers high-level advocacy among senior government officials which resulted in environment and climate change being integrated and prioritized in key government legal documents including the Juba Peace Agreement and the Constitutional Charter; mainstreaming environmental issues in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. UNEP also provides capacity building of the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) and support to develop an
environmental governance manual as a tool for building the capacity of the HCENR and the MoFEP on environmental governance. Ongoing programming with UNEP, UNDP and UNWOMEN focus on capacity development for natural resource governance at the local level in Blue Nile state. It ‘aims to support the peace process in Blue Nile state by enhancing community resilience to climate-related security risks, improving the local governance of natural resources and strengthening the local conflict resolution mechanisms that underpin the development prospects of all groups.’ The project uses action research to ensure local ownership, and relevance to the local population. UNEP’s integrated water resources management, inclusive natural resources governance and climate resilient livelihoods programme is also going on in North Darfur is close collaboration with State government, local communities and other actors. The innovative natural resource governance mechanisms provide dialogue platforms between State Level government authorities and government representatives.

**Programmatic Needs**

A range of programmatic needs have been highlighted to support the Transitional Government of Sudan to address climate change, enhance natural resource governance and implement provisions of the JPA. Noting that environmental management is a core responsibility of the states – such support should cover both national level initiatives and capacity development at the localities and state/regional levels.

First, at the national level, capacity development is needed to enable national actors – including the HCENR – to manage maintain and update data on the environment in Sudan and strengthen institutional capacity of environmental governance mechanisms. Such work would underpin both advocacy and policy making on the issue of environmental management, climate resilience, compliance, and reporting under international commitments. Technical assistance needed to support the National Green Sudan Programme for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement. Capacity support is for instance required for Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to include environmental issues as part of national planning tools. Technical assistance aligned with the PRSP, and the Three-Year National Program for Economic Development and Sustainability (2021-2023) will be a priority. Sudan State Meteorological Authority could be further supported through programmes that enable natural resource related conflict and environmental Multi-hazard early warning systems – to the benefit of communities prone to flooding as well as farmers and pastoralists. It is also envisaged to contribute to the ongoing efforts of Khartoum State Governorate and the related actors in addressing the chronic solid waste problem through integrated management solutions.

Second, at the state/region and localities innovative models for co-management use and sharing of natural resources are needed. Existing projects have included community environmental action planning; integrated water resource management and policy development with NGOs and local communities; infrastructure solutions such as water spreading weirs; landscape restoration and reforestation. Further capacity development of state and local institutions for natural resource management is needed and build on lessons learned around conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence. Best practices guidelines for natural resource management and integrated water resource management should be further developed and disseminated among local as well as international development practitioners. Noting the grassroots nature of existing programming on natural resource governance and peacebuilding to – scale-up and replication can be enabled upon receipt of financing in other parts of Sudan.

Thirdly, UNEP, in cooperation with UN partners, relevant government actors, academia and national NGOs will respond to their demands for integrating the post-2020 global biodiversity framework into national planning, implementation, monitoring, and reporting processes. UNEP will also provide

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94 During the fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, a post-2020 global biodiversity framework will be adopted as a stepping stone towards the 2050 Vision of “Living in harmony with nature”.
advisory and mediation support in mainstreaming and integrating biodiversity with other key areas and sectors for sustainable development, including food and agriculture, sustainable forest management, health, infrastructure, governance among others.

And finally, UNEP will support the promotion and enhancement of the circular economy, also with partner UN Agencies and other stakeholders. This will be achieved through an Integrated Waste Management approach, underpinned by recycling and reusing of waste as regenerative resource inputs for other processes like policy development aiming at clean cities, clean air and (ground)water, generation of clean energy and resources for compost, thus help Sudan to address its Nationally Determined Contribution’s, as well as reducing and minimizing pollution and carbon emissions.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Natural Resources Governance**

**OUTCOME 3.4:** Enhanced resilience to consequences of climate change, environmental stresses and natural hazards through strengthened institutions, policies, plans and programmes, and improved mechanisms for monitoring, prevention, management and resolution of inter-communal conflicts related to access to natural resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Partners:</th>
<th>UNEP, UN Women, UNDP, Sudan Partners National Development Forum, UNICEF</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Related SDGs: Goals 5, 6, 7, 8-16

Key relevant provisions of national documents:
- JPA: National Issues: 7.3, 9.5.6, 14.2.1, 14.4.1.2; Darfur: Ch.1: 31.1.12; Ch.2: 2, 8-11, 16.1, 16.4, 22-25, 31.1.14, Ch.3: 22.1.2, Ch. 6: 2, 3, 8.2, 8.5, 8.6, Ch.8: 29.5.4; Two Areas: Ch.2: 50, Ch.3: 13.11, 16, 18; Eastern: Ch.2: 39, 45, 47, 50-71;  
- National Green Sudan Programme  
- Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
- The Three-Year Program for Stability and Economic Development (2021-2023)  
- First Sudan State of the Environment and Outlook Report

**Outputs:**
1. Government capacity to effectively manage natural resources including land and extractive resources enhanced, and national standards in line with UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights adopted.
2. Support for enhanced early warning capacity for early action, including advocacy on the linkages between climate change and security,
3. Support to localities and state/regional level for natural resource governance – including peacebuilding interventions to reduce conflict-risks associated with competition over access and revenues.
4. Capacity support to the TGoS on environmental and natural resource governance at the national level – through technical and advisory support to requisite commissions and government entities
5. Capacity support to implement Green Sudan Programme in direct response to the environmental provisions of the JPA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. Degree of integrated water resources management implementation (0-100)   | Baseline: 61.30 (2018 - 2020)  
|                                                                             | Target: UNITAMS or UNDP to provide  
|                                                                             | Data Source: Yearly expert assessment by UN Environment based data from across all states captured in a score card. |
| b. # of new or amended policies, strategies, programmes and plans integrating environment and climate management informed by functional environmental governance and climate resilience-related mechanisms. | Baseline: 14 (2018-20)  
|                                                                             | Target: UNITAMS or UNDP to provide  
|                                                                             | Data Source: Decrees, meeting resolutions and recommendations and final policy, strategy and programme documents and plans. |
| Proposed: UN Women to confirm                                               | UN Women to advise                                                                                     |
| c. Degree to which women’s issues are mainstreamed in the public policies on the environmental issues, and climate change. | *Proposed: UN Women to confirm*  
|                                                                             | UN Women to advise                                                                                     |
| d. # of states/regions adopting policies, strategies, plans, or mechanisms for natural resource governance environmental management. | Baseline: Unknown  
|                                                                             | Target: All  
|                                                                             | Data Source: UNEP to provide                                                                         |
| No of integrated solid waste management policy endorsed                      | Baseline: 0  
|                                                                             | Target: 1  
|                                                                             | Data Source: final policy document                                                                    |

### 3.5 PEACEBUILDING

At the center of conflict in Sudan are questions around governance, economic management, rule of law, the social legacy of decades of conflict and environmental mismanagement. Structural issues exist around displacement due to conflict, uncertain land tenure, the role of security institutions and gender disparities. These have manifested themselves differently in different parts of the country fostering armed opposition in Darfur, the Two Areas and previously in the East; and lead to disputes over land rights, particularly as communities and other economic actors compete over natural and mineral resources; intensified inter-communal violence; and facilitated crime, including banditry, illicit trade, and human trafficking. In each of these instances’ violence has been further enabled by the prolific availability of weapons. Tension and conflict in Sudan are often resource-based, triggered by competition for scarce natural resources, a growing population and increasing dependency on the land for livelihood. In recent years climatic shocks have increased in severity and frequency, particularly affecting smallholder farmers, who are adversely affected by limited rainfall, scarcity of water and a single agricultural season. Overlaying these internal dynamics, are the dynamics linked to the Juba Peace Agreement - creating “winners and losers” and the ongoing negotiations with Abdelaziz al-Hilu, as well as, potentially in the future, SLA-Abdul Wahid, and the complicated regional and international environment.
Peacebuilding comprises a range of activities or approaches expressly designed and intended to strengthen national capacities at different levels for conflict management, address the causes of conflict and to promote social peace. In the current Sudan context, this would need to encompass both the implementation of peace agreements as well as further efforts beyond their implementation – to enable Sudanese to sustain peace at grass-roots level. Efforts to this effect should recognize that, if left unaddressed, structural issues that originally contributed to the emergence of violent conflict in the first place, could lead to a recurrence of violent conflict in the short to medium term. Building on the premise of the twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace (S/RES/2282 (2016) and A/RES/70/262 (2016)), sustaining peace “is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the government and all other national stakeholders, and should flow through all three pillars of the United Nations’ engagement at all stages of conflict, and in all its dimensions, and needs sustained international attention and assistance.” Promoting sustainable peace is a key responsibility of the United Nations in Sudan – working with national counterparts in all dimensions of programming.

To achieve the objective of a more peaceful, inclusive and democratic Sudan, it is important that civil society, particularly women and youth – participate in processes and institutions that will shape the future of the country, and their communities. Young people and women both need to be consulted and included. Viewed as underpinning the transition, peacebuilding support in Sudan should help national actors to build vertical trust between institutions and the population at large – as well as the horizontal trust amongst population groups.

Guiding Documents

UNITAMS engagement in peacebuilding is mandated both in Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021) as part of the third pillar of activities to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas with S/RES/2579 (2021) requesting the mission to focus on “conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation, community violence reduction with a particular focus on inter-communal violence, mine action, collection of small arms and light weapons consistent with international standards, durable solutions [...].” Following on from the twin resolutions on sustaining peace, peacebuilding in Sudan is to be mainstreamed throughout the mandate and all activities of UN agencies – in addition to encompassing specific initiatives designed to build vertical and horizontal trust and implementation of peace agreements. Security Council resolution 2579 (2021) mandates the integrated mission, to support Sudanese-led peacebuilding – in particular conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation, community violence reduction with a particularly focus on inter-communal violence.

The resolution asks the mission to assist, advise and support the Government of Sudan’s capacity to extend state presence and inclusive civilian governance through strengthening accountable rule of law and security institutions and support the Government of Sudan to establish a secure and stable environment, within which the JPA and future peace agreements can be implemented. The final areas where the mission is requested to focus in S/RES/2579 (2021) is to strengthen the respect, promotion and protection of human rights, in conflict-affected areas by supporting protection for women and children. Many of these areas are cross-cutting and are addressed in different parts of the SPPSP. The present sections seek to outline peacebuilding programming as it relates to inclusive participation; the extension of state authority at the consent of the communities; building trust among populations groups and with the state and security institutions – through community led mechanisms.

An overarching Peacebuilding framework for UNITAMS and the UNCT agencies, funds and programmes would need to enshrine the following principles of operation:

- the principle of national ownership based on government commitments.
- an inclusive and participatory approach, paying specific attention to inclusion of women in accordance with resolutions 1325 (2000) and civil society. Youth will need to be included in accordance with Security Council resolution 2250 (2015)
• a Human Rights based approach.
• coordination against joined evidence, assessments and data on peacebuilding needs; and
• a conflict sensitive approach across humanitarian, development and peace operations.

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) provides clear opportunities for UN peacebuilding support in both the Two Areas and Darfur. Within Darfur, the mechanisms created involve a plethora of commissions including but not limited to the Land and Hawakeer, IDPs and Refugees and Herders and Nomads Commissions that could provide entry points for peacebuilding work. The Darfur track agreement highlights priorities related to the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees, including compensation, as well as Transitional Justice. Within the Two Areas track, the JPA commits to ‘prioritize issues particular to the Two Areas within the framework of the peace process at the national level’, including the establishment of a Commission on Religious Freedom, and commits to addressing root causes as a ‘key requirement necessary for peacebuilding and sustainable development.’  

The agreement further highlights priorities related to IDPs, and refugees’ voluntary return, and emphasizes the need for a reconciliation conference for the states of ‘Blue Nile, South Kordofan/ Nuba Mountains and West Kordofan in order to heal the wounds of war and consolidate the social fabric’. The Eastern track of the agreement notes the Federal Government’s role to ‘consolidate social peace among the different components of the states/region through [...] making the necessary decisions, workshops and conferences.

The JPA provides for a National Peace Commission\(^\text{96}\) to implement the agreement – creating an institutional anchor to activities related to Peacebuilding. It also provides for a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism, including members of the international community.

In addition, the National Protection of Civilians Plan provides an additional framework for nexus programming, with its associated committees being created at national and state level offered the most ideal cross-cutting framework (with activities across the “triple nexus”) around which both the Government, UNITAMS and the UNCT could unite. Implementation of the NPPOC (S/202/429) including local conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation efforts […] and community violence reduction with a particular focus on inter-communal violence are highlighted in SC resolution 2579 as a priority and will therefore be prioritize in the coming year. It is of note that the NPPOC also provides a useful entry point for gender and sexual based violence in particular an issue that is tackled under other areas of the SPPSP.

**Institutional Entry Points**

Engaging local and national actors is critical to the success of peacebuilding action. The Peace Commission will be the main entry point on issues related to national peace and reconciliation efforts – however further entry-points may be explored on an issue-by-issue basis including the Human Rights Commission, the Transitional Justice Commission, and the Commission for Gender Equality and Women’s Rights. Other Commissions with whom the integrated Mission and UNCT partners must engage on peacebuilding include the Land and Hawakeer Commission, Herders and Farmers Commission. A full list of the institutions with whom UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners would need to work on peacebuilding is contained in the SPPSP section on JPA implementation, including the vast array of mechanisms that are to be established under the JPA. UN Sudan will also need to work with civil society partners, especially women and youth.

In non-government-controlled areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, key interlocutors for the mission are SPLM-N/Abdelaziz al-Hilu, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) and credible and

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95 JPA Two Areas CH3:6
96 JPA National Issues 20.1
experienced local peacebuilders. In these areas, logistical support will need to be provided to ensure safe cross-line movement.

All UN Sudan programming will need to be conflict-sensitive and consistent with the “do no harm principle”. This will mean delivering development, humanitarian and political assistance activities in a way that minimizes the risk that those activities could worsen conflict or increase the risk of violence.

Programmatic Needs

SC resolution 2579 (2021) emphasizes that cooperation between UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners shall be underpinned by the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) or equivalent. In paragraph 9 it also requests “the Secretary-General, in partnership with all relevant actors, including International Financial Institutions, to support the Government of Sudan in conducting a comprehensive assessment to define the country’s longer term conflict prevention, recovery and peacebuilding needs and in developing relevant strategies to address these needs”. Noting that, as requested by the Security Council, work on the UN Common Country Analysis, and Cooperation Framework is underway, and that the World Bank is about to prepare a Risk and Resilience Assessment to guide their portfolio, an initial focus must be to improve the evidence-base for peacebuilding in conflict-affected, and other areas, of the country and to ensure a better understanding of local dynamics and peacebuilding priorities in Sudan’s peripheries.

To this end, state-level assessments, and tailored research linked to Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) implementation, and local level peacebuilding needs, are vital to allow UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners, as well as the wider international community and the Government of Sudan to understand better where to focus limited resources that could facilitate implementation of the JPA (and effective monitoring and evaluation thereof), as well as underpinning strategy development and emergency response and developing a common understanding of the priorities vis-à-vis peace implementation and peacebuilding. Such assessments could also be of strategic value in shaping the development landscape in Sudan, in line with recommendations of the UN-World Bank Pathways for Peace report.

The vast remit of activities and approaches that could be undertaken to strengthen national capacities at different levels for conflict management, address the causes of conflict and to promote peacebuilding would need to be centered around building local and national trust between groups and between state institutions and the population at large. This might, broadly, encompass the following:

1. Supporting existing national infrastructures—following the outcomes of the System of Governance Conference – for peace at federal, state/regional, and localities level. Such work would support the Peace Commission as a national peacebuilding platform for consultation and cooperation; develop peace strategies to implement peace agreements combined with an early warning and response system through agreed upon infrastructures for peace; building national capacities for peace, including insider mediators and a promotion of culture of peace and peace education.

2. Broadening participation and increasing citizen voice in the political transition and participation in the peace processes – noting that sustainable peace requires broad-based popular support, from particularly marginalized groups, women and men. This will require sufficient focus on cross-line forum and budgeting for this.

3. Extending state authority, based on consent of communities both in terms of expanding social integration, government service delivery, buttressing conflict mediation efforts and, ensure engagement across conflict lines as well as to protect civilians in support of the NPPOC.

4. Community violence reduction – this is a priority area given extensive inter-communal violence across many parts of the country. This may focus on, inter alia, improving and/or establishing formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, preventing recruitment, reducing armed
violence in hotspot areas and creating political space through targeting specific armed movements.

5. Human rights/rule of law programming and transitional justice efforts. Systematic violations of human rights are not only a consequence of conflict but are also a cause of it. Human rights-based peace processes are more durable, as they reduce the stakes of politics and increase the opportunity costs of conflict. Effective transitional truth and reconciliation efforts can assist societies establishing cultures of peace.

6. Durable Solutions for returnees will encompass a major component of peacebuilding efforts – requiring facilitated processes that guarantee rights of returnees and local populations.

In addition to above mentioned areas of work – linked to various other sections of the SPPSP – the main thrust of peacebuilding efforts in Sudan lies in mainstreaming conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm principles across the UN and international partner development and humanitarian portfolio. This work can best be achieved through the aforementioned joint analysis of conflict risks, joint assessment of peacebuilding needs, planning and coordination of development programming against peacebuilding priorities.

With Sudan now being able to access funding from the World Bank, cooperation with the World Bank will need to be a central component of all peacebuilding programming going forward. In the coming months, the World Bank will likely engage in programme design for an upscale of funding – including on local governance work. It is important that the UN be able to provide the national counterparts a clear picture of the peacebuilding needs, and conflict risks associated with large scale development financing.

THEMATICAL INTERVENTION: Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME 3.5: Trust between communities and between the population and state institutions is increased.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Partners:</strong> UNITAMS, UNCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TGoS Partners:</strong> GOS, State and local governments, CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related SDGs:</strong> Goal 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key relevant provisions of national documents:</strong> Constitutional Charter: ch.15 on Comprehensive Peace Issues; JPA Darfur CH8:9.11, 30.2.3, Two Areas: CH2, 6.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outputs:**

1. Mainstream peacebuilding and conflict sensitive approaches.
2. Conduct joint assessments of peacebuilding needs in all states of Sudan to inform UN and IFI planning
3. Prepare trust and confidence building measures through programmes that bring communities together across conflict lines, on service delivery
4. Facilitate sharing of lessons learned, impact evaluations and research on peacebuilding outcomes for national, international, and local partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. % Increase in trust between communities. Disaggregated by geographical region, age, sex</td>
<td>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD Data Source: Peacebuilding Needs Assessments and UNCT programme documents contributing to peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. % increase of trust in federal government. Disaggregated by geographical region, age, sex</td>
<td>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD Data Source: Peacebuilding Needs Assessments and UNCT programme documents contributing to peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>% increase of trust in state-level government. Disaggregated by geographical region, age, sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>% increase in trust in local government. Disaggregated by geographical region, age, sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.1B indicator b on RoL)</td>
<td>% of community members reporting increased satisfaction with informal and formal rule of law mechanisms/ initiatives. Disaggregated by gender and age.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.6 indicator (a) on Durable Solutions)</td>
<td>Proportion of Population of Concern (PoCs) residing in physically safe and secure settlements with access to basic facilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.6 DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Decades of conflict and insecurity in Sudan and the region have forcibly displaced millions of people. By the end of 2021, UNHCR estimates that Sudan will host over 1.1 million refugees, about 70 percent of whom will be from South Sudan. Other refugee groups are from Chad, Eritrea, Syria and Yemen and, since November 2020, around 60,000 refugees have arrived from Ethiopia. Of note is that Khartoum hosts an estimated 200,000 refugees but has only limited resources to support them and the host population.

Discussions around forced displacement and Durable Solutions need to more clearly distinguish between (i) IDPs and returning Sudanese refugees; and (ii) refugees. This is important from a peacebuilding perspective: While the latter are victims of conflict in neighbouring countries, the former were displaced by parties to the conflict in this country and thus were (and are) part of the conflict dynamics. Another key difference is the fact that while refugees are foreigners, IDPs and returning Sudanese refugees are citizens of this countries with rights, therefore, that are different from those of refugees. Solutions for them would entail an end their marginalization and seek to make them full and productive members of society again.

The number of IDPs in Sudan is expected to number around 2.5 million by the end of 2021 of which UN partners estimate that some 400,000 IDPs may need durable solutions related assistance, including towards return/reintegration and local integration. Around 20,000 refugee returnees and 150,000 IDP returnees were expected to require assistance during 2021 to achieve durable solutions. In 2022, another 20,000 Sudanese refugees are anticipated to return to Sudan including spontaneous and facilitated voluntary returns should there be progress towards a comprehensive peace this number could significantly increase. Compounding the situation around forced displacement is the fact that Sudan is both a source and transit country for mixed migration, human smuggling and trafficking. The legal status of displaced and migrating individuals can change, making it difficult to distinguish the different causes of displacement and requiring multiple and complex interventions.

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97 Derived from PBF ‘Building Sustainable Peace and Social Cohesion’ Outcome Indicator.
98 As of May 2021, PBF has baseline figures for Tawilla Locality, North Darfur. A full PBF baselining exercise will need to be undertaken for all intervention areas.
Displacement in conflict-affected regions including both Darfur and the Two Areas, is generally protected, and highly political, which means that displaced populations often need humanitarian assistance as well as access to services and sustainable livelihood opportunities. Their presence stretches resources belonging to or necessary to the wellbeing of the host population creating tensions that can lead to violence. Protraction and displacement compromise the futures of both displaced and host populations, negatively impacting human rights and consequently peacebuilding and supporting durable solutions for IDPs must go together. As per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, ‘a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement’. To that extent, solutions can be achieved through: Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (hereinafter referred to as “return”); Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge (local integration); Sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country). The above means that Durable Solutions are not defined or achieved by merely the geographic features of the solutions outlined in the IASC Framework—to return, stay or settle elsewhere—and principles of non-discrimination and the voluntary nature of reaching long-term solutions must be retained. Guiding Documents

Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021) call for durable solutions for refugees and IDPs and their safe voluntary and dignified return, reintegration and relocation with host populations [... inter alia through integrated peacebuilding mechanisms. The Constitutional Charter, the National Protection of Civilians Plan and the Juba Peace Agreement all call for durable solutions for displaced Sudanese populations. One of the nine main components of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC) addresses the issue of displaced persons and refugees by improving the immediate response for protection and humanitarian assistance and the longer-term response to promoting access to services, livelihood opportunities and durable solutions. The JPA regards solutions for IDPs as an important element of building peace and establishes durable solutions as a key priority. The agreement looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands, whilst also paying attention to compensation, development and reconstruction needs. To support this, the peace agreement contains a separate Protocol on refugee and IDP return, and the establishment of a Refugee and IDP commission, with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur. Government interlocutors, hold that peace is contingent on durable solutions for Sudanese refugees and IDPs. The Juba Peace Agreement acknowledges these linkages and looks to addresses the root causes of conflict, linked to displacement and is based on the assumption that all (foreign) refugees will permanently remain in Sudan (unless they decide to return to their country of origin).

Buttressing all the above is an extensive international, regional, and national legal and policy framework in place for protection, provision of assistance and identification of durable solutions for displaced populations which already exists for Sudan and ongoing discussions and initiatives are seeking to strengthen this. Sudan has operated an open-door policy for refugees and asylum seekers since 1967 and reaffirmed its position in 1974 and in the 2014 Asylum Organization Acts. It acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Sudan is a party to the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa which enshrines this broader definition and is a member of the African Union which uses a broader definition for refugees than the 1951 convention and the 1967 Protocol as it includes as refugees those fleeing violent conflict and natural disaster. IDPs are also protected by the non-legally binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) which articulates 30 standards for providing humanitarian assistance and protection during displacement, return and integration. Although the African Union adopted the convention for the Protection

99 Humanitarian Policy Forum, 2020, Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding
assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa in 2009 (Kampala Convention). Sudan has not ratified this. Finally, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and member states adopted the Nairobi Protocol in March 2017. This facilitates regional approaches to refugee populations on issues that align with the Global Compact for Refugees. Supported by UNHCR, IGAD is also taking forward a policy initiative to support durable solutions for displaced populations in the East and the horn of Africa region, with a particular focus on Sudan and South Sudan.

The Transitional Government of Sudan made pledges at the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2019. These pledges were to: continue to maintain and implement an open-door policy for refugees; to develop solutions for the root causes of forced displacement; to facilitate humanitarian access to affected people and the movement of refugees. The Government of Sudan also pledged to integrate health services for refugees in the National Health System in a gradual manner and to integrate refugee education in the national education systems while creating and enhancing an enabling environment for the return of refugees and IDPs and facilitating their reintegration. It pledged to adopt a self-reliance policy for both refugees and host communities and to make the necessary legislative changes to allow refugees to work. UNHCHR believes that such efforts ensure the TGoS policies align with the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which is part of the Global Compact for Refugees. The CRRF aims to address the immediate and ongoing needs of refugees and their hosts jointly by including refugees in the national service systems and thereby by linking humanitarian and development interventions to promote reliance and reduce dependency.

Institutional Entry Points

The GoS is taking the national lead (Undersecretary of the Ministry of Federal Governance) and convenes a whole-of-government coordination forum. Other Key national stakeholders for forcible displacement and durable solutions include the Commission on Refugees, the National Peace Commission, Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), Ministry of Federal Governance, Line Ministries. However, the JPA creates several other bodies that will, once established be fundamental for Durable Solutions. These include both the provisions in the Juba Peace Agreement’s Darfur Protocols on the creation of an IDP and Refugee commission (Title 2, Chapter 5) and the Commission for Nomads and Herders (Title 2 chapter 6). In addition, the UN in Sudan will now need to prioritize work to support the creation and functioning of the JPA mechanisms linked to Durable Solutions.

Within the UN, Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG), co-chaired by UNHCR, UNDP and DRC, is mandated to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate. It consists of a small number of actors representing the UN and INGO (development, humanitarian, stabilization and peacebuilding actors) and donors. The DSWG is placing a strong focus on data and HLP issues with sub-working groups dedicated to these issues. The DSWG will work with and support liaison with other key entities: Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) and Protection Cluster given the importance of protection dimensions in durable solutions; UNDAF focus/results groups; the PBF Secretariat, the Relevant Donors’ Working Group and UNITAMS.

Ongoing UN Programmes

Within the UN Sudan, UNHCR and UNDP lead on the protection of displaced populations and work in partnership with other UN entities, relevant authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to protect persons with specific needs, and community-based protection networks. The Housing, Land and Property sub-sector for Sudan is jointly chaired by the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and is open to UN entities, international organizations and international and national NGOs with it recognized that the plethora of activities related to Durable Solutions that include, but are not limited to, protection through the presence of UNHCR, advocacy, monitoring, support to community protection networks, support to
secure legal documentation and address land issues and the provision of humanitarian assistance are important. This encompasses, PBF funded work on data and evidence-based programming prioritization, which will inform policy dialogue on solutions and feed into the development of a national durable solutions strategy, directly supporting the IGAD initiative.

Work is also ongoing towards Durable solutions action plans at the locality level as part of a collective effort, together with national authorities and producing locally owned action plans for short- medium- and long-term interventions at locality level. With the National Peace Commission(ers) underscoring the importance of inclusive dialogue with Sudanese refugees and IDPs, several specific initiatives planned towards this end once the legislation on the establishment of the governance structure for the JPA has been issued.

Programmatic Needs

There is a shared consensus by TGoS and partners on the need for a Durable Solutions strategy in order to ensure a more coherent approach as well as for a better-quality evidence base to prioritize Durable Solutions. Work towards this needs to be continued. Work must now prioritize engagement with the national authorities to facilitate the establishment and functioning of durable solutions. Significant investments will be required in the many localities from which the IDPs and refugees emanate. Long-term funding, programming and processes are required to achieve solutions for IDPs, returning refugees, and the host communities in which they reside including: (i) Solutions for camps in urban areas and peri-urban areas with a focus strengthening resilience and urban livelihood, support to sustainable urban development and infrastructure and community resilience and skills training and job creation schemes. (ii) Solutions in return areas including return and reintegration in places of origin, strengthening rural livelihood restoration and basic services.

### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Durable Solutions and Forced Displacement

**OUTCOME 3.6A**: Durable solutions for the return and local integration of IDPs and Sudanese refugees are made possible, including through peaceful resolution of land disputes, sustainable land and natural resource management and improved livelihoods.\(^{100}\)

**OUTCOME 3.6B**: Refugees and asylum seekers hosted by Sudan and IDPs enjoy their rights, in line with national, regional and international standards.\(^{101}\)

**UN Partners**: UNHCR, IOM, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF

**TGoS Partners**: Commission on Refugees, the Peace Commission, Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), Ministry of Federal Governance, Line Ministries.

**Related SDGs**: Goals 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
- Constitutional Charter: Art. 68(c);
- NPPoC: Art. 6
- TGoS pledges at the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2019

These references are used as refugees from other countries will not be under the jurisdiction JPA, whose IDP and refugee protocol covers Sudanese refugees and IDPs.

**Outputs:**
1. Gender, age and conflict sensitive analysis on the causes of displacement, and appropriate responses developed, in consultation with affected communities.

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100 UNHCR Programmatic Indicator
101 UNHCR Programmatic Indicator
2) Displaced populations and host communities (in Darfur and country-wide) access to safe and voluntary and durable solutions to displacement increased.

3) Gender-sensitive, age-sensitive and inclusive coordination and dialogue mechanisms established between service providers and displacement affected communities and locally owned solutions developed.

4) Strengthened capacity and longer-term resilience of displacement affected communities through context specific livelihoods, employment opportunities and rural economic infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Proportion of Population of Concern (PoCs) residing in physically safe and secure settlements with access to basic facilities.</td>
<td>UNHCR to advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Number of refugees who voluntarily return from neighboring countries to Sudan, their country of origin, in safety and dignity.</td>
<td>Baseline: 508 (2018-20) Target: TBD. UNITAMS or UNHCR to advise Data Source: RRR/RMS sector data (UNHCR note this is a long-term indicator and that we also list key elements/indicators contributing to DS, as per the below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. National durable solutions strategy developed.</td>
<td>Baseline: Not developed. Target: developed Data Source: UNHCR and UNITAMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Proportion of protracted displaced persons caseload achieving durable solutions.</td>
<td>Baseline: 508 (2018-20) Target: TBD Data Source: RRR/RMS sector data (UNHCR note this is a long-term indicator and that we also list key elements/indicators contributing to DS, as per the below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. % IDPs that have managed to return and regain access to their former land</td>
<td>Baseline: RRR/RMS sector data? Target: TBD Data Source: RRR/RMS sector data Measurable indicators need to be found that measure refugee’s integration with host communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. % of IDPs who have returned and report feeling safe when walking around in their neighbourhood</td>
<td>Baseline: PBF and/or RRR/RMS sector data? Target: TBD Data Source: RRR/RMS sector data Measurable indicators need to be found that measure refugee’s integration with host communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. # returnees overseen by Refugees and IDP Commission.</td>
<td>Baseline: TBD Target: UNITAMS or UNHCR to advise Data Source: RRR/RMS sector data Measurable indicators need to be found that measure refugee’s integration with host communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses to forced displacement

| a. Proportion of individuals seeking international protection who are able to access asylum procedures. Disaggregated for gender. | UNHCR to provide |

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102 UNHCR programmatic indicator.
103 UNHCR programmatic indicator (and Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) indicator 4.2.1).
104 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
105 UNDAF 5 indicator.
106 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
107 UNHCR programmatic indicator.
3.7 GENDER BASED VIOLENCE AND HARMFUL PRACTICES

Sudan is known for its cultural and social diversity and the large number of ethnic groups that differ in their lifestyle and traditions. However, despite ethnic and cultural differences, customs and practices that negatively discriminate against girls and women and violate their rights persist across Sudan’s diverse communities such as female genital mutilation, forced or early marriage, nutritional taboos or diet restrictions, virginity testing or related practices to enhance marriageability of women/girls, corporal punishment, and others. Other customs seek to limit or narrow women’s participation in decision-making and political life. Furthermore, poverty, demographic changes and structural gender inequalities associated with displacement, war, lack of education, regressive socio-cultural norms and low literacy levels have all played a significant role in entrenching and/or sustaining the practice of various forms of violence against women and girls.

Physical and sexual violence, including Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) remains a significant concern. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2020 identified that 2.3 million women and girls are exposed to immediate risks of Gender-based Violence (GBV). According to MICS 2014, 34% of women believe that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife and domestic violence is not considered a crime and bolstered by archaic laws such as the Personal Status Law (1991). Incidents that occur in the home are viewed as private issues to be resolved within the confines of the family, thus women tend not to seek legal redress. Marital rape is not recognized in the 2015 amendment of the Criminal Act (1991) and sexual violence and rape are more pervasive in rural and conflict-affected communities like parts of Darfur. (Human Rights Watch, 2016 in SIGI, 2019).

“Voices from Sudan 2020” which is the first nation-wide, qualitative assessment of GBV that has ever been done in Sudan, co-authored by UNFPA and the Government of Sudan’s Combating Violence against Women Unit (CVAW). This survey complemented existing methodologies for data gathering and analysis, by ensuring that the views, experiences and priorities of women and girls are understood and addressed. It was collected in all 18 states, 60 localities and camps. Key findings of the assessment are:

1. 9% of respondents of this study perceived domestic violence and sexual violence as the most common GBV incident happening in their community.

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108 UNHCR programmatic indicator (and Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) indicator 3.1.1)
109 UNHCR programmatic indicator.
110 Derived from NAP 1325: Relief and Reconstruction: Goal 1
• Survivors and their families are blamed for the violence. They are vulnerable to repeated violence particularly forced marriage, sexual and verbal abuse.
• Domestic violence is reported to be common, especially physical violence. Women and girl’s movement is restricted; they must seek permission from the household head any time they want to leave the house. Attitudes towards domestic violence do not consider this restrictions a violation of women’s rights.
• Marital rape is not specifically criminalized, and not considered a form of violence by the community as the wife owes a duty of obedience to her husband.
• Most violence goes unreported. Reporting domestic violence by members of the community is particularly challenging. Sexual violence goes unreported unless it results in pregnancy.

86.6 per cent of women aged 15–49 years have been subjected to FGM and 31% among 0-14 years old (Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics 2014). However, recent data (SCBS and UNICEF, 2020) indicate slight reduction in the practices of FGM and early marriages among younger women, with significant variation between states and between urban and rural areas. Attitudes indicate that there remains support for such practices by women themselves, though to a lesser extent in urban areas and amongst women in wealthier and more educated households. Sudan has one of the highest rates of child marriage in North Africa. Up to 10.7 per cent of women aged 15 to 49 were married before the age of 15, and 38 per cent were married before the age of 18 (MICS 2014). The Sharia-based Personal Status Law (1991) still permits legal unions for girls as young as 10 years old. Since 2016, child marriage has been in the spotlight, following an urgent recommendation from the UN.

It is widely acknowledged that the previous regime was complicit in perpetuating violence against women and girls with discriminatory laws such as the Public Order Act (that was repealed in November 2019), a weak legal and normative framework under the 1991 Criminal Code, which even after an amendment in 2015 created ambiguity between “victims” and “perpetrators” in relation to sexual harassment cases, confiscated rape and ‘Zina’ (adultery laws) which potentially excludes the possibility of marital rape, created ambiguity on age of consent (in comparison to the Child Act of 2010), and provided state immunity for a broad range of state officials. There were active measures to suppress records/reporting of violence against women and girls, particularly sexual violence recorded by official bodies. Procedural limitations in reporting sexual violence added another layer to the challenges faced by victims and survivors of sexual violence111 and is a challenge witnessed to date – in addition to the low representation of women in the police force, and the absence of specialized units and courts to address Violence Against Women. The political crackdown by the former regime on the role played by some civil society organizations working in the field of psychological and social rehabilitation, and the lack of shelters and specialized centers to address sexual and gender-based violence, impeded women’s access to safe havens and essential services.

Furthermore, due to social and institutional oppression, women and girls in Sudan have suffered from various injustices at the family, community and broader public level. E.g. limited access to resources, and limited decision-making power, with minimal participation in political forums.

The long–term and on-going conflicts have significantly increased Sudanese women’s vulnerability to violence. This is reflected in high levels of sexual violence perpetrated by warring parties during conflicts. Displaced women and girls in particular are at a high risk of sexual abuse and rape. Such serious forms of violence against women are not adequately reported due to a lack of protection and justice mechanisms, social stigma and cultural impunity of the perpetrators.

There is need to remain vigilant to ensure that such atrocities are never “normalized” or left unaddressed in Sudan’s transition – which will entail transformative and holistic change from reform of the penal code to women’s access to justice, increased representation of women in the security forces to sensitization and reform of the entire sector, to supporting women’s access to psycho-social and health services, and livelihoods opportunities.

111 Gender Briefing - Sudan by SIHA Network - issue
Basic services such as the necessary health, justice, or psycho-social response for survivors of GBV and HPs are lacking. Service providers adhere to adverse social norms and often lack experience and knowledge. Survivors often lack knowledge on how to seek help, do not have the financial capacity to do so, or may fear for their safety and the risk of stigma. Restricted access to rights, limited access to and confidence in the justice systems, socio-cultural and legal barriers, coupled with victimization from GBV response, prevent them from disclosing and reporting all forms of GBV.

Furthermore, the overall reproductive health profile of the country is poor and alarming. The 2017 UN estimates for maternal mortality ratio was 295 per 100,000 live births in Sudan. The 2019 Maternal Death Surveillance and Response (MDSR) reports identified obstetric hemorrhage as most common cause death, followed by Hypertensive disorders and sepsis, nearly 80% of the maternal deaths were avoidable. The contraceptive prevalence rate of Sudan is very low 12% (2014 MICS). The emergency obstetric care services are limited, and only 32% coverage compared to the needs. Only 14-24% of the health facilities provide Clinical Management of Rape (CMR) services.

Despite the above-mentioned challenges, a new political phase in Sudan brings a transformative potential, for moving from exclusive to democratic decision-making, from gender inequality to gender justice and from conflict and violence to sustainable peace. The revolution was led predominantly by women and young people. In April 2021 The Council of Ministers approved the ratification of CEDAW with reservation on article 2 (policy measures), article 16 (marriage and family life) and article 29/1 (arbitration of disputes) it also approved the ratification of the African Protocol on Women (Maputo Protocol). The final ratification will be done in the upcoming joint session of the Council of Ministers and the Sovereign Council. Upon ratification the convention will be part of the Convention Document. The ten core priorities for the transition identified include ending the war and building fair and sustainable peace; addressing the economic crisis and establishing the bases of sustainable development; repealing laws restricting freedoms and safeguarding human rights; and guaranteeing the rights of women in all fields and ensuring their fair representation in the institutions of the State; amongst others.

The transitional Government of Sudan is making strides to put in place safeguards for the protection, participation and empowerment of women and girls such as: the Constitutional Charter, repealing the Public Order Act, adoption of the National Plan of Action for implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, signing of a Framework for Cooperation with the UN to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence in 2020, criminalization of female genital mutilation (FGM) in 2020, development of a National Plan for Protection of Civilians with specific considerations on protection issues for women and girls, and the ratification (albeit with reservations) of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2021.

However, there is still need for urgent legislative action such as adoption of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Furthermore, the needs include reviewing and reforming discriminatory laws, notably the Personal Status Act of 1991, the Criminal Code of 1991, and the Employment Act of 1997, finalizing and endorsement of the “Violence Against Women Law” drafted in 2021, to align them with Sudan’s international obligations and enacting/promulgating laws that criminalize female genital mutilation (FGM) and all forms violence against women. Updating and operationalization of the “National Women Empowerment Strategy” will also be an opportunity to address the root cause of GBV and harmful practices.

Guiding Documents

The Constitutional Declaration of 2019 asserts in several articles the principle of non-discrimination based on gender, but it does not clearly distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination.

In November 2019, the Khartoum Public Order Act (1998) that controlled how women dressed was repealed. In April 2020, the transitional government of Sudan criminalized FGM with the introduction of Article 141 in the Criminal Code in 2020.

Security Council Resolution 2579 (2021) encouraged Sudan to implement the necessary measures to implement the new law criminalizing female genital mutilation (FGM) and the National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 related to women, peace, and security.

Sudan has signed and ratified regional and international human rights conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), although implementation has been inconsistent and laws still exist that contravene international legal obligations, in particular laws that relate to gender equality and the rights of women. In 2013, Sudan ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2001). Sudan is also a part of the Great Lakes Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children. The objectives of this Protocol are to: 1. Provide protection for women and children against the impunity of sexual violence; 2. Establish a legal framework under which Member States undertake to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence; 3. Provide a legal basis for the surrender of persons and fugitives charged with committing offences of sexual violence, without prejudice to the Protocol on Judicial Cooperation; 4. Make provision for the establishment of a regional mechanism for providing legal, medical, material and social assistance, including counseling and compensation, to women and children who are victims and survivors of sexual violence.

The latest resolution on Sudan reinforces national commitments made in the Constitutional Charter which states that the ‘state shall work to combat harmful customs and traditions that reduce the dignity and status of women.’ Furthermore, the Juba Peace Agreement highlights that no amnesty shall be given in context of sexual violence112 and emphasizes in the context of Darfur that parties shall pay special attention to protecting ‘displaced and refugee women from forms of harassment, exploitation, and sexual- or gender-based violence’113; In various sections, the JPA also highlights the prohibition of acts related to violence and maltreatment – including sexual violence – against women114. To address these issues, the National Action Plan for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) contains the following objective: ‘Ensuring the protection of women against any form of gender-based violence, such as rape and sexual slavery, and put an end to impunity.’

Throughout the NAP, there are specific goals strives for and activities to be rolled out to achieve this objective through systems strengthening, political leadership and participation, public policy, institutional capacity building, legislation, education/information, and access. For instance, under the prevention pillar the NAP further highlights the goals of ‘creating a social responsibility to combat violence against women and girls’115 while under its protection pillar 6 specific goals are set:116

Goal 1: Ensure the adoption and enforcement of national laws that follow international standards to protect women and girls
Goal 2: Ensure that women and girls have access to services that enhance their dignity and psychological resilience.

112 JPA National Issues 1.31
113 JPA Darfur CH 5:2.3
114 JPA Darfur CH 8:18.4 and Tamazuj CH 1:20.4
115 NAP 1325 Objective 3 and Prevention Pillar Goal 3
116 NAP 1325 Protection Pillar Goals
Goal 3: Ensure that women and girls who are survivors of sexual violence have access to justice systems that enhance their dignity and psychological resilience.
Goal 4: Ensure the existence of integrated rehabilitation services for survivors of violence.
Goal 5: Integration of mental health and reproductive health into primary health care.
Goal 6: Promote integrated and community-based health services.

Institutional Entry Points

The Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Social Development, in particular Unit for Combating Violence Against Women (CVAW Unit), the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Parliament, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Commission for Social Safety and Poverty Reduction, National Council for Persons with Disabilities, Ministry of Culture and Information, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowments, the Humanitarian Aid Commission, state level line/sectoral ministries and units should all be considered partners in the process to eliminate and mitigate the risk of GBV and harmful practices including Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and Child Marriage.

However, noting that addressing harmful practices require cultural shifts in addition to institutional and legal reforms – NGO partners and Civil Society would be critical entry points alongside traditional leaders, and women’s rights advocates at local and national level. Under the Constitutional Charter, the transitional Government of Sudan is required to set up a Women and Gender Equality Commission constituted by appointment. Once actualized, it could be a strong mechanism to advance women’s participation in political, social, economic, and legal reforms.

Private sector, media organizations, members of the academia (especially feminist research institutions), influential men and women community leaders, young men and women’s clubs and associations, women small traders’ associations, traditional leaders, faith-based worship and educational institutions, will also play key roles in addressing GBV and Harmful Practices.

Ongoing UN Programmes

Examples of ongoing UN programmes and interventions include:

• Under UNAMIDS mandate and in efforts to enhance women’s protection from harmful practices, UNFPA and as a part of the State Liaising Fund 2019 - 2020 supported the establishment of 52 gender desks within police stations in the five Darfur states to handle GBV reports and to ensure privacy and confidentiality of information. 300 senior police officers were trained at the national and state levels on gender-based violence (GBV), human rights, ethical reporting of GBV cases and operationalization of gender desks. 600 senior police officers also took part in parallel orientation sessions. Open dialogues between the police and the community were conducted to minimize misunderstandings and build confidence between both parties.

• A critical support to repeal discriminatory laws in Sudan is being led by UNDP in collaboration with UN Women and UNFPA as part of an Arab region initiative facilitated by ESCWA. The initiative is a study on Gender Justice and the Law which provides a comprehensive assessment of laws and policies affecting gender equality and protection against gender-based violence in the Arab states region. In 2018, the study profiled 18 countries in the region, including Sudan, providing a country-by-country analysis of key legislative and policy developments regarding gender justice in comparison to international standards. It has now been revised in 2021 to capture new legal developments and to review legal areas that had not been previously covered. UNDP Sudan is leading in-country consultations to validate the reports.

• FMOH and UNFPA updated the Clinical Management of Rape national protocol 2020, aiming to improve the health response to GBV survivors.

• As coordination lead on GBV programming in Sudan, UNFPA coordinated UN and INGO support to the Government of Sudan through the GBV sub-sector, to adopt the first national Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to prevent and respond to GBV in 2020, which includes referral pathways for survivors of GBV.
• A draft law upholding the SOPs has been drafted by the Combatting Violence Against Women (CVAW) Unit of the Ministry of Social Development in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice. The law will provide legal punishments that cover all forms of gender-based violence and enforce women’s rights to justice which had been hindered by previously weak laws on rape, harassment, and violence.
• Updating the “National Women Empowerment Strategy” by Women directorate/ MOSD, and led by UNFPA.
• UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on FGM (Phase III, 2018-2021) funded by the Governments of Austria, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, AECID (Spain), Sweden, the UK, USA, and the EU. The programs work across the socio-ecological spheres to effect social and gender norms change with a view to end harmful practices, including FGM using a blend of advocacy and community-based interventions, policy work; service delivery for child protection and SRH, and strengthening and amplification of social networks and social movements.
• The Sudan Free of FGM Program (Phase II, 2019-2023), funded by FCDO implemented by UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO
• “Voices from Sudan” is the first nation-wide, qualitative assessment of GBV, co-authored by UNFPA and the Government of Sudan’s Combating Violence against Women Unit (CVAW), conducted in 2020. The survey will be conducted every year in all 18 states.

Rural conflict affected communities have been targeted through these efforts to eliminate harmful practices by ensuring:

• information sharing and awareness raising as part of prevention, but also to sensitize communities about reporting for timely, potentially lifesaving interventions (including clinical management of rape).
• establishing a response system that prioritizes provision of medical/psychosocial/material/safety services to victims of harmful practices.
• And enhancing community-based protection by the community for the community.

Programmatic Needs

A range of activities have been proposed through the NAP to address both legal and cultural barriers to ending GBV and Harmful Practices such as FGM and Child Marriage. Noting that other sections of the SPPSP cover the issue of Women Peace and Security, Rule of Law and Human Rights – the below proposed set of activities focus on the cultural aspects as well as aspects related to integrated service delivery on the issue GBV including harmful practices, FGM and Child Marriage.

1. Ensure that women and girls have access to quality GBV services

• Strengthen legal, policy and institutional frameworks in line with international standards for protecting the rights of women and girls and support their implementation, encourage positive social norms, and build community alliances that will foster elimination of GBV and HPs
• Support establishment and strengthening of key institutions relevant to promoting human rights and gender justice, as well as to strengthen the capacities of relevant national and state level governance, health and justice sector bodies with knowledge and support to specifically address GBV and HPs
• Strengthen and support the uptake of response services; and up-scale and improve the quality of evidence-based, survivor-centred, integrated Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH)/GBV/HPs multi-sectoral responses and services through capacity-building, coordination, and information management, as well as an accountability mechanism to improve services with the feedback from beneficiaries.

2. Ensure the evidence-based design and implementation of programmes with participation of women and girls
• Conduct assessments on GBV and HPs, in line with international and regional standards; build capacities for data collection and management, and advocate for and support the adoption and integration of a harmonized national system for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data by all actors in collaboration with the Bureau of statistics.
• Developing plans and programs sensitive to the issues of women affected by conflict, and ensuring their access
• Forming reconstruction and relief committees with 50% participation of women.
• Training youth and community leaders in the camps and voluntary return areas to monitor and distribute relief services.
• Ensuring fair access to services, especially in isolated and most vulnerable areas, with the participation of security authorities
• Ensure women’s access to reproductive health care services (family planning and health education services and information)
• Conduct a gender audit of reconstruction plans and programs, to ensure that it responds to the needs of: women, IDPs, host villages, and urban area.

3. Ensuring effective participation of women in the political and legislative process, and in all state and peacebuilding agencies

• Reviewing national laws and legislation regarding the participation of women in the political process, and aligning them with international covenants and decisions regarding the fair and effective participation of women
• Building the capacities of women to ensure their participation in decision-making positions, and to advocate for gender issues
• Building the capacities of local women leaders and women led organizations on negotiation, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, conflict prevention and resolution

4. Ensuring Women’s participation in sustainable development processes

• Increase the number of women in the security, intelligence, and police institutions, the army, the judiciary, and the public prosecution, and build their capacities to deal with cases of gender-based violence.
• Review financing policies and removing obstacles that hinder women’s access to finance
• Establish and operationalize financing portfolios, enumerating women in the informal sector, and educating women about financing terms and financing policies
• Strengthen laws and policies to foster safe and enabling environment for women’s economic empowerment, such as inclusion of Gender Equality, Sexual Harassment, GBV and SRH in Labour law and rules
• Training women to increase production and productivity to contribute to national income, training in product marketing, establishing productive and service cooperatives, taking care of the rural economy and providing appropriate and profitable marketing for the state and productive communities
• Laying out a map of the natural resources for each state, raising the awareness of society, especially women, on how to preserve the environment and benefit from natural resources, raising the capabilities of rural women to use natural resources in environmentally friendly and income-generating ways

5. Create a societal responsibility towards combating violence against women and girls

• Inclusion of all measures to facilitate access to justice for victims and survivors of violence or harmful practices by developing a comprehensive curriculum on Gender Justice and Rule of Law, and training all actors/stakeholders involved in law enforcement or the delivery of justice
• Inclusion of GBV and Harmful practices in educational curricula and school activities
• Engage religious groups to address GBV and Harmful Practices
• Operationalize community mechanisms to provide community-based counseling and ongoing community-based outreach early warning system
• Expanding and empowering grassroots network of women’s rights advocates and human rights defenders who can champion women’s rights, act as agents of change and provide mentorship in communities
• Engage media to raise awareness on GBV and Harmful Practices, including awareness of health and legal services for victims or survivors of violence and harmful practices

6. Ensure the adoption and enforcement of national laws that follow international standards to address GBV and Harmful Practices

• To accede to international and regional instruments concerned with the protection and empowerment of women, to harmonize Sudanese laws so that they are in harmony with international and regional instruments ratified
• Amending laws on GBV and Harmful Practices and harmonizing Sudanese law with the Convention on the Rights of the Child
• Train the law enforcement actors, such as police, prosecutors, judges
• Train women cadres in armed forces; To respond to GBV situations and to raise awareness of protection

7. Ensure that DDR programs (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) are gender sensitive

• Reviewing and developing plans and programs for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, identifying needs and filling gaps (conducting studies and surveys).
• Considering the needs of female and girls’ ex-combatants attributed to armed movements in designing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs
• Creating a mechanism to integrate ex-combatants into the communities of their choice or to establish shelter centers for them.

### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Harmful practices – GBV, FGM

**OUTCOME 3.7**: Women and girls are protected from all forms of harmful practices and gender-based violence (GBV) and impunity for GBV is ended.\(^ {117}\)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UN Partners:</th>
<th>UN Women, UNFPA, WHO, UNITAMS, UNDP, OHCHR</th>
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</table>

**Related SDGs:** Goals 3, 5 & 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**

JPA: National Issues: 1.3.1; Darfur: Ch.5: 2.3; Ch. 8: 18.4; Tamazuj: Ch. 1: 20.4

NAP of SCr 1325

The endorsed Standard Operating Procedures on the prevention of and response to GBV


The draft combating violence against women act is submitted for final endorsement

The National Women Empowerment Strategy

**Outputs**

1. Ensure that women and girls have access to quality GBV services
2. Ensure the evidence-based design and implementation of programmes with participation of women and girls
3. Ensuring effective participation of women in the political and legislative process, and in all state and peacebuilding agencies
4. Ensuring Women’s participation in sustainable development processes
5. Create a societal responsibility towards combating violence against women and girls

\(^ {117}\) Derived from NAP 1325 Objective 3.
6. Ensure the adoption and enforcement of national laws that follow international standards to address GBV and Harmful Practices
7. SPF capacity for investigation of SGBV/CRSV cases developed through training on standardized and well-equipped investigation techniques.
8. Enhanced SPF capacity for SGBV/CRSV case monitoring and management
9. Mechanisms established and functional at community and civil society levels that enable stigma free reporting of SGBV cases.
10. Ensure that DDR programs (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) are gender sensitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggested Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Legal framework to prevent, respond to, and make accountable perpetrators of GBV developed and operationalized.</td>
<td>Baseline: No The draft combating violence against women act is submitted for final endorsement. Framework of Cooperation to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence was signed in 2020. Not yet operationalized. Target: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. # Number of actors providing GBV services in sectors of health, PSS, legal, Case Management.</td>
<td>Baseline: Number of actors providing GBV services in the following sectors: health/PSS/legal/Case Management (Source: Service Mapping conducted by GBV Sub-Sector, which is a comprehensive mapping of GBV services provided nationwide) Target: TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Number of shelter houses and Women and Girls Safe Spaces supported established and number of women and girls benefiting from the service.</td>
<td>Baseline: to be confirmed (Source: Service Mapping conducted by GBV Sub-Sector, which is a comprehensive mapping of GBV services provided nationwide) Target: Not developed Sources: Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.8 WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

Despite the proud lineage of Sudanese women as rulers, and their role in modern history in social organizing and resistance, there are severe gender equality deficits in Sudan stemming from deeply entrenched patriarchal social norms and structures, protracted conflict, and three decades under repressive regime of al-Bashir – with strong positions against women’s rights. The 2019 Gender Equality Index ranked Sudan 138 out of 189 countries. Women continue to face a range of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including domestic violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), forced marriage and economic violence. Most cases of violence go unreported and access to the justice system and services remains limited. The former regime used ‘morality laws’ to restrict women’s freedom of dress, movement, association, work and study, and employed sexual harassment and abuse as strategies to intimidate women and keep them confined to the home. Protracted conflict, forced displacement and the Covid-19 pandemic have also exacerbated gender inequalities by limiting access to the informal economy, exposing women to violence and discrimination, and increasing the challenges of fulfilling domestic responsibilities. Consequently, many women are confined to a low social status, and lack social recognition and empowerment which makes it difficult for them to ameliorate their situation without structural changes brought about through legal and policy frameworks and institutional systems.

The recent history of conflict in Sudan has led to the displacement of large numbers of people and had a negative impact on women and children – who have lost land, property, economic means of survival and safety. Women and Girls have been subjected to sexual violence and various forms,

118 UNITAMS benchmark indicator
including degradation and humiliation by parties to the conflict. As a result, millions of people were internally displaced in Khartoum, Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan while others were displaced to neighboring countries such as Chad, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

In 2018, while the male literacy rate was 65.44%, for females it was 56.06%, showing a gap between the sexes. Economically, the disparity between women and men in the labor force participation is also important. Sudanese women contribute to the household economy through both formal and informal work, in rural as well as in urban areas. Decades of conflicts have also created additional impediments and socio-economic challenges for women IDPs, refugees and migrants. The latter are among the most affected by gender-based discrimination, violence and unequal participation and representation.

In modern history, Sudanese women were involved in the struggle against Turkish colonialism and integral part of the national movements against Anglo-Egyptian colonialism. They have also fought for the right to vote, as well as in recent years in struggles against Omar Hassan Al-Bashir’s regime – a regime violently opposed to women’s rights, even as they mandated 25 per cent women in the legislature since 2010. Despite the worldwide acclaimed role played by women during the peaceful uprising that ended the former regime, their level of representation in decision-making is far from satisfactory. The cabinet of the current government includes only 4 women ministers out of 26 members. The yet-to-be established Transitional Legislative Council and the Women and Gender Commission may usher in opportunities for advancing the gender equality agenda – but have yet to become operational.

Sudan’s Cabinet has recently approved for ratification the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women-CEDAW, albeit with reservations to core provisions. The controversy spurred by the government’s step towards ratification of CEDAW reflects polarizing societal perceptions of women’s rights within the context of international norms and standards.

Guiding Documents

Security Council Resolution S/RES/2524 (2020) promotes gender equality and women’s rights, and places gender as a core cross-cutting issue that should be integrated throughout the UNITAMS mandate and that women should be actively included in processes to address Sudan’s instability and insecurity and shape its democratic future. In particular, Pillar 1 states that the Constitution must guarantee and protect women’s human rights; Pillar two calls for women to participate meaningfully in the peace processes; and Pillar 3 focuses on the protection of women from violence and abuse, including sexual abuse, and the provision of relevant support services to survivors of sexual violence.

The Constitutional Charter states that every citizen has the right to political participation in public affairs and that all people are equal before the law and have a right to protection without discrimination. Specifically, it seeks to “promote women’s rights in […] social, political, and economic fields, and combat all forms of discrimination against women, taking into account provisional preferential measures in both war and peace.”

In addition, the declaration provides for at least 40 per cent representation of women in the Transitional Legislative Council; commits to the establishment of the Women and Gender Equality Commission; It also contains detailed provisions for women’s rights in all fields to be guaranteed and developed through positive discrimination. The Constitution commits the state to work to combat harmful customs and traditions that reduce the

120 Constitutional Charter: arts. 7(7)
121 Constitutional Charter: arts. 23(2)
122 Constitutional Charter: arts. 38(5)(g)
dignity and status of women and protect women’s rights as provided in international and regional agreements ratified by Sudan\(^\text{122}\).

In respect to the political transition, state agencies are mandated to work towards achieving a just and comprehensive peace, end the war by addressing the roots of the Sudanese problem and addressing the consequences, taking into account the provisional preferential measures for regions affected by war and underdeveloped regions, and treat issues of marginalization and vulnerable groups and the groups most harmed. It also highlights the need to implement Security Council Resolution 1325 (on Women, Peace and Security) and the relevant African Union resolutions regarding participation of women at all levels in the peace process and apply regional and international charters regarding women’s rights. The constitutional charter also commits to legal reforms to repeal laws contrary to the realization of women’s rights in Sudan\(^\text{123}\). The Constitutional Charter also promises to start implementing transitional justice and accountability measures for crimes against humanity and war crimes – which include but are not limited to rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, directing attacks against civilians, using child soldiers, and using civilians as shields – and present the accused to national and international courts, in application of the no-impunity principle. The National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), highlights three objectives: (1) Actively involving women in peace-building, peacekeeping, peace negotiations and decision-making processes at all levels, and in relief, reconstruction and development; (2) Promoting the recognition of women’s rights before, during and after armed conflict; and (3) Ensuring the protection of women against any form of gender-based violence, such as rape and sexual slavery, and putting an end to impunity. The objectives also include a focus on changing the masculine culture, which has marginalized the role of women in decision-making processes and limited their active participation in peacemaking and has led to violation of many of their rights and the curtailment of the services necessary to protect them from multiple manifestations of violence.

In summary, the National Action Plan has the following objectives:

1. Actively involving women in peace building processes, peace preservation and peace negotiations, decision-making processes at all levels, relief, reconstruction and development.
2. Promote recognition of women’s rights before, during and after armed conflict.
3. Ensuring the protection of women from any violation based on gender, such as rape and sexual slavery, and an end to impunity.

These objectives are to be achieved through the:

(a) political participation of women and the participation of women in SDG related processes\(^\text{125}\);
(b) prevention through gender conscious policies, laws for women’s rights and promoting social responsibility to combat violence against women and girls\(^\text{126}\);
(c) protection through national laws, access to services, access to justice for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, rehabilitation services for women survivors, mental health and reproductive health, and promoting community-based health services\(^\text{127}\); and

\(^{122}\) Constitutional Charter: arts. 48
\(^{123}\) Constitutional Charter: arts. 67(c) and 67(d)
(d) offer relief and reconstruction with women’s participation in planning and implementation and ensuring gender sensitive DDR processes.

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) promotes gender equality and women’s rights stating that the participation of women at all levels for the transitional government should be at least 40 per cent\(^{128}\) – moving beyond the provisions of the Constitutional Charter which only emphasized 40 per cent women in the legislative council, though the target of 40 per cent is not confirmed throughout the JPA. In the chapters referring to the East of the country, commitments to S/RES/1325 (2000) is stated as well. Concerning Darfur the JPA highlights the need for women’s representation at all levels of government\(^ {129}\): calls for building the capacity of women and youth\(^ {130}\); emphasizes the role of women in “prevention and resolution of conflicts, in transitional justice processes and in peace-building”\(^ {131}\); calls for 40 per cent participation of women in the structures of the Compensations and Reparations Fund\(^ {132}\); calls for the protection of women\(^ {133}\); and women’s participation in security sector reform\(^ {134}\) and integration\(^ {135}\) as well as DDR\(^ {136}\). Provisions related to the Two Areas underscore that “women will also have a 40% share of representation in the legislative and executive bodies”\(^ {137}\); calls to promote protection of women and children\(^ {138}\); inclusion of women combatants in DDR processes\(^ {139}\) and consideration for women in policing\(^ {140}\); Provision of 40 per cent representation is highlighted in the Eastern Sudan track which also underscore the importance of ratifying international treaties on women’s rights\(^ {141}\). The JPA’s Central Track also highlighted the fair representation of women.\(^ {142}\)

**Institutional Entry Points**

A number of different partners exist in the context of implementing Women, Peace and Security in Sudan. The former Ministry of Labor and Social Development, which split into two ministries in February 2021, led efforts to develop the National Action Plan (NAP) for the Implementation of S/RES/1325 (2000) which was adopted by the transitional Government in June 2020. In addition to the Ministry of Social Development, the yet-to-be established Women and Gender Equality Commission will be a critical partner alongside the various line ministries tasked to mainstream Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment across their portfolios. Other Commissions noted in the NAP is the Commission for Social Safety and Poverty Reduction while civil society and Neighborhood Change and Services Committees would be key partners at the local level. However, entry points across the various commissions should be identified and pursued, including the National Land Commission, the Constitutional Drafting and the Constitutional Conference Commission; The Peace Commission; The Human Rights Commission; The Transitional Justice Commission; the Elections Commission; the Civil Service Reform Commission; the Legal Reform Commission; the DDR commission; the Permanent Ceasefire Committee and the Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements.

128 JPA National Issues: 1.20
129 JPA Darfur CH 1:22
130 JPA Darfur CH 2:18.12
131 JPA Darfur CH 3:10
132 JPA Darfur CH 4:12.4
133 JPA Darfur CH 5: 2.3, 4.1.11
134 JPA Darfur CH 8: 9.10
135 JPA Darfur CH 8: 26.18.5
136 JPA Darfur CH 8: 30.2.8, 30.6.3, 30.8.9, 30.10.6, 33.5.12
137 JPA Two Areas CH 2:43, CH 3:34, 59 and 79
138 JPA Two Areas CH 3:9.55
139 JPA Two Areas CH 4:48
140 JPA Two Areas CH 4:9.3
141 JPA Eastern CH 1:3, 7 and 8
142 JPA Central: 7
Ongoing UN programmes

Ongoing programming by UN Women offers capacity-building support to women’s civil society groups to articulate priorities across various dimensions of the GEWE agenda (law, political participation, economic reform, planning and budgeting, VAW) in response to the needs in-country. The UN Women country office supports diverse Sudanese women in the development of a women’s agenda and advance their rights, protection and participation as per the referenced national commitments.

- To support fulfilling the Constitutional Charter quota on 40% women’s representation in the Transitional Legislative Council, UNDP conducted a mapping exercise to promote women’s political participation in partnership with women CSOs in 2019. The exercise identified 1,070 women willing to represent their communities. The women are now registered in a database for future training and capacity development.
- To complement this work, UNWOMEN in partnership with the University of Khartoum will be launching a coordination platform for women in political parties. The platform will strengthen capacity and coordination amongst the women to intervene in four areas: strengthened legal, institutional and policy frameworks, enhanced women’s leadership and participation, elimination of structural and cultural barriers to women’s political participation and leadership and engendering political institutions such as the parliament and political parties. Building on observations from an Electoral Needs Assessment Mission conducted in April this year, the UN is poised to develop a joint programme on strengthening women’s political participation and leadership which will scale up these initiatives and broaden them to include women’s participation in transitional governance structures at all levels, Constitutional reforms, other legislative reforms and the elections.
- In support to realization of women’s inclusion in peace processes and implementation of the NAP1325, UNAMID, UNDP and UNWOMEN together supported women’s participation on the margins of the Juba peace talks, which culminated in the signature of the Juba Peace Agreement of October 2020. The agreement reinforces and extends the provisions of the Constitutional Charter in terms of women’s representation by stating in Article 1.20 under the general principles, "The importance of fair and effective representation of women in all levels of power and decision-making centers by not less than 40%." This extends the commitment of women’s political participation at a minimum of 40% beyond the Transitional Legislative Council to all decision-making structures.
- Building on lessons of the previous peace talks and JPA, in 2021 the UN strengthened its support to facilitation of peace talks between the government and SPLM-North Al Hilu faction, including to advance women’s meaningful and effective representation in the process, and to ensure gender-responsive outcomes. In the lead up to launch of the negotiations, UN Women facilitated a two-month process with broad-based women’s groups and associations which led to the development of the “Women’s Agenda”, a common platform of priorities and demands for the peace process, to which these groups/associations committed. The Women’s Agenda was supported by 19 consultations at community level and with government and CSOs.
- UNITAMS, UN Women and UNDP together held ongoing consultations with the Women’s Agenda to hear the articulation of their concrete asks of the UN, the parties to the negotiations, and the mediators. At the same time, UNITAMS was engaging with the TGOS, the SPLM-N al-Hilu delegation, and South Sudan (mediator) to advocate for more women in the delegations, the presence of women’s rights advocates during the talks, and gender observers inside the negotiations, in coordination with UN Women and UNDP. During the Juba talks in June 2021, UNITAMS, UNDP and UNWOMEN supported 30 women under the umbrella of the Women’s Agenda to engage in high level advocacy on the margins of the negotiations.
- The Government delegation committed to include more women in the Higher Council for Peace, bring on board a gender advisor to the government delegation, include 6 gender experts to be engaged on security arrangements and security sector reform, and ensure that future technical teams would include women. The government accepted the “Women’s
Agenda” document as a reference and proposed the inclusion of content from the Women’s Agenda in the draft framework agreement under negotiation. They reconfirmed their commitment to the 5 observatory seats in the negotiations for women gender experts and to having continued workshops on gender and topics relevant to the peace process.

- The SPLM-North delegation committed to study further and engage the “Women’s Agenda” document and ensure their technical committees would include at least 30% representation of women.
- For the first time in the history of peace processes in Sudan, women participated as gender expert observers inside the negotiations.

UNWOMEN is now supporting the implementation of the NAP1325 through development of state level action plans given the specificity of each region/ state; supporting the gender machinery to strengthen the coordination of sectors, clarify their roles and accountability to the NAP and build national capacities to implement the NAP.

UNFPA is supporting the following programmes focusing on the two key priorities of WPS NAP:

- Prevention through gender conscious policies, laws for women’s rights and promoting social responsibility to combat violence against women and girls
- Protection through national laws, access to services, access to justice for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, rehabilitation services for women survivors, mental health and reproductive health, and promoting community-based health services

The following are key ongoing/planned programmes to support the above-mentioned priorities.

1. EU-funded Project on Provision of coordinated, high quality GBV services, for the most vulnerable populations (Duration: March 2021- August 2022). Geographical Coverage: North Darfur, South Darfur, Central Darfur, Khartoum and Gedaref states
2. CERF-funded Project on harnessing the leadership of local women-Led organizations for promoting positive social norms and improving access to survivor-centred life-saving multisectoral GBV response (Duration: February 2021- February 2023). Geographical Coverage: North Darfur, West Darfur, South Darfur and Blue Nile states
3. CERF-funded project on the provision of quality comprehensive and life-saving support for GBV survivors among the most vulnerable people in West Darfur (Duration: April 2021-October 2021). Geographical Coverage: West Darfur State
4. Strengthening Coordination and Service Provision for Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Response and Integration with Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) (September 2021- August 2022). Geographical Coverage: Central, North, South, West Darfur States and Blue Nile State
5. Strengthening life-saving Sexual Reproductive Health Services and GBV prevention and response for Ethiopian Refugee Response in East Sudan (September 2021-). Geographical coverage: Gedaref, Kasala and Blue Nile states
6. UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on FGM (Phase III, 2018-2021, planning to be extended) The programs work across the socio-ecological spheres to effect social and gender norms change with a view to end harmful practices, including FGM using a blend of advocacy and community-based interventions, policy work; service delivery for child protection and SRH, and strengthening and amplification of social networks and social movements
Programmatic Needs

While the Constitutional Charter and the JPA provide important opportunities to initiate systemic changes to promote the rights of women and gender equality, women’s rights activists have been frustrated by the lag in implementation. The NAP for UNSCR 1325 and the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC), among other legal and policy instruments, provide a framework for interventions and a basis for advocacy to lobby the Sudan government to ratify CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol. The international community and development partners can promote gender equality and women’s rights by voicing their public support for the full adoption of these international and regional conventions and for implementation of gender milestones in the Constitutional Charter and JPA, as well as the NAP on 1325.

Three areas were identified for interventions under the UNITAMS’ Mandate for promoting women’s and gender equality:

1- Inclusion of women in peace building processes, peace preservation and peace negotiations, decision-making processes at all levels, relief, reconstruction and development

2- Promote recognition of women’s rights and Gender Equality

3- Ensuring the protection of women from any violation based on gender, including GBV

Interventions under pillar 1 aim to build the capacity of women for participation in the political and legislative process as well as in sustainable development processes. This includes support for gender-responsive constitution making and electoral processes including new electoral legislation, and to support for the implementation of the 40 per cent guaranteed representation of women in the Transitional Legislative Council and other decision making bodies.

Interventions under pillar 2 aim to promote Gender Equality through the provision of gender advisors to the line ministries, technical support is provided for gender-responsive reforms and policy-making, including to the Ministries of Justice, Health, Labor, Social Development and Finance. It also aims to support for the establishment of the Gender Equality Commission provided for in the Constitutional Charter.

Interventions under pillar 3 aims to create enabling protective and resilient environment in line with the National Plan on Protection of Civilians (NPPOC) and other relevant policies and strategies. In This includes strengthening GBV prevention and response, as well as to support the functions of community-based structures, such as Community-based Protection Networks (CBPNs) to address GBV/protection components in NPPOC, as well as engaging women and youth in community-based Early Warning.

Beyond the advisory capacities offered by the UN, there is high demands from women’s civil society to scale up support to strengthen women’s capacities and facilitate access points to meaningfully engage in politics and reduce the gender gap in national, regional and local governance and decision making bodies. The UN provides capacity building to women from diverse backgrounds, including those from conflict-affected areas, to become skilled political leaders while building linkages between local women’s groups and community-based organizations and women in formal leadership positions.

The UN also provides technical training for women in specific sectoral fields of relevance to the transitional milestones, and engages in high level advocacy on women’s participation in all bodies and commissions arising from the Constitutional Charter and JPA. In addition, the UN is commits to ensuring inclusive electoral processes that secure women’s representation and their full and effective participation as voters and candidates, including through temporary special measures, and support initiatives to develop women’s leadership capacities, paying special attention to capacity building for young women leaders.

Concomitantly with these efforts, the UN is working to change gender norms to eliminate structural and cultural barriers to women’s political participation and leadership, by raising awareness about
the rights and roles of women among political, cultural and religious duty bearers through advocacy, dialogue, media and social media.

In regard to Pillar II on the peace process, the UN is committed to undertake requisite gender and conflict analysis in consultation with women in conflict affected areas of Sudan to have a nuanced and effective understanding of conflict factors, actors and dynamics, highlight the gendered nature of the causes and impact of conflict and provide a deeper understanding of the structural issues that need to be addressed through peacebuilding. The UN will share findings and recommendations with relevant stakeholders to inform policy and programme interventions across the UN portfolio and with the civil society, including in ensuring that the needs of women are addressed in repatriation, rehabilitation/reintegration and reconstruction processes. The UN has also been supporting the meaningful participation of women in the South Sudanese-mediated negotiations in Juba between the transitional Government and SPLM-N El Hili by supporting diverse women’s coalescing around a common platform of priorities including from across conflict lines, opening advocacy opportunities, and providing spaces for their direct engagement in the talks including as gender monitors with observer status. UN Women will support women’s representation and participation in future stages of the peace process with SPLM-N El Hili, in potential additional peace track with SLM- Abdel Wahid al Nur, and the integration of their voices, concerns, and perspectives in any future peace agreement. Support partners to implement UNSCR on women, peace and security (1325) and on youth, peace and security (2250) and facilitating the participation of women, including young women, in decision-making forums, including in conflict mediation, negotiations, peacebuilding and mechanisms to build consensus and reduce social tensions. In addition, the UN seeks to monitor and report on ceasefire implementation with specific attention on any violations that impact specifically on women and girls, while supporting sustainable expansion of women-led/women-centered protection and peacebuilding mechanisms, such as women protection networks and women mediation networks in conflict affected areas. The UN further commits to ensure that DDR, SSR and Mine Action interventions are supported by gendered conflict and peace analysis and enables women and girls, including women ex-combatants and peacebuilders to fully participate in the security sector decision making to accelerate their influence in the reforms of this sector, including in DDR and SSR and mine action interventions.

Pillar 3 will address the enabling protective and resilient environment in line with the National Plan on Protection of Civilians (NPPOC), which is crucial for enhancing women’s empowerment and participation. It will support the functions of community-based structures, such as Community-based Protection Networks (CBPNs) to address GBV/protection components in NPPOC, as well as engaging women in community-based Early Warning.

For the support of GBV survivors, Pillar 3 will support the provision of life-saving services to support GBV survivors including health services. This includes integration of mental health and sexual reproductive health into primary health care, as well as to promote integrated and community based health services.

Pillar 3 also contributes to the development of enabling legal and policy frameworks to prevent GBV, end impunity for perpetrators, and ensure that the law promotes a protective environment for women’s political and economic participation.

To support the survivors in a sustainable manner, pillar 3 also supports strengthening integrated rehabilitation services for survivors, including economic psychosocial support and economic empowerment.

Pillar 3 will also integrate gender dimensions into judicial reform to create an enabling environment for the protection of women’s and girls’ rights; and support the strengthening of national capacities to prevent and respond to all forms of GBV. The UN will work in close coordination with the government to develop and roll out a gender sensitive training programme for current and prospective (in training) members/officers of the Armed forces, the Rapid Support forces, the Police and the General Intelligence Service. This should also include a module on women’s rights as well as special measures to protect women and girls from GBV (including sexual violence and other forms of abuse), and all other forms of violence in conflict/post conflict.
Pillar 3 will also critical legislative initiatives in gender justice (e.g. implementation of UNSCR 1325 through the National Action Plan, ratification of CEDAW and of the Maputo Protocol); while also supporting transitional justice mechanisms to provide redress for conflict-related gender crimes, including through the implementation of the agreed framework for cooperation on conflict-related sexual violence for Sudan and the fair representation and the effective participation of women in formal and informal transitional justice mechanisms. It will also ensure that women and girls who are survivors of sexual violence have access to justice systems that enhance their dignity and psychological resilience.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Women Peace and Security**

**OUTCOME 3.8:** Women meaningfully participate in peacebuilding and decision-making processes, including peace processes, at all levels; the rights of women and girls are promoted before, during and post armed conflict; and they are protected from conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).

**UN Partners:** UN Women, UNDP, UNFPA, UNITAMS


**Related SDGs:** Goals 5 & 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
- Constitutional Charter: arts. 7(7), 23(2), 38(5)(g), 48, 67(c), 67(d)
- JPA: National Issues: 1.3.1, 1.20, Darfur: Ch. 1: 22, 31.1.18, 19, Ch.2: 18.12, Ch.3: 10, Ch.4: 12.4, Ch.5: 2.3, 4.1.11, Ch.8: 9.10, 18.4, 26.18.5, 30.2.8, 30.6.3, 30.8.9, 30.10.6, 33.5.12; Two Areas: Ch.2: 43, Ch.3: 5, 9.55, 34, 58, 79, Ch.4: 13, 48, 91.3; Eastern: Ch.1: 3, 7, 8; Central: 7, Tamazuj: Ch.1: 20.4
- NAP 1325: All provisions
- NPPoC: art. 5

**Outputs:**
1. Inclusion of women in peace building processes, peace preservation and peace negotiations, decision-making processes at all levels, relief, reconstruction and development
2. Promote recognition of women’s rights and Gender Equality
3. Ensuring the protection of women from any violation based on gender, including GBV

**Suggested Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Source: Commission reports; UNITAMS and UN Women reports and assessments; media reporting; civil society assessments</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. # of women in UN- supported peacebuilding and political processes</td>
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143 Derived from NAP 1325 objectives at p. 21
144 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
| c. # of existing reporting mechanisms for the prevention and response to sexual violence in conflict | Baseline: Child and Family Protection units at the police stations, existing gender desks established by UNFPA in Darfur  
Target: 30% of the Child and Family Protection Units and Gender Desks established/strengthened  
|---|---|
| d. Number of Community-based mechanisms to address GBV/protection, as well as engaging women and youth in community-based Early Warning | Baseline: TBD  
Targets: TBD |
| e. % of women represented in security governance arrangements including at senior decision-making levels. | Baseline: UNITAMS to advise  
Target: 40% UNITAMS to confirm  
Data Source: Women and Gender Equality Commission and UNITAMS/UNCT reports |
| f. % of women participating in security forces and community-based mechanisms for PoC. | Baseline: Not available  
Target: 40%  
Data Source: Women and Gender Equality Commission, UNITAMS/UNCT and CSO reports |
| g. % of citizens who know how to access justice systems and are aware of their human rights (by gender). | Baseline: TBD - UNDP  
Target: TBD - UNDP  
Data source: Perception survey |
| h. Access to justice services disaggregated by gender, age, geographic location, population group | Baseline: TBD - UNDP  
Targets: TBD- UNDP  
Data Source: Citizen Report Card Survey by UNDP (every two years), UNDP tracking studies, UNITAMS, United Nations organizations, rule of law institutions; PBF: Reporting mechanism among HHs whose members have experienced a security incident the past 12 months. |
| i. # (and %) of women in political institutions; TLC, cabinet, commissions, and state level institutions. | Baseline: A mapping by UNDP identify 1,070 potential women candidates from 17 states.  
Target: 40%/120-seat female component of the 300-seat Transitional Legislative Council and in other institutions.  
Source: Sudan Constitutional Declaration, August 2019 |

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145 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
146 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
147 UNDP Country Programme Document indicator
148 UNDP Country Programme Document indicator
149 NAP Indicator
j. Legal framework to prevent, respond to, and make accountable perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence developed, operationalized and resourced. The endorsed Framework of Cooperation (FoC) between the government of Sudan and the UN to prevent and respond to CRSV and the establishment of a Higher Ministerial mechanism to follow up the implementation of the FoC.

k. Perceptions of physical security of women and girls measuring how women's and girls' ability to participate in public life has been affected

Baseline: Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment 2020
16% of HHs overall reported having women and/or girls who had avoided areas in their current location because they felt unsafe, in the 6 months prior to data collection
Non-displaced (15%) IDP* (27%) Refugee* (18%)
Abyei PCA (29%)
Target: TBD

l. Proportion of budget related to indicators that address gender equality issues in strategic planning frameworks

Baseline: TBD
Targets: TBD

m. Percentage of benefits from DDR programmes received by women and girls

Baseline: TBD
Targets: TBD

3.9 INTEGRATED COMMUNITY STABILIZATION

Community stabilization is a multifaceted approach to address complex needs among conflict-affected populations implemented through partnerships of UN entities, NGOs, civil society, and local authorities. It is a triple nexus intervention as it incorporates elements to address humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding needs – while potentially enhancing the capacity of government service providers. This outcome aims at stabilizing communities by reducing violence and vulnerabilities, addressing prevention in a more sustainable response to crisis and displacement but also takes its starting point in the short- and long-term needs of those displaced and the communities which host them.

Activities will be sequenced and build on each other such that development investments can be made in hotspots where emergencies are recurrent. The various components of community stabilization are intended to be mutually reinforcing and create space in areas of violent conflict for the foundation of state-building, development, and sustainable peace allowing participating agencies to ensure work be done with localities and communities to achieve collective outcomes. The “Sudan Peacemaking, Peacebuilding and Stabilization Programme (SPPSP)” presents an opportunity for closer alignment of community stabilization activities undertaken to date, and for enhanced coordination.

Sudan continues to experience numerous challenges to its ongoing transition, largely related to peace, stabilization, and socio-economic recovery, significantly impacting humanitarian and recovery issues in addition to emerging issues in the context of the ongoing peace process. The

150 UNITAMS benchmark indicator
presence of non-State armed groups across the country and high level of inter-communal violence further compounds the need to find effective means to address the situation of localized conflicts. Moreover, the country faces obstacles on social, economic, security, political and governance fronts, with impacts on peace and stability, food security, livelihoods, durable solutions, and displacement. This situation is exacerbated by rising inflation, inadequate basic services, especially in health and education and access to energy, and issues related to COVID-19 and its socio-economic impacts. Increasing numbers of refugees/IDPs and unprecedented floods have intensified an already fragile situation. Such an approach is long overdue as Sudan holds approximately 2.5 million internally displaced people and approximately 1.07 million refugees mainly from South Sudan, Ethiopia, CAR and Eritrea. Conflict is the biggest source of displacement in Sudan. A conflict analysis by UNDP (2020) estimates more 1.5 million people have been affected by conflicts in the Southern States, while inter-communal conflicts in Darfur continue to induce displacement and protection risks. Meanwhile, the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan estimates at least 1.3 million people face emergency levels of acute food insecurity, while around 5.8 million face crisis levels of acute food insecurity. Some 13.4 million people – 29 per cent of the population – were identified as needing humanitarian assistance throughout 2021; 64.2 per cent of the population identified to be below the national poverty line including those affected by fragility, conflict, and displacement. Women and girls are disproportionately affected by ongoing humanitarian crises.

According to the 2018-21 Sudan United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), communities in Sudan face insecurity stemming from various factors: protracted and emerging conflicts; large-scale displacement; the proliferation of arms, armed violence and illegal activities, including human trafficking and other cross-border issues; the incidence of gender-based violence; the presence of people with conflict-carrying capacities, ex-combatants and child soldiers; and the presence of landmines and explosive remnants of war. Environmental degradation, climate change and an increased scarcity of natural resources lie at the root of many conflicts. Limited livelihood opportunities, and inadequate services, infrastructure and shelter/housing remain potential sources of conflict that hamper the increase of self-reliance. These problems result from limited capacities of law enforcement at federal and local level, limited capacities and resources of native administrations and land commissions, and limited community participation, especially from women and youth. This is compounded by weak conflict resolution mechanisms, non-conducive environments for durable solutions, social cohesion, coexistence, socioeconomic development and self-reliance, and migration management capacity.

Community stabilization programmes are designed to address the needs and problems of each specific context. They adopt conflict-sensitive approaches and include governance, security, rule of law and human rights interventions, promote protection of civilians and consider the needs of specific social and demographic groups including women, youth, displaced populations, and other marginalized groups.

Guiding Documents

The objectives of community stabilization interventions fall under Strategic Objective (iii) of United Nations Security Council resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021) which promotes peacebuilding, rule of law and protection of civilians at the community level and reinforce Strategic Objective (ii) in support of peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. Governance reforms under Strategic Objective (i) provide the framework for the implementation of community stabilization through the relevant counterparts at the state and localities level.

Community stabilization interventions implement the rule of law and human rights objectives of the Constitutional Charter, the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians, the National Action Plan for implementation of S/RES/1325 (2000), and the Framework of Cooperation of The Republic of Sudan and the United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. Community stabilization initiatives
are an underlying focus for many of the mechanisms and institutions prioritized by the Juba Peace Agreement various protocols, not least in Darfur and the Two Areas. Future reference documents, inter alia, may also include the ongoing development of the Integrated Community and Stabilization Programme (ICSP), the forthcoming UNITAMS Peacebuilding Strategy for Sudan, and a yet-to-be-developed country-specific United Nations strategy on community violence reduction (CVR) including weapons and ammunition management (WAM) measures.

Institutional Entry Points

Local governments and host communities are the primary entry points for community stabilization interventions. Programmatic activities and capacity-building initiatives at this level require a high degree integration among international partners. The establishment of a designate coordination mechanism is therefore paramount, both for the development of an overarching strategy and the implementation of community stabilization activities across Sudan. It needs to build on principals laid out in the Juba Peace Agreement, highlighting that local-level administration are the primary sites for provision of basic services.

An integrated approach therefore needs to focus on the localization in prevention and peacebuilding measures in tackling the root causes of conflict and fragility and in ensuring lifesaving, and life-sustaining interventions for displacement – that build trust with local service providers; secures continuation of service provisioning and underpins existing and emerging governance capacities at the local level. While emergency security and humanitarian inventions continue to be essential, prevention, preparedness, and integrated efforts to address root causes of fragility remain effective to sustaining peace and ensuring stabilization. This entails supporting local governance institutions to provide, in an equitable and inclusive way, service delivery, rule of law, human rights, justice and reconciliation.

Ongoing UN programmes

As highlighted in the 2018-21 UNDAF, United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes in Sudan continue to implement a broad range of community stabilization initiatives. Those include activities to strengthen community security and social cohesion, reinforce traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and native administration, and develop capacities for dialogue and mediation. The United Nations is also engaged in the sensitization of host communities towards refugees and other displaced populations to ensure peaceful coexistence. Other stabilization activities focus on community security and issues related to the control of small arms and light weapons.

To address conflict drivers and root causes of violence, the United Nations in Sudan supports peacebuilding and conflict management around natural resources, as well as the provision of peace and socio-economic dividends, such as basic services and alternative livelihoods. Past and ongoing stabilization initiatives also aim at strengthening security, protection and empowerment of affected groups, including displaced Sudanese populations, refugees, communities affected by mines and explosive remnants of war, women, children and elders. Other stabilization projects focus on at-risk youth, including youth with conflict-carrying capacities, unemployed youth, youth at risk of being radicalized, refugee youth, or youth engaged in irregular migration channels. The participation of women is specifically supported through initiatives to promote empowerment and representation in decision-making and participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes.

Given its interlinkages with other parts of the SPPSP, coordination is required between the community stabilization framework and areas of Peacebuilding, Rule of Law, Protection of Civilians, Durable Solutions, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (including community violence reduction, and weapons and ammunition management), and Mine Action.
Programmatic Needs

Aiming at a closer alignment and coherence of community stabilization activities across Sudan, and to further support the Sudan Peacemaking, Peacebuilding and Stabilization Framework, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP – with other agencies in supportive roles – are in the process of developing an Integrated Community Stabilization Programme (ICSP) in Sudan. The approach seeks to enhance community stability by reducing violence, addressing vulnerabilities and threats, and ensuring a recovery and development vision. The ICSP aims to sustain peace and pave the way for longer-term recovery and development, address emergencies, and support basic service provision and durable solutions for stability and effective recovery at the community level. It builds on eight components as entry-points to collectively strengthen community stabilization in an aligned and coordinated way.

Out of the 189 localities prioritized under the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan, the ICSP targets 150 localities directly impacting approximately 2.6 million individuals, along with the overall assistance of state authorities.

The United Nations Country Team entities in Sudan, in coordination with UNITAMS, lead on the implementation of community stabilization initiatives through an integrated approach, based on comparative advantages and under a designated coordination principle to guide the prioritization and sequencing of activities. With the SPPSP providing the overall framework for community stabilization, coordination of the ICSP with other ongoing programmatic efforts, such as the IOM Transition and Recovery Strategy, and UNICEF-led efforts addressing the recruitment of children by armed movements will be critical.

To complement the ICSP, and in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions 2524 (2000) and 2579 (2021), additional elements related to community security need to be developed. This shall include (but not limited to) the development of a comprehensive community violence reduction (CVR) strategy with links to weapons and ammunition management initiatives at community level (e.g., weapon-free zones), thereby helping to create a conducive environment for a future DDR process and programming that puts a centrality on protection. The CVR approach in Sudan shall be designed based on the lessons learned from previous programmatic activities, such as the UNDP-led Community Security and Stabilization Programme (C2SP), as well as the Community Labour-Intensive Projects (CLIPs) and Community Stability Projects (CSP) by UNAMID during the period from 2012 to 2020. Additional building blocks for weapons and ammunition management initiatives at the community level are included in the Preliminary Study on Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management in Sudan with a Focus on Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Ongoing programming on integrated community stabilization will build on successful experiences from southern countries bordering Sudan and will leverage activities focused on community violence reduction – so as not to duplicate programme structures. The need for continues capacity building of local communities to take lead in community stabilization approaches is paramount for sustainability but also to take ownership of their own affairs. Hence, strengthening of existing non-political local community management committees (CMCs) alongside governance is crucial.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Integrated Community Stabilization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME 3.9: Community Level Stabilization is increased and supported through developed capacities and longer-term resilience of displacement-affected and at-risk communities through context-specific livelihoods, rural infrastructure, social cohesion, and peacebuilding interventions ensuring basic service delivery and socio-economic development planning.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Partners: UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, IOM, UN Habitat, UNESCO, UNOPS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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151 UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 6.
**TGoS Partners:** Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Community Management Committees (CMCs), Ministry or Religious Affairs, relevant line ministries and departments at state level (e.g. State Government, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Urban Planning, Ministry of Welfare and Social Security), Sudan DDR Commission.

**Related SDGs:** Goals 1-5, 8-10, 12, 16, 17

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
JPA: Darfur: Ch.3: 22.3, 22.5.5, 22.5.9, Ch.5: 8.6.3, Ch.6: 4, 8.8, Ch. 8: 30.7.5; Two Areas: Ch.3: 95, 83; Northern: 32
National Plan for the Protection of Civilians: Arts. 2-9
Second objective of Sudan Economic Revival Plan announced by the TGoS on 19 October 2020
TGoS response plan to COVID-19 (Goals 1.1 and Goal 1.4)
Draft National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2016-2030 (Priority Actions 5, 6 and 7)

**Outputs:**
1. National conflict vulnerability analysis conducted and linked to climate and disaster risk assessments
2. Integrated country-wide peacebuilding strategy developed, based on community and stakeholder consultations
3. Gender- and age-sensitive violence reduction programmes, and peace dialogues designed and implemented with local communities
4. Gender- and age-sensitive and inclusive community-based dispute resolution mechanisms supported with a focus on Housing Land and Property issues
5. Community-based protection/early warning structures supported
6. Gender and conflict-sensitive analyses of the causes of displacement, and appropriate responses developed, in consultation with affected communities
7. Displaced populations’ and host communities’ (in Darfur and country-wide) access to safe, voluntary and durable solutions to displacement increased
8. Using an area-based approach and community support programming ensure access to Immediate Service Delivery (ISD), including health, education, shelter, access to energy, rural development which enhances and builds on Durable Solutions with a particular, but not exclusive, focus on conflict affected areas of Darfur, the Two Areas and the East
9. UN Interagency approach to community security and stabilization agreed in the Two Areas and Darfur, engaging the HDP nexus
10. Gender- and age-sensitive and inclusive coordination and dialogue mechanisms established between service providers and displacement affected communities and locally owned solutions developed
11. Meet the ‘life-saving and life-sustaining needs’ of IDPs, refugees and returnees to enable them to meet their basic needs, including access to essential services such as protection, basic education, shelter, WASH, health care including vaccination, antenatal care and reproductive health, nutrition supplements and school feeding.
12. Mitigate protection risks through humanitarian de-mining and small arms control, the establishment of community protection networks, community policing initiatives, construction of police posts, and GBV sensitization;
13. Strengthen capacities and longer-term resilience of displacement affected communities through context-specific livelihoods, employment opportunities and rural economic infrastructure;
15. Enhance the capacity of local government structures for peace and service delivery

**Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. % of community members in conflict-affected areas that</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024). Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. % of community members in conflict-affected areas that</td>
<td>Baseline: 65% (2018 - 2020)153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

153 Proposed UNDAF baseline derived from 2018-20 data.
154 The (so far unmet) target for 2021 was 85%
consider their environment as safe and stable, disaggregated by priority population, gender, and age.\textsuperscript{152}

Data source: Annual perception survey. PBF Indicator: Proportion of HHs that feel safe when walking in their neighborhood during the day and the night (SDG indicator)

| b. # of conflict incidences occurring in affected in Sudan.\textsuperscript{155} | Baseline: 3,192 (2018-20)  
Target\textsuperscript{156}: 0  
Data source: Partner reports of ACLED |
| --- | --- |
| c. # of conflict-affected communities with functional conflict resolution mechanisms in place.\textsuperscript{157} | Baseline: 84 (2018-20)  
Target: UNCT to provide  
Data source: Partner reports; |
Target: UNCT to provide  
Data Source: Partner reports |
| e. # of interventions in prioritized locations addressing livelihoods and provision of durable solutions. | Baseline: TBD  
Target: interventions across 150 localities  
Data source: partner reports |
| f. # of conflict-affected communities with increased basic services | Baseline: TBD  
Target: increase of XX% individuals attaining access to basic service delivery  
Data source: assessments and partner reports; PBF indicators: Access to basic services (education, health, water, sanitation etc.), access to employment and livelihood sources, both topics disaggregated by sex, age, locality. |

3.10 LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZATION

A legitimate well-capacitated decentralized governance system is essential for rule of law, security, protection of its citizens and managing the functions of the state in an equitable and participatory manner. The role and capacity of national, as well as subnational governance, remains critical for long term sustainability of the political transition. Full democratic accountability and effective administration of service provisioning will be core to the social contract throughout the transition and beyond. However, at present, the sub-national level of government is marred by absent political leadership following removal of Walis and Local Commissioners; weak communications and coordination with Ministry of Federal Governance and States and Localities; attrition of sub-national civil service staff; capacity limitations; reduction in tax revenue collection; and tensions between competing revolutionary services and government structures.

The previous regime’s centralized development efforts have long been recognized as a driver of conflict and were compounded by consecutive authoritarian reforms that further centralized power to appoint Governors and officials in Khartoum. Despite commitments to decentralization in the Constitutional Charter as well as in the Juba Peace Agreement, the legislative framework for local governance and decentralization remains weak and does not reflect the ambitions of the transition

\textsuperscript{152} UNDAF 5 indicator.  
\textsuperscript{155} UNDAF 5 indicator.  
\textsuperscript{156} The (so far unmet) target for 2021 was 2,000  
\textsuperscript{157} UNDAF 5 indicator.  
\textsuperscript{158} Proposed UNDAF baseline derived from 2018-20 data.
or other evolving issues the country is grappling with, such as the economic crisis and COVID-19. Consequently, there is a mismatch between needs and existing capacities at local and decentralized levels, significantly affecting public participation and the ability to hold duty bearers accountable for service delivery. The same challenges apply to the local planning and budgeting frameworks, as well as local revenue generation mechanisms and public finance management.

Following the revolution, efforts were made to decentralize power and enable governors to be appointed locally. The process of governance reform is a result of decisions made in the Juba Peace Agreement, which requested the establishment of a regional federal system in Sudan and followed the Constitutional Charter in mandating a system of federalism for the country. Current efforts also seek to ensure broad-based popular participation in the affairs of the local and state-level governments following the principle of subsidiarity where authority overlap between federal and state level. On 4 March 2021, the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lt. G. Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, issued a constitutional decree (number 6/2021) establishing the regional federal system in Sudan and constituted a fourth governance level (national, regional, states and localities). Regions that would be formed include Khartoum, Eastern Sudan, Northern Sudan, Central Sudan, Darfur, South and West Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces. The decree tasked a committee to prepare for the convening of the Conference on the System of Governance to decide, among other things, on the number of regions, boundaries, structures, authorities, competencies and the governance and administration levels of these regions. The System of Governance System is likely to take place late 2021 with consultations already ongoing in 189 localities. The consultations solicit the views of the citizens.

The JPA provides significant detail on how division of powers between the state/regional level and the federal level. By way of example, the Governance Protocol for the Two Areas, and for the establishment of the regional system in Darfur, is highly detailed and sets out what powers would be concurrent to the state/regional government, and which would be exclusive. It also stipulates that the Two Areas themselves retain the right to legislate based on the 1973 Constitution. Meanwhile, the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed by the TGoS and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N Al-Hilu) in March 2021 has also highlighted the need to introduce a federal system of governance. Article 2-2 emphasized “the right of the peoples of the regions of Sudan to manage their affairs through decentralization or federalism”.

Since then, on 10 June, Lt. General Al-Burhan issued a constitutional decree granting the Blue Nile and South Kordofan autonomy. The decree specified that the management system for the Two Areas would be in accordance with Article 8 of Chapter 3 of the Juba Peace Agreement and deals separately with the three states – Blue Nile, South Kordofan and West Kordofan.

In addition to the distribution of authorities and capacities of governance institutions at state and local level, the issue of revenue sharing across states – for equitable development is critical in the context of governance reform. Moving towards fully capacitated state governments, with requisite revenue streams will require significant investments in both human resource capacities, institution building and revenue mobilization. However, a more equitable distribution of both development funding, revenues and human resource capacities across states and localities is critical for sustainable peace. Although the precise distribution of revenues is to be clarified in legislation following the JPA, the Constitutional Conference and the System of Governance Conference, the capacities of localities and administrative units to absorb, plan, prioritize and coordinate recovery and development efforts against popular demands might still be limited.

A number of risks associated with governance reform persist. First, although the decree nr. 6 reintroduces a federal system – at present the Governors are still appointed from Khartoum rather than through participatory processes at the state level noting the un-clear separation of powers at the state level. Second, the previous system of governance offered preferential status to local tribal leaders and certain tribes on the basis of divide and rule principles and ensuring full participation in governance
reform processes will be critical to prevent spoilers. The role of native administration remains unclear in this regard. Political parties in Khartoum may oppose efforts to divert funding, human resource capacities and authority out of the Capital. Finally, civil society lacks capacity in advocacy and does not have adequate information on key issues such as inclusive transparent community planning and area-based budgeting, weakening their oversight function. It’s worth mentioning that there has been an intentional dichotomy between planning and budgeting at different governance levels, resulting in unused planning exercises across the states with annual plans that are not informing the national budget allocations and funds transfers from the center to the states. Linking planning with financial allocations, revenue distribution and transfers is a pre-requisite for a transparent, inclusive, and publicly accepted governance system. Critical legislation on relationship between executive functions and their respective legislative oversights have yet to be made – and capacities for legislative oversight remain weak across Sudan. This is an area that will need to be addressed going forward.

Ongoing processes and foundational documents

The Constitutional Charter sees the “Republic of Sudan as an independent, sovereign democratic, parliamentary, pluralist, decentralized state where rights and duties are based on citizenship without discrimination based on race, […] or regional affiliation…”. It further defines three levels of governance (1) the federal level exercising sovereignty; (2) the regional or provincial levels with competencies to be defined in subsequent measures; and (3) the local level which focus on broad popular participation and expresses the basic needs of the population. The Charter further highlights the system of governance to be essential for peace negotiations. The JPA Title 1 on National Issues highlights that respect for diversity and principles of non-discrimination are to be reflected in the governance system; and highlights the delegation of executive, legislative and judicial power to different levels of governance is a foundation of ‘democratic governance’ and further guarantees the participation of all Sudanese at all levels of governance, state institutions and civil service. All parts of the agreement emphasize the principle of federalism and notes the three levels of government outlined in the Constitutional Charter. Title 1 also highlights the issue of governance and authority as an issue of the National Constitution Conference and establishes ‘the System of Governance Conference’ to ‘review the borders and administrative division of the regions; the different levels of governance; and structures, powers, and competencies of the regions’.

The JPA Darfur Protocols introduces the concept of federalism; highlight the establishment of a regional system of governance to be further legislated by official decisions of the Transitional Government and emphasize a range of concurrent and exclusive powers at the Darfur State and the Federal level emphasizing principles of human rights, subsidiarity and promotion of welfare. The Protocols on the Two Areas reiterate the right to legislate at the state level; highlight the right to undertake requisite transitional justice, reconciliation and reparation efforts at the state level; and emphasizes separation of powers at the state level.

Noting recent development, the Committee for the System of Governance Conference has outlined the following agenda for the conference (1) the policies, structures, levels, legislation and relations of

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159 Constitutional Charter 8
160 JPA National Issues 1.9
161 JPA National Issues 1.12
162 JPA National Issues 1.19
163 JPA Eastern: JPA Northern: Gen Principles: 2 and 18, Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 1 and 5
164 JPA National Issues 10
165 JPA Darfur CH1:25.1-4
166 JPA Darfur CH1:10.1-2
167 JPA Darfur CH1:31
168 JPA Darfur CH1:33.1.1-4
169 JPA Two Areas CH1:42
170 JPA Two Areas CH3:9.6
171 JPA Two Areas CH3:24-26
a regional federal system; (2) the autonomous rule in a regional federal system; (3) human, economic, financial, and economic development and services resources; (4) the geographical boundaries; and (5) the local government rules and structures.

Crucially, the question of revenue distribution, and of state level development funds are also outlined in various sections of agreements – which overall highlight the need to establish mechanisms for dividing the fiscal resources allocated, including: (a) Revenue Fund; (b) Revenue Division and Distribution Commission; (c) Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund; (d) Blue Nile Reconstruction Fund; € Eastern Sudan Development Fund; (f) Darfur Development Bank; (g) East Sudan National Bank – all requiring issuance of the necessary legislation.

Institutional Entry Points

At present, the Ministry for Federal Governance oversees the sub-national governance architecture, while the National Committee for the Governance and Administration Conference oversees the roadmap for preparation of recommendations to the Constitutional Conference. As such, delays to clarify the roles and responsibilities at various levels of governance risk delaying democratic transition as a whole. All support to local and state-level governments – whether related to public administration capacity development or broadening political participation in local processes – should take its point of departure in the delineation of responsibilities being articulated in the political process underpinning the transition.

Ongoing UN Programmes

Noting that the mandates of various levels of governance have yet to be clarified, technical assistance is ongoing to ensure the process surrounding the governance conference is informed by evidence and best practice; and supports the alignment of processes between the constitutional conference and the governance conference. An ongoing comprehensive capacity assessment for the status of local governance in Sudan is presently under way. UNDPs Sudan Subnational Governance Resilience Project (SGRP) provides entry points to (1) better integrate subnational government institutions (state & locality levels) into the whole-of-government crisis response system of the federal government; (2) build capacities for the continuity of essential services at the localities level in a crisis context; (3) mobilize communities for the prevention & response to COVID-19 and other disasters; and (4) chart a path to resilience-building and recovery through inclusive participation. UN efforts in the area of Integrated Community Stabilization will also help capacitate local governance efforts through integrated service delivery against priority needs of communities and populations.

Programmatic Needs

Further programming needs are to be articulated to promote good governance at the local level, beyond work on service delivery and good public administration. Strengthening the capacity of the civil service and strengthening governance structures at sub-national level applies to the whole of Sudan, with this requirement particularly great in regions that will enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In addition to work in core government functions, building human resource capacities for both the state and local civil service is most urgently needed – and should be based on principles of equitable distribution of capacity development across all states. A cadre of civil service staff remains to be developed to undertake the functions of the level of states and localities. Capacity building for democratic participation at localities and state level will also require significant efforts – noting that local legislatives have not yet been operationalized in most cases. Extended community consultations are merited to ensure broad-based participation in local and state-level political process through formal as well as informal means. Civic space at the local level is needed to facilitate political processes and promote citizen participation through formal mechanisms and legislative bodies as well as informal mechanisms.
Popular participation in locality and state level political processes need to expand and work concomitantly with technical assistance and funding for central executive functions at the subnational level. In essence, sub-national support for fiscal decentralization; public financial management at the sub-national level; and tax revenue and resource mobilization at the subnational level – should be supported through requisite legal frameworks and be underpinned by principles of subsidiarity laid out in the JPA. Finally, noting that the separation of powers is determined for all levels of governance – support to decentralization would also be carried out through the auspices of Rule of Law support and capacity development for judiciary at all levels. Pending the final clarification of duties and responsibilities at the various levels of governance, support to rule of law institutions should be aligned with the principles of decentralization outlined in the JPA, and subsequent legislation.

Finally, rebuilding state-society relations at the state, and locality level will require substantial coordination and cooperation as well as the sensitization and involvement of local actors – well ahead of direct capacity support to public administrations. Priority activities include a comprehensive analysis of support requirements for democratic governance at the sub-national level; capacity assessment of local governance institutions and alignment with peacebuilding efforts focused on trust and confidence between government and communities – as outlined in the SPPSP section on peacebuilding.

THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Local Governance and Decentralization

OUTCOME 3.10: The unity of Sudan’s people and territory is maintained through operationalization of a new system of democratic governance at the local level, with legislative, executive, and judicial powers delegated to the different levels of governance.

UN Partners: UNITAMS, UNDP, UNICEF, UNWomen
TGoS Partners: Ministry of Federal Governance, line Ministries, Civil Service Commission, Gender Commission

Related SDGs: All Goals, SDG 16 in particular

Key relevant provisions of national documents:
Constitutional Charter: arts. 3(1), 8, 68(f)
National Issues: 1.6, 1.9, 1.12, 1.13, 1.19, 1.21, 7.1, 7.5, 9.5.5, 10; Darfur: Ch. 1: 10, 11, 17, 25, 30.1.17, 31.1.29, 33, Ch. 2: 15, 16, Two Areas: Ch.2: 8.1, 8.2, 8.5, 40, 42, Ch. 3: 9.6, 26-67; Eastern: 1; Northern: Gen Principles: 2, 18, Political and Socioeconomic Issues: 1, 5

Outputs:
1 Capacity development for legislative functions at state and local levels – including state-level constitutions where required.
2 Capacity and support to civil society to take part in local and state-level political processes and expanding civic space
3 Support for Civil Service training of trainers and the development of a functional civil service
4 Support to revenue mobilization at state and localities level – through operationalizing relevant provisions of the JPA.

Indicators | Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source
---|---
a. Progress in restoring the regional system of governance. | Baseline: No regional system (2020) Target: TGoS issues decision to restore the regional system of governance. Data Source: UNITAMS to advise

172 Covered under Pillar 2 with references to other pillars.
173 Derived from JPA: National Issues: 1.6, 1.12 & 1.21
174 Derived from JPA: Darfur Track: Power Sharing Implementation Matrix, at # 5
175 Derived from JPA: Darfur Track: Power Sharing Implementation Matrix, at # 7 & 8
c. Degree of establishment and functionality of the National Commission for the Division, Allocation, and Monitoring of Financial Resources and Revenue.

Baseline: Not established (2020)
Target: Commission established and functional.
Data Source: TBD

D. Recommendations produced on regional governance system consultations at the states level

Baseline: No recommendations have been produced
Source: TBC

d. Degree to which autonomy in the Two Areas by which powers stipulated in the JPA are exercised, without prejudice to the unity of Sudan.176

Baseline: No autonomy (2020)
Target: Autonomy in the Two Areas by which powers stipulated in the JPA are exercised, without prejudice to the unity of Sudan.
Data Source: UN Sudan to advise

f. # of legislative bodies established at the state and localities level

Baseline: Capacity mapping of subnational governance

g. # Human Rights activists and organizations are able to operate, advocate and petition at the at all three level's of government.

Baseline:
Target:
Data Source: UNITAMS

h. Degree of citizens participation in decision making processes

Baseline: TBD
Target: regular public consultations in priority settings and needs identification
Data source: UN Programme Documents

3.11 SUDANESE POLICE FORCE

The Sudanese Police Force is a highly centralized agency under the authority of the General Director of Police who reports directly to the Minister of Interior. There are estimated to be around 90,000 police personnel. Since the resumption of civil war in 1983, serious human rights abuses, including sexual violence, crimes against humanity and war crimes, have not generally been attributed to the police as opposed to the armed forces and other security apparatuses attributed to or affiliated with the government. However, the challenge ahead is to transform a militarized police force used to enforce the power of an authoritarian regime to civilian police – upholding human rights and trusted by all segments of society, while upholding security in the entire country.

Of all law enforcement agencies, the SPF are the most trusted. In the demonstrations in 2019 that brought down the former regime there were initially reports of some police acting out against protesters, but Sudan’s police leadership ordered officers to not intervene against protesters. While seen as a positive response, the police are still a firmly established agency that operates against a long legacy of the former regime. However, the SPF are also not immune to accusations that the violate human rights, in particular those of refugees, detainees, displaced populations and other vulnerable groups by using unlawful measures and acting with impunity.

In general, the police lack capacity, training and equipment and members of the public have little trust in the police. Accountability is weak and most offences by the police go unpunished or unreported. In rural areas police presence is limited and in most IDP camps there is no police presence at all. In areas that have recently experienced conflict such as Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile

176 Derived from JPA: Two Areas Track: Political Issues Implementation Matrix, at # 2
State, there are few rule of law institutions. Therefore, while a general vetting process is not envisaged at the moment, a key focus for capacity building will need to be on ensuring accountability.

Where courts are absent, the police have taken on a prosecutorial role although in some cases the police also refrain from conducting investigations due to lack of resources or the know-how to conduct proper investigations and fear of retaliation of perpetrators. Victims are also scared of reporting incidents due to fear of retaliation. In cases of sexual and gender-based violence police are frequently reluctant to investigate and are often accused of sexual harassment. Addressing such issues will require large sweeping organizational change and an internal cultural transformation if it is to actively support the types of reforms envisaged during the transition. Changes in the law and establishment of democratic and civilian oversight will be key in achieving a more professional, responsive, transparent and accountable police.

Building trustful relationships at local level between law enforcement actors and the society will be key to establish a community fabric that can improve resilience to the challenges of the transition phase. Community Policing enables safer communities through enhancing the capacity of the Sudan Police and local community, as well as community participation by promoting the thinking that the police is a service provider for society and communities, promoting safety, security and access to justice with the aim of reinforcing trust between the citizens and the rule of law institutions.

Guiding Documents

The Sudanese Police Force (SPF) is a key focus for UNITAMS and SC resolution 2579 (2021) mandates the mission to prioritize the SPF, through advisory and capacity building support, with the objective of enhancing civilian-led protection, security, and the rule of law. With a focus on the National Protection of Civilians Plan, the SPF will build the SPF’s capacity for conflict prevention and physical protection of civilians, including displaced populations, is enhanced through the support of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) for the implementation of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians.

Key national documents on which such efforts would be based include the Sudan Police Act 2008, Section Four, Article 13 as well as the Criminal Procedure Law 1991. Within the nine areas outlined within the National Protection of Civilians Plan (S/2020/429) a focus would be on articles 1 B, 2 & 3, which determine the levels and types of protection for civilians. This determines that protection be provided through planning, protection and pre-emption and that there be the increased deployment of military and police contingents capable of rapid response and deterrence; the community protection of civilians through dialogue and dissemination of the values of peaceful coexistence between tribes (in areas where farmers and herders are in contact); and a focus on the creation of a protective environment for civilians (camps and areas of voluntary return) that includes the establishment of prosecutor offices, police branch stations and police patrols. The NPPOC clearly prioritizes the training and deployment of sufficient numbers of women police officers in support of prosecution offices, especially in areas of voluntary return and displaced persons camps and the provision of additional material incentive to military, police and civilian units operating in civilian protection commensurate with the nature of the tasks, and training programmes to develop and upgrade capacities on a regular basis in the field of protection and in dealing with the civilian population as it pertains to its changing role in dealing with a civilian population.

In addition, certain elements of the Juba Peace Agreement are relevant. These include title 2-chapter 3, the Justice Accountability and Reconciliation Protocol, with a focus specifically on article 16, 17 & 22.1.2 which request the provision of security and full protection to all citizens and a recognition of wrongdoing and accountability as well as (title 2-chapter 3, 22.1.2) ensuring the provision of appropriate conditions for social and peaceful reconciliation amongst components of the society. Chapter 5 on Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees (article 2.2, 2.3 ,4.1.1, 5.2 , 7.4) makes further
commitments in this regard. Relevant sections are chapter 8 article 27, 29.3.3, 29.4.1.1, 29.5 & title 3 article 30.

Within the NPPOC framework, the UNITAMS Police Advisory Unit, focusing on matters related to SPF responsibilities to implement the POC National Plan. This would include the operational deployment of SPF and tactical plans; the establishment of an early warning system; quick response teams and a focus on increasing female participation. Work would also take place on technology-based policing and the integration of ex-combatants. As regards community-oriented policing, SPF and UNITAMS have already agreed to: develop comprehensive SOPs with focus on IDPs and return areas; ensure sensitization and public outreach programs to ensure how local communities understand their role in their own security and start playing an effective role and to provide training for trainers courses for the SPF at different levels. Work would also need to take place with community Policing Volunteers (CPVs).

Work with the SPF on Family and Child Protection will focus on expanding the SPF presence to the remote areas including IDPs and return areas and to providing the support needed to develop and implement action plan on SGBV. This would aim to address underreporting of SGBV cases and improve women’s access to justice and to create awareness on SGBV and FCP crimes and incidents while also providing local communities with a role in their own security and creating community policing volunteers.

As regards investigations and evidence-based policing, SPF have developed strategy based on applied laws and regulations in line with international standards. They identified an urgent need for mobile forensic to cover remote areas with a focus on the Investigation of serious conflict-related crimes; the collaboration mechanism between police and prosecutors and evidence-based policing.

**Institutional Entry Points**

Work with the Sudan Police Forces will necessarily entail significant interaction with the Ministry of Interior. As regards Accountability of the SPF, work would need to take place with both the legal Affairs Department and the Judicial system. Work on community policing will involve both SPF HQ and Local Communities and work on Sexual and Gender based violence would entail working with the SPF, Family and Child Protection Unit (FCPU), Ministry of Social Development, Unit for Violence Against Women and Children, Universities and Academic Institutions.

**Ongoing UN Programming**

The UNITAMS Police Advisory Unit will focus on the provision of support to the SPF in reestablishing an accountable and professional police service, in general, and in Darfur region and the Two Areas to enable them to perform a range of policing functions in accordance with the principles of human rights and that enhances their credibility in the eyes of population in terms of provision of security and justice. As the PAU is mandated to focus on advisory and capacity development role, it will focus on the immediate needs of the SPF to support the transition process taking into consideration the desired end-state. The Unit will also assist in national efforts to mobilize and coordinate international assistance to the SPF and related oversight and management bodies where required, while contributing to the Mission/UNCT’s delivery of coherent “one-UN” security sector support. As such, the PAU will work closely with other constituents of UNITAMS particularly with the Office of Support to the Political Transition, Office of Support to Civilian Protection, and Integrated Electoral Assistance Division.

The PAU will mainly focus on supporting the SPF in implementing the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians, on the one hand, and capacity building support for election security to ensure free, fair, and peaceful elections.
As in the below organogram, the PAU has three Multi-Functional Teams (MTF) in El-Fasher, Zalingei and Nyala, each team comprises 4 IPOs specialized in community policing, SGBV, Investigation and accountability.

**Programmatic Needs**

PAU started engagement with SPF at early stages of the mission to ensure SPF ownership in identifying their priorities and requirements to implement the NPPOC. Our joint analysis involves data collection to identify actual workload, identify and recommend appropriate staffing and deployment levels and review the policies and procedures for every discrete operational and support function in the regional police HQs. We also addressed the organizational structure and accountability.

Five thematic policing areas required immediate support interrelated under the requirement of NPPOC implementation were identified: Protection of civilians, community policing, SGBV and family and child protection, accountability, and electoral security.

### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: SPF Capacity Building on POC

**OUTCOME 1.1:**

Sudanese Police Force (SPF) capacity for conflict prevention and physical protection of civilians, including displaced populations, is enhanced through the support of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) for the implementation of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC).

**UN Partners:** UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCHR, UNICEF.

**TGoS Partners:** Ministry of Interior, SPF HQ and Local Communities

**Related SDGs:** Goal 10, 11 & 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**

- Sudan Police Act 2008, Section Four, Article 13
- National Plan on the Protection of Civilians (NPPOC): Art 1 B, 2 & 3
- JPA: title 2 chapter 3, article 16, 17 & 22.1.2/ Chapter 5 article 2.2, 2.3, 4.1.1, 5.2, 7.4/ chapter 8 article 27, 29.3.3, 29.4.1.1, 29.5 & title 3 article 30.

**Relevant draft SPPSP Outcomes/Outputs:**

**Outcome 1.1:**

**Outputs:**

1. Overall improvement in the protective environment for the Sudanese Population, in particular in the conflict and post-conflict areas.
2. Enhanced SPF PoC capacities in the areas of planning, prevention, and operational response.
3. Improved environment conducive to the voluntary and safe return of IDPs and refugees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Number of SPF officers trained as trainers on protection of civilians based on domestic</td>
<td>Baseline: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

177 UNITAMS benchmark related to strategic priority (6).
| Number of trainings conducted for the SPF commanders at the state level on protection of civilians based on domestic legal provisions, international human rights law, refugee and criminal law and Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. | Baseline: 0  
Target: 25 (2 trainings in each state of Darfur and the Two Areas, 1 training in the rest of the states of Sudan)  
Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS |}
| Number of civilian protection’s patrols, for protection through presence and visibility in the IDP camps. | Baseline: Not established  
Target: Patrols on Daily Basis in the IDP camps and return areas  
Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS & UNCT reports |}
| Percentage of women participating in security forces. | Baseline: 2.7%  
Target: 15% of the new recruits.  
Data Source: SPF records |}
| Number of female police officers trained for investigating sexual and gender-based violence and child abuse. | Baseline: unknown  
Target: 1 female officer in each police station in Darfur and the Two Areas.  
Data Source: SPF records, UNITAMS |}
| Policy for witness protection developed and functional. | Baseline: No records  
Target: Policy in place and operationalized  
Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS and UNCTs’ reports |}
| Reduction in the frequency of mass intercommunal violence and related casualties in IDP camps. | Baseline: Not Established  
Target: 10% per year  
Data Source: SPF, UNITAM and UNCT reports |}

178 UNITAMS indicator related to strategic priority (6).
179 UNITAMS indicator related to strategic priority (6).
180 UNITAMS indicator related to strategic priority (6).
181 UNITAMS indicator related to strategic priority (6).
182 UNITAMS indicator related to strategic priority (6).
183 Derived from UNITAMS indicator related to strategic priority (6).
184 UNITAMS Police Advisory UNIT Concepts of Operation Benchmark # 8.1.1.4.
THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Trust Building \ Community Policing

OUTCOME 2.1

Building trust between SPF and local communities, including through community-policing initiatives, or other methods of unarmed civilian protection, and providing advisory and capacity building support to SPF\(^{185}\).

UN Partners:

UNCTS (UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCHR, UNICEF, WFP, UN Women) and NGOs:

TGos Partners: Governors, SPF, Local Women network and Local Community Leaders

Related SDGs

Goals 16

Key relevant provisions of national documents:

Sudan Police Act 2008, Section Four, Article 13, National Plan on the Protection of Civilian Section 3, SPF Draft SOP on Community Policing, NAPPOC; 1.B, 2 & 3

JPA: title 2, chapter 3 article 10, 11 & 15 / chapter 5 article 4.1.11

Relevant draft SPPSP Outcomes/Outputs:

Outcome: 2.1

Outputs:

1. Enhanced cooperation between the SPF and the community to address intercommunal violence and crime.
2. Enhanced SPF capacity to address intercommunal violence and crime and fear of those in the communities.
3. Increased facilitation of community reconciliation through enhanced SPF capacity for operationalizing community-oriented policing both at national and state level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. An inclusive and gender-responsive community-oriented policing policy and protocol is put in place to also support early warning\(^{186}\). | Baseline: Drafted  
Target: Operationalization of SOPs  
Data source: UNITAMS, SPF |
| b. Number of advisory sessions conducted with the Sudanese Police Force on community-oriented policing. | Baseline: 0  
Target: 144 per year  
Data Source: SPF/FCPU, UNITAMS |
| c. % of trust and confidence of the communities in the SPF\(^{187}\). | Baseline: 37% high confidence (2021)\(^{188}\)  
Target: 50% have confidence |

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\(^{186}\) UNITAMS indicator related to strategic priority (6).

\(^{187}\) Derived from UNITAMS Police Advisory UNIT Concepts of Operation Benchmark # 8.1.3.1.

| Data source: UNDP tracking studies, UNAMID, United Nations organizations, rule of law institutions |
| d. Number of the SPF / community joint initiatives to address intercommunal violence and crime\(^\text{189}\). |
| Baseline: Not established |
| Target: 36 |
| Data source: UNITAMS, SPF |

| e. Number of SPF male and female officers adequately trained on community policing and able to train other SPF officers on community policing\(^\text{190}\). |
| Baseline: Not established |
| Target: 90 Trainers |
| Data Source: UNITAMS, SPF |

| f. Number of the community policing volunteers participating in establishing security, the rule of law and crime prevention, especially among displaced persons\(^\text{191}\). |
| Baseline: Not Established |
| Target: 1 CPV per 1000 IDPs. |
| Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS |

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: SGBV and family and child protection**

**OUTCOME 3.1:**
Women and children are protected from any form of gender-based violence and impunity for GBV is ended.\(^\text{192}\)

**UN Partners:**
UN Women, UNITAMS, UNFPA, WHO

**TGoS Partners:** SPF, Family and Child Protection Unit (FCPU), Ministry of Labour and Social Development, Unit for Violence Against Women and Children, Universities and Academic Institutions.

**Related SDGs**
Goals 5 & 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
Child act of 2010, Decree on Family and Child Protection Unit in 2007
NAPPOC, 1.B & 3
JPA, chapter 5 article 2.3, 4.1, 11, 5.2

**Relevant draft SPPSP Outcomes/Outputs:**

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189 Derived from UNITAMS Police Advisory UNIT Concepts of Operation Benchmark # 8.1.3.3.
190 Derived from UNITAMS Police Advisory UNIT Concepts of Operation Benchmark # 8.1.3.5.
191 Derived from UNITAMS Police Advisory UNIT Concepts of Operation Benchmark # 8.1.3.6.
192 Derived from NAP 1325 Objective 3.
Outcome 3.1.

Output:

1. SPF capacity for investigation of SGBV/CRSV cases developed through training on standardized and well-equipped investigation techniques.
2. Enhanced SPF capacity for SGBV/CRSV case monitoring and management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. SOP and/or policies to prevent, respond to, and make accountable perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence reviewed and operationalised. | Baseline: Draft SOP under review  
Target: Operationalization of SOPs  
Data Source: SPF, FCPU UNITAMS |
| b. Number of advisory sessions conducted with the Sudanese Police Force on the prevention and response to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. | Baseline: 0  
Target: 144 per year  
Data Source: SPF/FCPU, UNITAMS |
| c. Number of SPF officers trained as trainers on the prevention and responding to SGBV. | Baseline: 0  
Target: 90  
Data Source: SPF/FCPU, UNITAMS |
| d. Number of training sessions on the prevention and responding to SGBV conducted for the SPF. | Baseline: 0  
Target: 54 in three years, 18 per year |
| e. Number of female police officers trained on the investigation of sexual and gender-based violence and child abuse. | Baseline: unknown  
Target: 1 female officer in each police station in Darfur and the Two Areas.  
Data Source: SPF records, UNITAMS |
| f. Number of female police officers deployed as investigators of sexual and gender-based violence and child abuse. | Baseline: Not Established  
Target: 1 female officer in each police station in Darfur and the Two Areas.  
Data Source: SPF/FCPU, UNITAMS |
| g. Improved coverage of family and child protection units represented by number of SPF Family and Child protection Units/sections at localities’ level being established in Darfur and the Two Areas. | Baseline: 29  
Target: 34  
Data Source: SPF/FCPU, UNCT, UNITAMS |
| h. Operationalization of 15 Gender Desks previously established but are not functional. | Target: 15  
Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS |

193 UNITAMS benchmark indicator  
194 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark indicator  
195 Derived from under UNDAF Output 1.2. SGBV support systems strengthened. **UNICEF to provide further indicators.**
### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Accountability

**OUTCOME 4.1**

SPF are more effective to carry out their mandates efficiently including strengthened normative frameworks that respect the rule of law and human rights and fundamental freedoms and ensure effective service delivery; and community level protection capacity is increased and supported to promote and protect the rule of law and human rights.\(^{196}\)

#### UN Partners:

UNDP, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNFPA

#### TGoS Partners:

SPF /Legal Affairs Department, Judicial system

#### Related SDGs:

Goals 10 & 16

#### Key relevant provisions of national documents:

- Police Act of 2008 Article 14
- Code of Conduct 2019 SPF
- NAPPOC: 3

#### Relevant draft SPPSP Outcomes/Outputs:

**Outcome 4.1**

**Outputs:**

1. Enhanced SPF capacity for reinforcing accountability and non-impunity in order to prevent abuse of power and excessive use of force.
2. Enhanced SPF capacity for addressing misconduct as well as offences committed by police.
3. Enhanced SPF personnel’s awareness of international Human Rights standards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. % of citizens who have confidence in SPF being independent, impartial, effective and fair.\(^{197}\) | Baseline: 37%,\(^{198}\) high confidence (2021)  
Target: 50% have confidence  
Data source: UNDP tracking studies, UNAMID, United Nations organizations, rule of law institutions |

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\(^{196}\) Derived from a combination of a UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 6 and UNDAF outcome 4. This has included adding “rule of law” to the text.  
\(^{197}\) UNDP Country Programme Document indicator.  
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| 2. | SPF Code of Conduct reviewed and implemented.\(^{199}\)  
Baseline: Code of Conduct 2019  
Target: review and implementation of SPF code of conduct.  
Data Source: Legal Affairs Department /SPF, Judicial authority |
| 3. | Inclusion of international Human Rights Law, international Humanitarian Law, Rule of Law in the police training curriculum\(^{200}\).  
Baseline: Not Established  
Target: fully included in basic training curriculum.  
Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS |
| 4. | Complaints' procedures, both for making complaints to the police directly and to independent bodies are developed and implemented\(^{201}\).  
Baseline: Not Established  
Target: developed and implemented  
Data Source: Judicial Authority, UNHCHR, UNITAMS |

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Elections’ Security**

**OUTCOME 5.1:**  
SPF provide safe and secure environment for free, fair, and credible elections that are held in a peaceful manner at the end of the transitional period with the meaningful participation of women as candidates and voters.\(^{202}\)

**UN Partners:**  
UNDP, OHCHR, UNHCR, UN Women and UNFPA

**TGoS Partners:** SPF

**Related SDGs:**  
Goal 5, 16

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**  
Constitutional Declaration:  
Police Act of 2008

**Relevant draft SPPSP Outcomes/Outputs:**  
Outcome 5.1

**Outputs:**  
1. Nationwide electoral security operational planning that includes clarification of the role of the police during elections at unit and personal levels, understanding of the role of the police during elections by all SPF personnel participants, deployment of SPF officers to all polling centers to provide security for the election, and response by SPF to incidents of electoral violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. SPF prepare and implement electoral security plans that ensure safe and secure environment for free, fair, and credible elections\(^{203}\) in Sudan\(^{204}\). | Baseline: Not Established  
Target: SPF HQ and Regional Directorates |

\(^{199}\) Derived from UNODC Handbook on police accountability, oversight, and integrity.  
\(^{200}\) Derived from UNODC Handbook on police accountability, oversight, and integrity.  
\(^{201}\) Derived from UNODC Handbook on police accountability, oversight, and integrity.  
\(^{202}\) UNITAMS benchmark under Strategy Priority 2  
\(^{203}\) Derived from UNITAMS benchmark under Strategy Priority 2.  
\(^{204}\) Derived from UNITAMS Police Advisory UNIT Concepts of Operation/ Election Security Benchmarks.
b. Number of advisory sessions on electoral security conducted with the Sudanese Police Force.
   - Baseline: 0
   - Target: 72
   - Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS

c. Number of SPF officers trained as trainers on Electoral Security.
   - Baseline: 0
   - Target: 90 from all states of Sudan
   - Data Source: SPF, UNITAMS

d. Response by SPF to incidents of electoral violence.
   - Target: all major incidents
   - Data source: UNITAMS, UNCTs, and national and international stakeholders.

3.12 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR), COMMUNITY VIOLENCE REDUCTION (CVR), WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM), AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)

Against the background of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) calling upon the signatory parties to engage in a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, the international community is set to develop a strategy on how to support this future endeavour. Prior to embarking on preparatory steps for DDR, however, progress is required on the implementation of various JPA security provisions, such as the reform of the Sudan DDR Commission, and the establishment of new strategic (i.e. DDR High Council) and regional structures (i.e. Darfur Regional Commission; DDR Committees in the Two Areas). Upon completion of those institutional reforms, the establishment of a DDR coordination framework for national and international stakeholders and the development of related policy documents (e.g. national DDR strategy) will commence.

Future support to DDR should be based on the lessons learned from previous DDR programmatic interventions in Sudan. (Since 2005, some 11,000 former combatants have been disarmed and demobilized, with only a limited number having received reintegration support). In the short term, therefore, the international community is encouraged to develop a framework for the coordinated planning and implementation of community violence reduction (CVR) initiatives, especially in hotspot areas and/or areas with a significant presence of signatory/non-signatory armed movements, to gradually create a conducive environment for future DDR activities. In addition, transitional weapons and ammunition management (WAM) should be introduced to strengthen the legal institutional framework and complement CVR activities (e.g. weapon-free zones in communities). For this, a technical assessment by UN entities is recommended to build on the findings of the preliminary study on transitional WAM in Sudan prepared by UNIDIR (Oct 2020). DDR, CVR and WAM activities also need to be jointly planned and require close coordination throughout their implementation.

**DDR Entry Points, prioritization and sequencing**

DDR is part of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and one of the sections of the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPPoC). While the Sudan DDR Commission may serve as an interim interlocutor for any DDR-related issues, it will – as part of its planned restructuring – be crucial to ensure the inclusion of representatives of the signatory armed movements as a prerequisite for the policy development process. At the local level, it will be imperative to ensure that community-based interventions to reduce violence are integrated to ensure unity of effort under a joint CVR framework. Priority locations should be selected and sequenced based on a comprehensive hotspot assessment.
Key planning considerations are that any DDR process be planned and implemented in an integrated/holistic manner. While a national DDR programme is closely linked to the political process (and might therefore take more time), planning for DDR-related activities – such as CVR and WAM – can start immediately. This will require the broad engagement of both the UNCT and other strategic partners on DDR, CVR and WAM is required throughout, based on a mapping of existing capacities (DPET assessment, Dec 2020) and comparative advantages of stakeholders. Given the politically sensitive nature of efforts, and the myriad of implications, UNITAMS will lead on the coordination of international DDR, CVR and WAM efforts, through a designated mechanism (e.g. DDR Steering Committee), in order to further (i) develop the results framework, and (ii) decide on the sequencing/prioritization of programmatic interventions with technical-level meetings and director-level meetings to be chaired by DSRSG/RC/HC or Principal Political Affairs Officer.

Consultations/coordination with national authorities will need to be institutionalized (e.g. through the establishment of a Government-led coordination forum with international stakeholders). And the SPPSP will need to reflect key areas of interventions (e.g. release and reintegration of children), to be followed by development of detailed activities in key programmatic areas. A preliminary step might entail DDR/CVR technical assessment, co-led by UN DPO/DPPA and UNDP (other possible participating entities: UNICEF; IOM; UN WOMEN; World Bank) and a WAM technical assessment. This latter would build on recommendations of the WAM preliminary study), co-led by DPO and Office of Disarmament Affairs (other possible participating entities: UNDP; UNMAS; UNIDIR).

Based on lessons learned, community-based reintegration approaches, led by communities themselves, are now better understood and agreed to. This understanding has been achieved in large part through UNDP’s Community Security and Stabilization Programme (C2SP). The need for economic opportunity mapping exercise and relaying the information to former combatants via sensitization and counselling during the demobilization phase is vital for informed decision making by ex-combatants.

Programmatic Needs

On the basis thereof, the following would be a prioritization of activities:

**Short/mid-term (6-12 months)**

- Workshop/seminar series to sensitize relevant stakeholders (including civil society representatives) on the implementation of security arrangements (e.g. DDR; WAM).
- DDR institutional and policy development (e.g. establish/consolidate national DDR architecture; draft policy documents (National DDR Strategy, etc.); establish/maintain coordination mechanisms; initiate capacity building; start resource mobilization).
- Reintegration opportunities identified (including community-based reintegration).
- WAM (e.g. develop strategic framework; identify gaps and potential areas of intervention across regions; sensitize counterparts; start resource mobilization).
- CVR (e.g. identification of community hotspot areas; assess and build national/institutional capacities; CVR sensitization; develop programmatic activities; initiate pilot projects in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan).
- Release and reintegration of child soldiers (e.g. ensure commitment of the parties; develop capacities; initiate programmatic activities).
- Prevention of recruitment (e.g. advance conflict analysis; identify hotspot areas including presences of armed groups; conduct needs assessment).
- Gender-responsive DDR (e.g. promote gender-mainstreaming across interventions; engage women-led organizations).

**Mid/long-term (12-24 months)**

- Resource mobilization (multi-year programme).
• National DDR Strategy operationalization and DDR Programme implementation.
• National WAM Strategy operationalization (e.g. develop WAM programme; programmatic implementation – see WAM thematic area for more details).
• Continued implementation of programmatic activities from short/mid-term phase (e.g. CVR; reintegration of child soldiers; prevention of recruitment).

External factors and challenges that would need to be considered when developing the planned course of action include political factors such as the fact that the Juba Peace Agreement is not inclusive. Initial discussions about DDR and related activities, and participation in any restructured/newly established coordination bodies and institutions (e.g. Sudan DDR Commission) are limited to the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. In the event other armed groups join the peace agreement, this may have a direct impact on the total number of beneficiaries of a future DDR programme and any pre-DDR activities that may be commenced before. With discussions still ongoing in Juba, the future vision of the national security architecture (e.g. structure national security forces) remains undefined (and outside of the UNITAMS mandate). Additional armed groups joining the peace agreement might, inadvertently, have implications for the quota per armed group of former combatants being integrated into the national security forces. Finally, DDR-related advice may be required during negotiations, also as a potential confidence-building measure between the parties.

Ongoing violence – for example that seen in West Darfur – presents security challenges which could have implications for non-signatory armed groups who may be reluctant to join the peace process and/or be included in a wide-reaching disarmament exercise. Conflict-affected communities may be wary of risks of a power imbalance and therefore unwilling to engage in any disarmament and other WAM-related activities. Additionally, initial CVR activities will be limited to areas currently affected by violent conflict.

From an institutional perspective, there is an incomplete DDR framework/architecture. This is currently reflected in the lack of progress on the JPA provisions on security arrangements. The calls, within the JPA for restructuring of DDR Commission (to include signatory armed movement representatives) and the establishment of other coordination bodies – e.g. DDR High Council; forum for national and international stakeholders to engage – are still pending. Progress on DDR-related policy developments (e.g. national DDR strategy) are contingent upon progress on institutional reforms (e.g. restructuring of the Sudan DDR Commission). The process of developing a national DDR strategy is yet to commence and based on previous experience, national expectations regarding future scale (including resources provided by the international community) of a DDR programme may be unrealistic.

While the establishment of DDR coordination structures is still pending, making progress on a national DDR strategy for Sudan will be required to build trust with donors including those involved in the support of previous DDR programmes. As this is done, the Sudan DDR Commission and other national counterparts will require specific capacity-building support (e.g. workshop to develop national strategy; WAM training) for them to lead (national ownership) on current and future DDR activities. Internally, there visions for DDR plans and/or a strategy are still underdeveloped. The international community is yet to develop detailed plans for a DDR process in Sudan which links a future national DDR programme with CVR/community-based interventions and WAM activities. There is also an unfinished stock taking exercise: UNITAMS and DPO are yet to complete the series of lessons learned workshops on DDR in Sudan which started in the autumn of 2020 with support from the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF). As of late, CPPF has identified a total of six lessons learned areas for discussion among international (and national) partners at the final workshop (June/tbc), to inform the ongoing DDR technical planning process. A planning workshop for international partners will also be required to i) develop a results framework of DDR/CVR/WAM activities in Sudan (see “Prioritization of activities”) and ii) agree on a division of labour based on existing capacities (e.g. there are questions as to which entity is best-placed to lead on WAM? How can a future disarmament/demobilization process be supported?

152
WAM/SALW

Decades of conflict have resulted in the widespread proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition in Sudan. There is no specific national strategy or action plan for weapons and ammunition management (WAM) and little information on existing national WAM standards or procedures. In recent years, there have also not been efforts to undertake a comprehensive review of the existing legal framework related to WAM in Sudan. The level of success of previous external interventions to support WAM is unclear and there is a perceived lack of political will in Sudan and donor funding for WAM initiatives.

The ongoing political transition and peace process provides impetus for renewed WAM initiatives to support the implementation of the peace process and contribute to stability and peacebuilding in Sudan. Numerous international and regional instruments as well as national policies and legislation provide a basis for developing a more comprehensive national regulatory framework, institutions and capacity for effective WAM in Sudan.

Guiding Documents

Institutional references in which such efforts could be undertaken are largely found in the Juba Peace Agreement. The JPA refers to WAM as follows: Monitoring arms and assets; in calls for the licensing of small firearms in the Two Areas; and, as part of the DDR and monitoring, including collection, documentation, storage and disposal of arms and ammunition. There are additional references as part of the ceasefire agreement and references to weapons and ammunition management as part of the border controls that would been to be undertaken in order to prevent weapons being smuggled by organized criminal gangs or militias. Finally, there are references to both weapons and ammunitions management and small arms and light weapons as part of the comprehensive remit of activities that would been to be taken as part of any security sector reform efforts.

The National Legal and Policy Framework on which such efforts would build encompasses the following: (a) the Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Act of 1986 which was amended in 2001 to include the use of the death penalty for violations and in 2018 to criminalize celebratory gunfire. (b) Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Regulations of 1993 and Amendment No.1 of 1997. (c) Presidential Decree no. 419 in 2017 adopted for a civilian weapons collection and disarmament campaign. Since the creation of the transitional government, such efforts are enshrined within the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians. The NPPoC refers to the Weapons and Ammunition Act and references the control of weapons as part of DDR. It also makes special provision for the protection of women and children.

The Regional Framework for such efforts comprises the (a) Nairobi Protocol. Sudan is a State Party to the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa which provides a framework for regional cooperation among its 15 Member States. The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) is an intergovernmental organization and acts as the Secretariat for the Nairobi Protocol. It is mandated to build the capacity of the Member States and to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Protocol within the RECSA Region. In addition, dan is a signatory to the 2012 Khartoum Declaration on the Control of SALW which established the Sub-Regional Arms Control Mechanism (SARCOM). In addition to Sudan, members include Chad, CAR, DRC and Libya. Finally, Sudan is bound by membership to decisions made by the African Union

205 For more detail see UNIDIR (2020) Preliminary Study on Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management in Sudan with a Focus on Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, September 2020
206 (JPA, Chapter 3: Political Issues Agreement: Regarding the Issue of Sudan in the Two Areas, General Principles, 9.42)
207 JPA, Chapter 4: Agreement on the Final Security Arrangements between the Transitional Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, North/South Revolutionary Front, 91.12;
(AU), including the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa. In 2008, the AU established a regional steering committee on small arms to coordinate regional efforts to combat the illicit circulation of small arms and their impact on peace and security. The framework for action is provided by: (i) The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000); (ii) Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (2002); (iii) Plan of Action of the African Union High-level Inter-governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (2002); (iv) Africa Common Position to PoA Review Conference (Windhoek Common Position) (2005); and the African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Lights Weapons (2011).

International Instruments that are pertinent to WAM and SALW efforts include: The United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, known as the Firearms Protocol, entered into force in 2005. Sudan Acceded to the Protocol in October 2018. It is legally binding and provides a framework for states to cooperate on the regulation of licit and illicit firearms flows. Other international instruments that are applicable include the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, known as the Programme of Action (PoA) and its International Tracing Instrument (ITI), which is politically binding and aims to promote international cooperation to prevent human suffering caused by illicit small arms trade. Under the PoA, governments agreed to improve national small arms laws, import/export controls, and stockpile management and to engage in cooperation and assistance. Sudan has submitted reports to the PoA in 2003, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2016 and 2018.

Efforts to move forward on issues related to Small Arms and Light Weapons will be hampered by the fact that Sudan has not adopted the following instruments and because Sudan is not a State Party of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UN ROCA) is a politically binding agreement which Sudan does not report to. The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, known as the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) is politically binding. Sudan has not submitted full reports.

Work on WAM/SALM would entail working with the following national institutional structures: Ministries of Defence and Interior; the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Sudanese Police Force; the Sudan DDR Commission [yet to be restructured] and the DDR Commission for Darfur [yet to be established] as well as the High Committee for Weapons Collection

Programmatic Needs

WAM, SSR and DDR and community violence reduction (CVR) initiatives are mutually reinforcing. It will be necessary to prioritize and sequence WAM interventions pragmatically according to levels of permissiveness and sensitivities of some of the key stakeholders.

Assessments, Planning and Coordination: WAM initiatives need to be planned, designed and implemented in consultation and collaboration with key national, regional and international stakeholders. They must be based on an in-depth mapping of relevant national, regional and international actors and technical needs assessments of arms control institutions to assess their capacities and be tailored to the context. A WAM Baseline Assessment would facilitate a review and map existing national WAM institutions, processes and practices, and identify ways to strengthen frameworks in alignment with international guidelines and standards. Implementation must be flexible and coordinated adapted to respond to changing circumstances as necessary. Coordination

208 For more detail on instruments provided by other regional organizations see UNIDIR (2020) Preliminary Study on Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management in Sudan with a Focus on Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, September 2020
mechanisms for national arms control actors and international partners should be established at national and sub-national levels.

National WAM regulatory framework: Support will be needed for the GoS and relevant stakeholders to develop, manage and implement coherent and realistic strategies, plans and operational procedures for WAM, DDR and CVR, in line with the revised Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and relevant international arms control standards and technical guidelines, and taking a gender- and conflict-sensitive approach.

Research and Advocacy: Further research is necessary to understand how illicit weapons and ammunition proliferation occurs and how their presence affects security and stability so that interventions can be designed to address specific issues. Advocacy campaigns, informed by research, can be developed to raise awareness about SALW control issues and to mobilize resources from donors and other stakeholders.

Strengthening of policy and institutions: Technical support will need to be provided to the TGoS and relevant stakeholders to develop, manage and implement WAM measures in line with international standards and guidelines and in compliance with legal and politically binding instruments that Sudan has committed to.

Control of Supply: Support measures to control the supply of weapons and ammunition which include: Effective, safe and secure management of state-owned weapons and ammunition through training in and implementation of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) including improved marking and registration of state-held weapons; Strengthening border control measures to prevent illicit weapons and ammunition flows; Security sector reform (SSR) to regulate the control, storage and issuing of firearms and ammunition to the security forces as well as their use according to national and international law. Other measures might include the review and update national legislation and regulations pertaining to arms control, including civilian weapons ownership, with a view to harmonizing the national normative and legal framework with international and regional instruments.

Control of demand: Going forward work will be needed on support measures to reduce the demand of weapons and ammunition which include: (i) SSR, rule of law and effective provision of security to reduce civilian demand for weapons and ammunition; (ii) DDR of former combatants contributes to confidence-building, the prospects of peace and stability and a reduced civilian demand for weapons and ammunition for protection; (iii) Conflict transformation and peacebuilding interventions to mitigate the impact of conflict, address local level grievances and conflict triggers; (iv) Development and alternative livelihoods to reduce conflict over scarce natural resources and livelihoods and to provide an alternative to joining armed groups as a means to survive; (v) Integration of WAM activities as part of CVR programmes, including sensitization to the dangers of weapons and ammunition and public awareness campaigns about legislation regulating weapons and ammunition, the role of the state and security services in enforcing the law and the responsibilities of the civilian population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC INTERVENTION: DDR/CVR/WAM</th>
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| **OUTCOME 3.12:** DDR, CVR and WAM processes planned and implemented.

**UN Partners:** UNITAMS, UNDP, ODA, DPO/OROLSI DDRS, IOM, UNICEF

**TGoS Partners:** DDR Commission, Ministry of Defence, armed forces, police, other security forces, local authorities

**Related SDGs:** Goal 16

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209 Derived from JPA language on DDR. UNITAMS and UNCT to develop an integrated plan for support to DDR, WAM and CVR in Sudan, including roles and responsibilities based on the comparative advantage and capacities of each entity. This section needs to be read in conjunction with the PoC-related sections of the SPPSP.
Key relevant provisions of national documents:
JPA: Darfur: Ch.8: 9.11, 10.3, 13.1.5, 21.4, 22, 25.5.3.4, 26.14.5, 26.18.4, 30-32; Two Areas: Ch.2: 17, 19, 26, 29, 33, Ch.4: 5, 34.4, 48, 53, 56, 61-94; Eastern: Ch.2: 86.1; Tamazuj: 22.3.3, 22.3.4, 22.5.3, 22.5.4, 23, 24, 26, 27

### Outputs
1. National Peace Architecture, including the National Peace Commission, DDR Commissions at sub-national levels, Compensation and Reparations Fund in Darfur and other infrastructures for peace, established and equipped with peace agreements implemented in an equitable manner to effectively address regional disparities.
2. Stakeholders and communities engaged in creating a national DDR strategy for ex-combatants, with a particular focus on the needs, experiences and safety of women and children associated with armed groups (ex-combatants)
3. DDR strategy implemented, and ex-combatants reintegrated using a community-based and inclusive approach
4. Capacity of relevant institutions to effectively manage and report on progress of DDR enhanced
5. DDR processes in place are gender-responsive and women participate in DDR processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Degree to which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)</td>
<td>Baseline: Not developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity developed and operationalized across national and regional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions. (^{210})</td>
<td>Target: i) DDR High Council established; ii) Sudan DDR Commission restructured; iii) regional DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Degree to which National DDR Commission and DDR High Council</td>
<td>capacities (i.e., Darfur Regional DDR Commission; DDR Committees in the Two Areas) established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restructured and functional. (^{211})</td>
<td>Data Source: Integrated DDR technical assessment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNITAMS reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. # of former combatants absorbed (^{212})</td>
<td>Baseline: not developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target: To be defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once the Sudan DDR Commission is restructured and includes representation of JPA signatories, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>process will start to define (agree upon) a future DDR caseload.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Including a concrete figure in the SPPSP is therefore premature and would risk undermining the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>subsequent process of agreeing on a future DDR caseload.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Degree to which integrated national DDR strategy is developed and</td>
<td>Baseline: No strategy developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operationalized, including the establishment of coordination</td>
<td>Target: Integrated national DDR strategy is developed and operationalized, including the establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mechanisms. (^{213})</td>
<td>of coordination mechanisms, and definition of future DDR caseload and related eligibility criteria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{210}\) UNITAMS benchmark indicator. Also based on JPA: Darfur: Ch. 8: 30.5.

\(^{211}\) Based on JPA: Darfur: Ch. 8: 30.4. This commission does not have a UNITAMS benchmark indicator, but this proposed indicator uses similar language to that used for other UNITAMS benchmark indicators on commissions.

\(^{212}\) UNITAMS benchmark indicator.

\(^{213}\) UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
3.13 MINE ACTION

There is 29 km² of known explosive ordnance contamination in Sudan in the Darfur Region (2 km²), South Kordofan State (26 km²) and Blue Nile State (1.52 km²) and likely to be more unknown explosive ordnance contamination posing a threat to civilian lives and livelihoods and impeding humanitarian access and longer-term development processes. While South Kordofan and Blue Nile states are contaminated with both landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), Darfur region is believed to contain ERW only. Key non-state armed groups operating in these areas have yet to reach a peace agreement with the Sudanese government (at the time of writing, 11 April 2021) so some contaminated or suspected contaminated areas fall under the control of armed groups and outside government control.

Guiding Documents

The Government of Sudan (GoS) ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 2004 which commits states parties, inter alia, to survey and clear all explosive ordnance from its territory, provide explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and victim assistance. The current timetable for achieving Article 5 of the APMBC requires all known explosive ordnance to be cleared by 2023 but the GoS will be submitting an extension request to postpone this deadline. Ongoing conflict and lack

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214 UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
of access to areas outside GoS control have impeded clearance operations (e.g. the Two Areas under SPLM-N Al Hilu control).

The GoS has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) which are suspected to have been used in Sudan. However, the contamination caused by and the impact of unexploded cluster munitions and also anti-vehicle mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) are addressed through survey and clearance, risk education and victim assistance. The SPLM-N al-Hilu, which is engaged in ongoing peace talks with the GoS and controls areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile that have the largest explosive ordnance contamination recorded, has signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, the equivalent legal instrument to the APMBC for non-state actors.

Obligations to the APMBC and Deed of Commitment are fulfilled through mine action interventions which fall under international humanitarian law (IHL) and protection of civilians (PoC) and, by extension, form part of Sudan’s National Plan for the Protection of Civilians (NPoC) and its obligations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and other IHL and human rights instruments. Sudan has ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) which promotes a rights-based approach to disability and reinforces Sudan’s obligations to victims of explosive ordnance and their families.

Mine action is regarded as an enabler of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and specifically contributes to SDG 16.

UNSCR 2524 includes mine action under Pillar III of the UNITAMS mandate ‘to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, particularly in Darfur and the Two Areas’. Under Pillar II, UNITMAS is mandated ‘to support peace and the implementation of future peace agreements’ - the Juba Peace Agreement specifically mentions mine action in relation to the following issues:

**Darfur**

- Chapter 5, 4.1.3: to facilitate the safe return of displaced populations and access to routes to markets, schools, health services, sanitation and other amenities, demining should be undertaken;
- Chapter 8, 17.1.1: as part of the permanent ceasefire and final security protocol, demining and elimination of military threats fall under permissible acts to be undertaken in cooperation with, and agreement between, the Parties;
- Chapter 8, 25.6.4: also as part of the permanent ceasefire and final security protocol, demining activities and deactivation of unexploded ordnances and any other military threats shall be monitored by the ceasefire committee.

**Two Areas**

- Chapter 1, 18.5: as part of humanitarian action, a Joint Humanitarian Committee comprising the GoS, SPLM-N and the Revolutionary Front shall help UN agencies and international and national organizations to develop a plan for demining the Two Areas and removing explosive remnants of war from each party’s respective areas of control;
- Chapter 1, 29.1: the permanent ceasefire arrangements between the GoS Government of Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army – North and the Sudan Revolutionary Front stress the importance of reducing the impact of the conflict on civilians and encouraging support for peace through a range of activities including demining and removal of military threats;
- Chapter 1, 54.1.6: The Joint High Military Committee for Security Arrangements (composition described in the JPA 53.1–53.6) shall monitor demining activities and deactivation of unexploded ordnances and any other military threats.
Eastern Sudan

- Chapter 2, 86.4; under socioeconomic issues, (and included in a list of measures to implement DDR although it is unclear why) the GoS and the Sudan revolutionary Front, agree to demine areas affected by landmines and address the impact on victims of landmines.

Tamazuj [West Kordofan and Darfur]

- Chapter 1, 19.1.1: with the aim of mitigating the impact of war on civilians and encouraging support for the peace process, the GoS and the Third Front-Tamazuj agree to demining and the elimination of military threats.

Programmatic Needs

UNMAS is the mandated United Nations-lead for mine action and has been operating in Sudan since 2002, either independently, and/or as part of UNAMID under the name Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO). The government counterpart in Khartoum, the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), is part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). There are National Ordnance Disposal Offices (NODO) in el-Fasher Nyala, Zalingei and Geneina in Darfur.

Sudan has developed National Mine Action Standards (SNMAS) which regulate all mine action interventions in Sudan and comply with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Mine action programmes are implemented according to the latest UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action (2019). The development of national mine action capacity takes place alongside mine action operations to strengthen national ownership and to develop sustainable capacity.

In the Juba Peace Agreement, mine action is presented as a confidence building activity among the conflict parties to be undertaken in cooperation and monitored as part of the permanent ceasefire agreements and security arrangements. It is also seen as an important humanitarian intervention contributing to protection of civilians and the safe movement of displaced populations, as well as enabling humanitarian action. Mine action can help to raise public support for the peace agreement through contributing to stability and reducing the impact of the conflict on civilians. Support to victims of explosive ordnance, is mentioned specifically only for Eastern Sudan but would be implement where necessary in Sudan as part of mine action operations.

Min action contributes to the achievement of the UNITAMS mandate and facilitates UNITAMS operations. In the longer-term mine action contributes to sustainable development in Sudan, including the achievement of the SDGs, and is necessary to meet the GoS commitments to the APMBC.

In cooperation with the NMAC, UNMAS is working towards the following in Sudan:

1. Safe access for UNITAMS, humanitarian actors and populations at risk;
2. The impact of explosive ordnance over civilian population in Sudan is reduced to low/residual threats;
3. Sudan meets APMBC obligations under the Article 5;
4. National capacity is sufficiently strengthened to sustainably handle the residual contamination of mines and ERW beyond April 2023;
5. Victim assistance is integrated in the Government’s Persons with Disability Assistance sector.

The table summarizes the mine action priorities in response to the UNSCR 2524 and the Juba Peace Agreement. UNMAS estimates that if political processes succeed in facilitating access to areas of
contamination or suspected contamination, these nine priorities will take 3-4 years to complete.
Tamazuj is not included as a priority because there is no known significant contamination. If access improves, the situation in Tamazuj can be assessed and a decision made about mine action needs in the area.

Cost estimates (108.5 million USD) are based on assumptions about the extent and complexity of explosive hazard contamination, there are numerous factors influencing the overall cost. If political processes are positive, access improves and it is acceptable to all parties to the conflict to use national capacity, costs would be reduced. However, if areas of contamination are technically difficult to clear, more international capacity may be required or demining teams may have to be deployed for extended periods resulting in increased costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Survey and clearance of five crossline humanitarian corridors in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.</td>
<td>Survey and clearance of these routes, suspected to be contaminated with mines and ERW, has previously been agreed between the GoS and SPLM-N al-Hilu but unresolved political issues and the Covid-Pandemic have delayed implementation. Safe access is needed to enable cross-lines humanitarian access to areas that have been isolated for a decade. These activities contribute to confidence building and to the implementation of the JPA, UNSCR 2524 and GoS and SPLM-N commitments to fulfill mine action objectives in Sudan. Ongoing security sensitivities mean that SPLM-N al-Hilu insists that international mine action capacity is used. Although more expensive than national capacity, use of international capacity would expedite mine action activities that are considered essential to facilitate humanitarian assistance. It is estimated that, with deployment of international teams, these mine action tasks could be completed within five to six months. Activities: survey and clearance of 5 main corridors by deployment of at least 4 x international multi-task teams and 1 x route clearance team for 6 months operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 million USD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Clearance of Kauda airfield and its vicinity</td>
<td>Survey and clearance of the airport and its vicinity to enable humanitarian access and the establishment of a UNITAMS office. The World Food Programme (WFP) and other agencies are flying humanitarian assistance into the Kadua airport from where, they provide assistance to the other areas within the SPLM-N territory on the road. As there have been no mine action interventions in the entire areas, and 6 unexploded ordnance identified in Kadua itself, there are concerns that regular use of the airport presents a high-risk. Given the security sensitivities and the need for rapid survey and clearance, it is recommended that international capacity is used for mine action in and around the airport. Activities: survey and clearance of Kauda airport and town by deployment of at least 2 x international multi-task teams for 12 months operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 million USD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Facilitating humanitarian access for WFP and AFPs</td>
<td>To ensure conflict sensitivity and fair and timely access to humanitarian assistance, access routes and other priority areas under SPLM-N control, survey and clearance and EORE are urgently needed. As no appropriate local capacity for rapid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| in South Kordofan and Blue Nile | deployment currently exists within SPLM-N Al Hilu and Sudanese nationals from elsewhere are not allowed in the areas, international capacity must be deployed. However, if the political and security situation allows, local capacity could be developed to conduct mine action in these areas within an acceptable timeframe.

Activities: survey, clearance and EORE of South Kordofan and Blue Nile under SPLM-N Al Hilu control by deployment of at least 5 x international multi-task teams for 12 months operations. |
| 4. Local capacity Development | SPLM-N al-Hilu has a mine action focal point with whom UNMAS can liaise. However, the aim is to develop a local mine action capacity to complement to work of the NMAC or run a similar functions vested within the parallel authority of SPLM-N al-Hilu until further peace agreement allow for the joint structure. This would facilitate the development of national capacity to plan and the coordination of mine with UNMAS and other partners. Operational capacity is needed to implement survey and clearance and EORE. There are between 20-30 local deminers that previously worked for a local NGO. The intention is to retrain them to resume work and contribute to sustainable national capacity through support re-establishing local mine action NGOs with at least two multi-task teams (MTTs) capacities.

Activities: provision of trainings, equipment and on-the job training and consultation to build local mine action coordination center and 2 x multitask teams. |
| 5. Areas under control of Malik Agar in Blue Nile State | Survey and clearance and EORE in preparation of the return of refugees to Ullu and Inga Sana mountain areas and roads between Ullu and Damazine. There are also concerns about the safety of large numbers of Ethiopian refugees in nearby GoS controlled areas. EORE is considered a priority.

Activities: survey and clearance by deployment of at least 5 x national/local hybrid multi-task teams for 24 months operations |
| 6. Survey, clearance and EORE in Jabal Marrah, Darfur | Areas under the control of SLA-AW are assumed to be heavily contaminated. As peace talks progress, survey, EOD spot tasks and clearance activities along with EORE should be undertaken in the Jebel Marrah. The extent of the contamination is unknown as access has not been allowed to areas under the control of Abdul Wahid. However, once access to the area is agreed as part of ongoing peace talks, it is anticipated that there will be high levels of ERW and therefore protection requirements. It is expected that national teams could be used and deployed relatively quickly in this area.

Activities: survey, EOD spot-tasks, clearance and EORE by deployment of at least 5 x national multi-task teams for 24 months operations |
| 7. Survey and clearance and EORE in specific areas of South Kordofan | EORE and extensive survey and clearance is required in South Kordofan State (Kadugli, Talodi, Dalami, Dillinge and Abu Karsholla) and in Blue Nile State (Baw and Kurmuk) to confirm contaminated |
| State and Blue Nile State under GoS control. | 20 million USD | Areas and to plan and implement clearance operations. UNMAS has been able to access GoS-controlled areas only since 2017 and has no data prior to 2009. Costs are based on using national capacity and an assumption that the contamination does not require high levels of expertise to clear. If a higher level of expertise is required, the cost of clearance would increase. Activities: survey, EOD spot-tasks, clearance and EORE by deployment of at least 8 x national multi-task teams, 5 x manual clearance teams, 3 x mechanical teams, 5 x EORE/NTS teams for 36 months operations |
| 8. Victim Assistance in opposition-controlled areas | 10 million USD | Assessments of remote GoS-controlled areas and areas of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Jebel Marra in Darfur, are needed to determine the number of victim/survivors and the type of support required. There is a lack of providers for persons with disabilities in Sudan so, as the provider of last resort, UNMAS provides a range of support to victims of explosive ordnance and their families. UNMAS Sudan has initiated a consultation process with the support of a consultant to strengthen its victim assistance strategy and identify other potential assistance providers. UNMAS may review its victim assistance interventions depending on the conclusions of the consultation. |
| 9. Survey and clearance in remaining areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states under Government of Sudan control | 60 million USD | When access to all South Kordofan and Blue Nile is possible, it is anticipated that significant time, capacity and funding will be required to complete the clearance of explosive ordnance. The APMBC and the Deed of Commitment, commit the GoS and SPLM-N respectively to remove all known explosive ordnance from Sudanese territory. Based on current information, it is estimated that the survey and clearance of these remaining areas will take between 3 and 4 years. Activities: survey, EOD spot-tasks, clearance and EORE by deployment of combinations of national and international land release and EORE teams. |

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Mine Action**

OUTCOME 3.13: The United Nations and the local population safely use areas previously contaminated with explosive ordnance.215

UN Partners: UNMAS, UNITAMS, UNOPS, UNICEF
TGoS Partners: National Mine Action Centre

Related SDGs Direct contribution to SDG 16 and enabler of other SDGs

Key relevant provisions of national documents: JPA: Darfur: Ch. 5: 4.1.3, Ch. 8: 17.1.1, 25.6.4.6; Two Areas: Ch.1: 18.5, 29.1, 54.1.6; Eastern Sudan: Ch.2: 86.4; Tamazuj: Ch.1: 19.1.1

Sudan National Mine Action Standards (SNMAS)

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215 UNMAS programmatic outcome
Outputs:
1. Mitigate protection risks through humanitarian demining and small arms control, the establishment of community protection networks, community policing initiatives, construction of police posts and GBV sensitization
2. Mine safety and awareness campaigns developed and implemented
3. Relevant bodies capacity to undertake mine marking and clearance enhanced
4. National strategy for the collection and management of small arms and light weapons developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. # and % of EORE beneficiaries that demonstrate an increase in knowledge between unsafe and safe practices (disaggregated for gender and age).</td>
<td>Baseline: Around 50 % of the EORE beneficiaries reported retaining increased knowledge between unsafe and safe practices. (2020) Target: UNMAS to provide Data Source: Pre- and post-intervention surveys of population sample (ongoing on a project-by-project basis), aggregated on an annualized basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Area and % of land released used productively (disaggregated by usage type: residential, agricultural, humanitarian response, etc.)</td>
<td>Baseline: 29km² of land has been released since 2018. Approximately 70 percent of the released land is used productively for residential, livelihoods and humanitarian response. (records to April 2021) Target: UNMAS to provide Data Source: UNMAS non-technical surveys, UNMAS Implementing Partners’ (IP) reports, Post Demining Impact Assessment (PDIA) reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. % and # of core functions fully managed by NMAC and any other relevant bodies in line with national standard and operational procedures without UNMAS technical assistance (disaggregated by entity and function).</td>
<td>Baseline: NMAC is providing core functions of mine action (accreditation, tasking, operations management, quality assurance and information management) at about 80% capacity. In 2020 NMAC issued 127 tasks and 48 accreditations. Target: UNMAS to provide Data Source: NMAC Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), UNMAS training records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Proportion of community members in conflict-affected areas that consider their environment as safe and stable due to mine action and related interventions, disaggregated by priority population and gender.</td>
<td>Baseline: 50 % of community representatives including women, men and children in conflict-affected communities consider their environment as safe and stable due to mine action interventions. (2020) Target: UNMAS to provide Data Source: UNMAS Non-Technical Survey (NTS) reports, PDIA reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

216 Derived from UNDAF 5 indicator.
PILLAR IV: MOBILIZATION OF ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEBUILDING ASSISTANCE

BACKGROUND

The success of the political transition will ultimately depend on the ability of the TGoS to address the ongoing economic crisis, which affects all aspects of daily life, and at the same time to promote economic reform. Over the past three years, Sudan has seen a stark deterioration in its economy, with a doubling of poverty affecting nearly two-thirds of the population, slipping from lower middle income to poor country status. The economy is in recession, with deficits exceeding ten percent of GDP, and a record inflation rate of 154 percent in 2020. Shortages of key commodities and power outages are frequent. Trade in goods and services is limited and remittances have been curtailed. Social indicators have also worsened, with Sudan ranked 160 out of 173 countries in the Human Capital Index (HCI; 2020) and 170 out of 189 countries based on the Human Development Index (HDI; 2019 data, 2020 report).

A largely agrarian country, Sudan is significantly impacted by climate change and recently has been battered by frequent floods and droughts as well as a locust plague. There are now an estimated 9.6 million people in acute food insecurity. Moreover, there are approximately 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in need of urgent assistance and over one million refugees and asylum-seekers. These challenges have been further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. A high frequency WB/Central Bureau of Statistics survey on Covid-19 conducted in 2020 found that about 38 percent of households had experienced a decrease in their income and 46 percent reported being worried about having enough food to eat. Nearly half of small enterprises went out of business.

The economic crisis, natural disasters, intercommunal conflict in Darfur, and the Ethiopian refugee crisis in the East continue to drive humanitarian needs. The COVID-19 pandemic remains a challenge, affecting the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable Sudanese and refugees. High food prices persist amidst deepening inflation and the recent devaluation of the exchange rate, causing increasing food insecurity.

Addressing the economy is an imperative, since the failure to stabilize it and improve living conditions will expose the TGoS’ reform agenda to internal and external shocks, potentially worsening the hardships on the population. Conversely, delivering immediate and tangible socio-economic dividends to the Sudanese people would sustain the social and political space required for the critical economic reforms that are a prerequisite for setting Sudan on the path to economic recovery and sustainable development. The meaningful economic participation of women requires specific attention, as does the economic empowerment of young people. When disaggregated by sex, the Gender Development Index of Sudan is 0.860, a low value, but not as low as that of some neighbouring countries.
Youth (i.e. the 15–24-year-olds) constitute around 60 per cent of the population, and around 40 percent of the population is under 17 years old. The World Bank calculates youth unemployment rate to be over 31 percent in 2020, although this is likely to be an underestimate. Providing jobs and opportunities to youth and empowering their political participation will be an essential part of building a stable and peaceful Sudan.

To achieve these goals, Sudan must address the legacy of decades of international isolation that cuts it off from significant external support at a time when it is most needed. Large external debt bars it from access to the significant levels of external financing usually available to developing countries. Sudan is one of the most isolated countries globally, due to its geographical location, weak infrastructure, but mainly to its policy regime. Negative growth and rising inflation necessitate a rapid overhaul of fiscal and economic policies, both as a prerequisite for a more sustainable development path in Sudan and for accessing significant external resources through IFIs and the international community.

The past year has seen substantial international support for Sudan, but this has mainly been humanitarian assistance. However, this has not yet translated into levels of external financing commensurate with the scale of the country’s development challenges. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative provides a framework for addressing the country’s debt situation in a comprehensive manner. TGoS reached the HIPC Initiative decision point in June 2021 qualifying the country for debt relief. Clearance of arrears with the International Development Association ($1.1 billion), the African Development Bank ($400 million), and the accord to clear arrears to the IMF ($1.4 billion) is helping restore Sudan’s eligibility to borrow from these institutions. Assuming full application of debt relief and participation by all creditors, this would imply an estimated reduction in Sudan’s debt from $49.7 billion to $8 billion at completion point in June 2024.

Through such international resource mobilization, Sudan will be supported with the economic and financial resources to support its political transition and economic reforms and recovery. To the extent possible, Sudan will be provided with the necessary support to ensure that the economic governance and policy reforms are gender responsive. For the transition to be effective, it will also need to reach more equitable access to resources that builds social cohesion through higher vertical and spatial equality. To ensure this, coordination among development but also with humanitarian, actors would need to expand to national, regional and state levels.

THE MANDATE

Recognizing that Sudan’s political transition is closely linked to the ability of the TGoS to mobilize and manage international financial support, the Security Council mandated UNITAMS in Security Council resolution 2579 (2021) with the strategic objective to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance through (a) collaborating with IFIs to support the mobilization of international economic and development assistance; (b) supporting and facilitating, in close cooperation with humanitarian actors, full, rapid, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance and its coordination; and (c) ensuring UN integration and cooperation with relevant partners, including IFIs and the international community, with a view to making maximum use of existing and forthcoming bilateral and multilateral assistance in Sudan, including in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Pillar 4 includes 5 thematic interventions, with an outcome attached to each:
1. Support international resource mobilization and national socio-economic reforms
2. Support the establishment of a national architecture for development planning and aid effectiveness
3. Information hub
4. Agricultural Census
5. Population and Housing Census

These thematic interventions are closely related to each other. In order to make the international resources sustainable, relate them firmly to the country’s development objectives, and increase Sudan’s capacity in policy coordination, planning, and monitoring and evaluation, the national architecture for development planning and aid effectiveness needs to be improved. The basis for effective development and economic policy making is quality information. The Agricultural Census and the Population and Housing Census are key elements of these baseline data. The various information sources and elements as the censuses will be increasingly integrated over time in an integrated data management system.

PRINCIPLES

Sudan and its international partners are guided by the international principles of aid coordination and aid effectiveness as formulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008), Busan Partnership (2011) and others, to which Sudan and its partners have committed. Most importantly, development and aid effectiveness should be guided by political, social and economic history as a conflict-affected country with a natural resource dependent economy; and deep economic and geographic inequalities. While there are rich experiences from elsewhere that Sudan can learn from, interventions must be adapted to the Sudanese context. In particular, the following principles will guide the process of supporting the mobilization of economic and development assistance:

Sudanese ownership and leadership of development priorities and aligned with the implementation capacities of Sudan – while building the capacities of national and subnational actors – within and outside of government. Secure broad-based buy in and multi-stakeholder coalitions in support of large scale development and reform efforts to safeguard legitimacy, relevance and sustainability. Ensure all development and reform efforts help address the root causes of conflict; protects the legitimacy of the political transition and leaves no one behind. The mobilization of economic and development assistance increased and coordination of humanitarian assistance improved

4.1 ADEQUATE RESOURCES MOBILIZED FOR NATIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORMS

On the one hand, the transitional Government of Sudan has to ensure that the population enjoys improving living standards and experience the dividends of peace and a strengthened social contract. At the same time, the Government needs to undertake painful economic reforms to correct longstanding mismanagement; corruption; and unfavorable business environments. In the context of the political transition, donors are scaling up development aid significantly. Development and economic assistance will be vital to cushion the social cost of economic stabilization, and to support economic reform.
Guiding Documents

The Sudan’s Government’s Three-Year Program for Stability and Economic Development (2021-2023) includes the following priority axes:

- Attain a sustainable, inclusive economic growth that is conducive for creating employment opportunities through fiscal, monetary, external debt and foreign trade sector policies. Rely on agriculture, livestock and agro-processing as an engine of inclusive and sustainable growth during the medium-term.
- Achieve sustainable social development for all by focusing on people and human rights, supporting production, growth and economic development, and promoting justice, equality, inclusiveness, stability and peace for all. Priority sectors include health, education, nutrition, water and sanitation, social welfare and protection, fighting poverty and unemployment.
- Implement governance practices in the public sector, to promote the values of justice, freedom, equality, the rule of law, integrity, transparency and accountability. Conduct legal and legislative, institutional, financial reforms and fight corruption.
- Promote infrastructure development including urban development and housing, revival of transportation modes (rail, road, water, air). Support reforms in energy, irrigation, water and sewage and telecommunications.
- Lay the foundations and necessary components for a healthy and sustainable environment, preserving and optimizing natural resources and promoting and protecting the environment, with actions on biodiversity, adaptation to climate change, addressing land degradation and desertification, pollution and waste.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy (2021-2023) proposes a five-pillar plan that aims to create opportunities for inclusive growth and poverty reduction, consistently with the Government’s Three Year Program for Stability and Economic Development (2021-2023).

- **Pillar 1: Promoting Macroeconomic Stability.** Improving domestic revenue, reallocating public resources towards social spending and key infrastructure investments.
- **Pillar 2: Fostering Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth.** Growth in agriculture and livestock, and the role of the private sector; enabling the environment for private sector growth; strengthening of energy, transport, and infrastructure services; and protecting the environment.
- **Pillar 3: Boosting Human and Social Development.** Investment in human development to build and enhance the population capabilities through education and better health and reducing the inequality in human and social development outcomes between states and regions and gender.
- **Pillar 4: Promoting Peace and Providing Equal Opportunities for All Sudanese.** Emphasizing peace in Sudan, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees’ return; managing diversity, geographical disparities, competition over natural resources and land; and transitional justice.
- **Pillar 5: Strengthening Governance and Institutional Capacity.** Improving institutional capacity through effective public financial management (PFM) and decentralization, peace, and security; fighting corruption; promoting human rights; and improving justice.

Strengthening gender and other kinds of social equity, such as disability inclusion, is a cross-cutting policy (imperative) that is integrated into each pillar, representing an important strategy for both targeting and prioritizing interventions.

Ongoing UN Programmes

The support envisaged complements that of the IMF, the World Bank and WFP to Sudan’s economic reform. It already includes 28 projects on economic recovery through UN agencies; empowerment of
women and gender equality; youth participation and inclusion through entrepreneurship; and economic diversification strategies. Critically, the Family Support Programme “Tamarat” constitute a corner stone of the strengthened social contract with support from the World Bank and WFP. Through the Bank Financing Window for Host Communities and Refugees, the World Bank also supports TGoS-owned development approaches for host communities and refugees with the WFP as the government agent for areas where there is no adequate national infrastructure to deliver the programme. WFP is also developing a nationwide social protection umbrella to inform stage II of the Thamarat Programme.

The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in Sudan, comprised of 19 resident and three non-resident representatives of UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes, delivers its support through development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. More than 70% of total funding in 2020 belonged to humanitarian assistance.

The collective response of the United Nations to national development priorities is outlined in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2018-2021. Its five interlinked focus areas include: (i) economic development and poverty reduction; (ii) environment, climate resilience and disaster risk management; (iii) social services; (iv) governance, rule of law and institutional capacity development; and (v) community stabilization. Total spending on UNDAF priorities during 2018-2020 has amounted to USD 432 million. Overall UNDAF planned funding for the same period has been USD 1.1 billion. In other words, only about 38% of envisaged planned funding has materialized under the umbrella of UNDAF. As additional challenge related to the implementation of UNDAF has been the decreased relevance of the document in a drastically changed political and economic context in the country.

In view of Government’s the 3 year programme and the PRSP, as well as drawing on the lessons from the implementation of the UNDAF, an in-depth analysis can realistically assess the funding gap, and a strategic approach to financing can be developed through analyzing the external environment, matching potential funding sources to unfunded outcomes, and engaging with partners and donors on a continuous basis.

Priorities for the coming years need to take forward the following issues:

(1) Analysis of human and institutional capacities of Sudan government and relevant stakeholders: It is not clear to which degree these capacities have been assessed. As a sustainable development and successful economic transition has to build on these capacities and competencies, this analysis has a high priority. This should also include an analysis of past initiatives, policies, and institutional structures.

(2) Support to international economic integration: In order to implement Sudan’s ambition to overcome political and economic isolation, the administration would need concerted UN support to reform policy regimes and develop administrative capacity.

(3) Support to think tanks: Broad-based dialogue on economic priorities is critical and should be informed by evidence. At present, the capacity development for think-tanks and alternative institutions are needed to ensure discussion of government’s reform, especially economic reform, plans, policies, actions and their results.

(4) Business should re-energize bodies for systematic public-private dialogue, for example the Sudanese Business and Employers Federation (SBEF), the Chamber, and the National Development and Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) – including inclusion of women and youth entrepreneurs.
4.2 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

The transitional Government of Sudan seeks to establish an effective aid administration and aid coordination function to take leadership on donor coordination and planning. At its centre is the Aid Coordination Unit (ACU) at the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The ACU is responsible for the coordination, monitoring and management of external support provided by Sudan’s development partners. This is embedded in MoFEP’s broader mandate of mobilizing domestic and external financial resources, ensuring their efficient allocation, and pursuing effective Public Finance Management. It has an internal and an external coordination function. While it leads and oversees the use of aid within government, it is also the key interface between the transitional Government and its development partners.

The anticipated National Aid Strategy provides principles, goals, modalities and a legal framework to Government, development and humanitarian partners, civil society organizations (CSOs) and other stakeholders for the management and coordination of aid in Sudan. The Strategy identifies the following challenges - a trust deficit; lack of structured government-donor dialogue; weak coordination between government ministries and agencies; proliferation of donor groups; a fragmented aid architecture that does not respond to the development needs of the country; and a lack of ownership and sustainability of donor interventions. The Strategy identifies budget support as an efficient aid modality but recognizes that it requires a sound policy and institutional framework, including a transparent budget, adequate financial management and procurement systems, and a viable Poverty Reduction Strategy.

While a Sudan International Partners Forum was instituted after the beginning of Sudan’s political transition, it did not include all partners and does not fulfill all necessary functions. On this basis, a more comprehensive structure has been developed that is now implemented. A Sudan Partners Forum will be established and will be responsible for coordination between the TGoS and its international development partners. It is envisioned that the Forum will function on two levels.

First, at the strategic level (chaired by the PM) with the participation of Minister of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP), line ministries, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), World Bank and development partners at Ambassador level. It will focus on strategic/policy issues and the peacebuilding processes.

Second, at the substantive level (chaired by the MFEP), responsible for the formulation and implementation of the national development framework. Participants including line ministries will discuss sector wide strategies as well as progress and challenges associated to the implementation of the Three-Year Programme for Stability and Economic Development (2021-23) and the PRSP. Within the second level thematic and/or sectoral groups, reflecting national priorities will be formed.

Humanitarian coordination meetings at both Federal and State level will continue as currently established. International and national stakeholders will adopt evidence-based approaches to both development and peacebuilding needs such that both a Crisis-Risk-Dashboard and a Common Data and Information Hub are established as early warning systems and to assess evolving needs and risks across the humanitarian – development peacebuilding spectrum, including in support of an integrated gender responsive and youth-centred analysis.
4.3 DATA AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR AID EFFECTIVENESS

The quality of information and its availability are important determinants of the success of the current political and economic transformation of Sudan. Both Sudan and its international partners need an improved information management system. To this effect two ongoing initiatives exist:

At present the situation can be summarized as:

- A large body of data is available, within the UN system (including IMF and World Bank) and INGOs, but also in various government organizations. However, data is frequently outdated with no agreed-upon standards that guide what information is shared, with whom, and in what manner.

- National-level data often masks existing critical data gaps at the field level, particularly in conflict-affected areas, which undermines effective evidence-based responses.

Noting the converging problems and priorities, the project seeks to establish a Common Data and Information (CDI) Management Hub for Sudan, to support shared analysis, data, and evidence across the HDP nexus – and underpin the use of comparative advantages of partners. This would be the first step in a modular approach, as part of the integrated mission and in close consultation with the World Bank, to support the UNCT to establish a Common Data and Information (CDI) Hub for Sudan that could be used by Government, UN agencies, International and National NGOs/CSOs, and the broader International Community actors and will, once fully established, be handed over to the Government of Sudan.

The CDI ensures that an early warning and early action response system can be made operational and provide a Crisis Risk Dashboard to monitor the situation across the country. The information hub, among other things, will help foment a joint understanding of vulnerability drivers including drivers of inter-communal conflict and will enhance humanitarian and development partners capacity to support core government entities including Ministry of Finance and Planning Central Bureau of Statistics, as well as selected State government structures.

In a meeting between National Information Centre, the Central Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister and UN RCO in October 2020 the transitional Government confirmed their commitment to develop a National Information Management Strategy and set-up a National Information Management High Commission.

In parallel, efforts should be made to enhance national institutional capacities to better use the generated evidence in policy making and practical implementation of programmes, which could dramatically help reduce poverty and increase economic growth, while at the same time building the coherence and sustainability of an inclusive economic governance approach. The efforts of the Government of Sudan to develop a national social protection strategy and systems needs to be supported structurally for an integrated, comprehensive and child- and gender-sensitive social protection system. This requires sounds data and information management that respects principles of anonymity, impartiality and confidentiality.

The international partners for Sudan should also commence – with UN support – a costing and prioritization process for the JPA that indicates the contribution of each party including the Sudanese Government, International Community, UN etc. – to fulfill the joint assessment of long-term development and peacebuilding needs requested in Paragraph 6 of S/RES/2425 (2020) and paragraph 9 of S/RES/2579 (2021).
Robust, comprehensive, and accurate data on the current population of Sudan is needed to provide a solid evidence base for national planning. However, the most recent census was undertaken in 2008 (15 years after the previous one) with Sudan having conducted four previous population and housing censuses, the first one at independence in 1956, and three consecutive censuses in 1973, 1983, 1993. By contrast, the only nationwide agricultural census took place in 1964/1965, and was by no means complete as the livestock component was covered only by sample survey. The underlying cause was largely political; coupled with low levels of funding and statistical capacity the consequences of a lack of political support for quality statistics. In turn the lack of demand for data lead to fewer resources available for data production.

As part of the ongoing transition process and as a key input to sensitive resource sharing negotiations, the conduct of a census/survey is a politically sensitive exercise, particularly in a setting such as Sudan. Promoting greater openness and transparency of data as a pathway to mitigate political economy constraints and raising the public profile for statistics may help Sudan overcome its statistical tragedy with it imperative that timely, accurate, granular, and accessible data provide the foundation for evidence base policymaking. With an up-to-date census, with accurate and current population and agricultural data, national services could also be more accurately targeted to those who need it most.

The envisaged Population and Housing Census (PHC) will provide data to measure/establish baseline indicators to monitor progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In addition to an updated and rich socioeconomic data base, the PHC will offer the base to compute hundreds of indicators, including tens of SGD monitoring indicators. Its provision of key basic data will be an important basis for the political and economic reform of the Transitional Government and political transition in Sudan. The PHC is a tool for political development and good governance and can enhance and sustain fair representation of the population. Key policy development plans like the PRSP and the 3 Year Plan can be monitored.

The Census Supreme Council is the highest body mandated to conduct censuses. As per government legal arrangements, Central Bureau of Statistics serves as the Secretariat to the Supreme Council and is empowered to conduct population and housing censuses. It has been determined that a National Census Technical Committee (NTCC), be the highest technical body for census implementation and that this will comprise senior technical staff representing key users of census information.

The conduct of a Population and Housing Census is therefore a key element of both SC resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579(2021), both of which point to the need for a census in order to assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace. It is of note however that with a view to de-politicizing the census, this will be considered by UN Sudan as part of programming under Pillar IV of the UNITAMS mandate. There are scant references to the need for a Population and Housing Census in national documents but this is mentioned in the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA Two Areas Protocol) in Ch. 2: 58.5 where the parties agreed [... to] conducting a new nationwide census (Ch. 3 10.14) following the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees within the framework of the transitional period arrangements and agree to conduct population censuses and prepare statistics in the state/region (Ch. 3: 10.14) as well as carrying out national census and statistics (Ch 3: 11.24).

Also important is the PHC’s role in trust building and peacebuilding, and its impartial nature. Professional international advice will be crucial. It will be important to keep political influence to a minimum (providing the financial, administrative and logistical support) and to ensure that the PHC is fully planned and implemented in accordance with internationally established standards and

217 UN Population & housing Census Principles and Recommendation and FAO World Census of Agriculture Programme, recommend that censuses be undertaken every ten years.
The Census is conducted into three main phases: (i) precatory phase which includes mainly mapping and the pilot census, (ii) enumeration and (iii) data processing and analysis. In each of these phases, it will be important to mitigate the risks of politicization of the census project and to clearly separate the technical process from the political (i.e. the elections). The PHC will be comprehensive, aiming to cover all the population in Sudan. It also shed light on the role of women and youth.

The national execution agency is the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The CBS looks back to a history of the five past censuses, with the most recent census done in 2008. It is noted that the UN recommends a PHC every 10 years. The CBS has accumulated considerable capacities and competencies over time. However, gaps remain mainly in: (i) digital mapping, (ii) IT, (iii) data collection and monitoring, (iv) data analysis and (v) conducting the Post Enumeration Survey. UNFPA is providing the necessary technical support and knowledge transfer. This challenge is only increased, the coming Census will be the first digital census to be conducted in the country. This will require new skills and competencies. Thus, capacity building will be an important part of the exercise. In contrast to previous PHCs, because of its digital nature, the results of the census will be able to be disseminated widely. This will provide an opportunity for public education and enhance data use.

### THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Population and Housing Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME 4.4:</th>
<th>A population census, that enumerates all residents in the country, including in areas of displacement, and provides high quality sociodemographic data disaggregated by and sex and age, is conducted.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Partners:</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGoS Partners:</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Related SDGs:</td>
<td>All Goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key relevant provisions of national documents:**
- JPA Two Areas Protocol: Ch. 2: 58.5, Ch.3: 9.22, 10.14, 11.24
- Ch. 2: 58.5. The Parties agreed [...] to conducting a new nationwide census following the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees within the framework of the transitional period arrangements.
- Ch. 3: 9.22. To conduct population censuses and prepare statistics in the state/region.
- Ch. 3: 10.14: 10.14. Conduct population census [...] 

**Outputs:**
1. Relevant public bodies capacitated and equipped to design and implement a gender-responsive system for gathering census data
2. Census enumerators and staff trained in gender responsive data gathering and checking
3. Population’s awareness and understanding of census enhanced
4. Census is conducted in a gender-responsive manner with concomitant outcomes.

#### Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. A Population and Housing Census carried out to international norms and standards.</th>
<th>Baseline: Census not conducted. Target: Census carried out in accordance to international norms and standards. Data Source: UNFPA and CBS reports.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. # Updated database on populations’ feature sociodemographic characteristics and housing conditions available.</td>
<td>Baseline: Outdated database of 2008 census. Target: Updated database available. Data Source: UNFPA and CBS reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

218 UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 2.  
219 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark indicator and UNFPA briefing on census planning.  
220 Derived from UNITAMS benchmark indicator.
### 4.5 COMPREHENSIVE AGRICULTURAL CENSUS

Sudan conducted its first and last agricultural census in 1964/1965. The country therefore lacks current and complete information on the structure of the agricultural sector to make decisions, these being made without sound evidence. The current Government of Sudan has made the decision to synchronize the conduct of the Agriculture, and Population and Housing and Population, Censuses in line with the United Nations Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses (2017) and the FAO & UNFPA Guidelines for linking population and housing censuses with agricultural censuses (2012). This will provide for increased efficiencies and provide the framework for listing farms in the household sector while also ensuring that the cartography for the Agriculture Census is made available from the Population and Housing Census. Such an approach has additional advantages as it provides a wider set of data for analysis and the use of common concepts, definitions and classifications. It also ensures value for money in the use of common infrastructure and equipment, such as cartography and electronic devices for data collection.

The Government of Sudan adopted an Agricultural Census Act, - i.e. the Council of Ministers Resolution No 323 as of 24 November 2013 -, to put in place high-level and technical census committees both at national level and states level. This comprises: (i) High-level National Steering Committee (NSC) to oversee the Comprehensive Agricultural Census; (ii) National CAC Technical Committee (CACTC); (iii) National Census Committee for Information and Advocacy (NCCIA) including its State Census Committees. For the purpose of planning, preparation and implementation of the CAC, the Central Office of the Comprehensive Agricultural Census (COCAC) has been established within the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). COCAC is the operational structure for the conduct of the CAC. CBS, the Ministry of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF), and the Ministry of Animal Resources (MOAR) will provide the competent managers and professionals to the COCAC.

The Government has already commenced preparation for the planned Comprehensive Agricultural Census (CAC). The CAC of Sudan will entail both an agricultural census, a community survey and agricultural surveys for annual crop and livestock production building on data collected during the Population and Housing Census with it noted that the agricultural census is one of the key pillars of a national statistical system. It is the only data collection instrument that produces national statistical information on farms at the lowest administrative level and is therefore an essential source of information for agricultural decision makers. The CAC will be conducted the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MOAF) and the Ministry of Animal Resources (MOAR), in close collaboration with other agencies and institutions concerned with the economic and social development of the country at the national and subnational levels. The exercise will provide essential national data on demographics.

Proposed programming supports preparatory work entails the development of census methodology and instruments and the training of trainers for the listing and enumeration of the CAC, Community Survey and ACLPS. The conduct of the 1st CAC could lead to the strengthening of capacity of CBS.

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| c. Capacity of national statistics system for conducting digital population and housing censuses enhances. 221 | Baseline: Existing capacity to conduct paper-based population censuses. No experience with digital censuses. Target: National statistics system has increased capacity to conduct digital population and housing censuses. Data Source: UNFPA and CBS reports. |

221 Derived from FAO outcomes in agricultural census concept note.
MOAF and MOAR especially in large-scale data collection, analysis and dissemination of data. Moreover, it will also help in building the capacity and knowledge of using new technologies and almost certainly play an essential role of the national statistical system in the country.

**THEMATIC INTERVENTION: Comprehensive Agricultural Census**

OUTCOME 4.5: A Comprehensive Agricultural Census, that covers all areas of the country and provides high quality information, is conducted.²²³

| UN Partners: FAO  |
| TGoS Partners: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Animal Resources, and other agencies and institutions concerned with economic and social development of the country at the national and subnational levels.  |
| Related SDGs: Goal 2  |
| Key relevant provisions of national documents: None  |

**Outputs**

1) Relevant public bodies capacitated and equipped to design and implement a gender-responsive system for gathering census data
2) Census enumerators and staff trained in gender responsive data gathering and checking
3) Population’s awareness and understanding of census enhanced
4) Census is conducted in a gender-responsive manner with concomitant outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline, Target (2024), Data Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Degree to which Comprehensive Agricultural Census carried out in accordance with international best practice standards.²²⁴</td>
<td>Baseline: Agriculture Census not conducted. Target: Agriculture Census carried out to international best practice standards. Data Source: FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Degree to which capacity of national statistics system enhanced for implementation and collection of data for Comprehensive Agricultural Census.</td>
<td>Baseline: Existing capacity to implement CAC. Target: National statistics system has increased capacity. Data Source: UN, international community and CSO reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Availability of quality benchmark agriculture data from the agriculture census and complementary surveys at the national, state, and other subnational levels suitable for policy formulation, monitoring &amp; evaluation for agriculture, rural development, poverty alleviation, and food security improvement of the population.</td>
<td>Baseline: Census data not available Target: Analysis of census data Data Source: Census data; UN, international community and CSO reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Establish a permanent system of agricultural statistics²²⁵ to provide agricultural statistical data (i.e. production and dissemination)</td>
<td>Baseline: Agriculture Statistics System not in place Target: Complementary modules of the Agriculture Census, establishing the national statistics system conducted Data Source: Census data; UN, international community and CSO reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Capacity of national statistics system to provide data for food and agriculture decision making.</td>
<td>Baseline: Existing capacity to produce agriculture statistics Target: Enhanced capacity to produce regular quality agriculture statistics through complementary surveys Data Source: UN, international community and CSO reports.</td>
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</tbody>
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²²³ Derived from UNITAMS benchmark under Strategic Priority 2 (for the population census).
²²⁴ Adapted from the UNITAMS benchmark indicator on the population and housing census.
| Technical and organizational capacity of the main organizations comprising the national statistical system to conduct country-wide, comprehensive data collection, data management, data processing, and data dissemination methods for agriculture censuses to provide data to be used for planning, monitoring, and evaluating agriculture and rural development programs and projects | Baseline: Existing capacity to conduct agriculture censuses in line with international guidelines  
Target: Increased capacity to conduct agriculture censuses in line with international best practices  
Data Source: UN, international community and CSO reports. |

**INTEGRATION AND NEXT STEPS**

The SPPSP is the integrated programmatic framework for UNITAMS, and the UNCT, which will contribute to the implementation of the Security Council mandate as articulated in resolutions 2524 (2020) and 2579 (2021). The resolutions state that UNITAMS, and in accordance with its mandate, will support the Government of Sudan in implementing its national priorities, and, that cooperation between UNITAMS, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and the Government will be conducted through an Integrated Strategic Framework or equivalent framework.

The SPPSP will inform the development of this integrated framework, particularly in the areas of UNCT programming that correspond to the first three pillars of the UNITAMS mandate. The integrated framework/cooperation framework will include the full spectrum of UN agency, funds and programs strategic priorities and programs in fulfillment of the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs in Sudan; and pillar IV of the UNITAMS mandate, which focuses on supporting the mobilization of economic and development assistance and the coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance. These efforts will be strategically aligned with humanitarian assistance, which remains independent, impartial, humane and neutral with activities beyond the scope of the integrated framework. The consultations and consensus reached on the SPPSP will be integral building blocks for the Common Country Analyses process, and for the development of the integrated framework.

In delivering on this integrated vision, UNITAMS and the UNCT, working closely with the Government will invest in a series of enablers. For example, the Integrated Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC, will be the hub fostering integration, including through joint planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, including at the regional level. The integrated framework/coordination framework will present the joint vision and the theories of change to support the national transition priorities, including development assistance. The Sudan Partnership Forum, led by the Government of Sudan, with member states, UN organizations, international financial and regional institutions involved will be the platform to ensure coordinated economic and development assistance to Sudan. In fulfilling the commitments of the humanitarian – development – peace nexus programming, the platform will receive regular reporting from the key UN planning and response frameworks.

Taking note of the Security Council (S/2021/470) endorsed benchmarks to track UNITAMS progress against its strategic objectives; and that the integrated framework will have a robust monitoring and evaluation framework; the UN team in Sudan will establish a baseline, robust data collection mechanisms and state level coordination platforms to support the implementation of these complementary frameworks. The dedicated M&E frameworks for the SPPSP and for the integrated
framework will be mutually enhancing, while the integrated framework monitoring and evaluation system will be broader as it will encompass the UNCT’s Decade of Action commitments in support of Sudan attaining the SDGs by 2030. The monitoring and evaluation frameworks, will articulate, and measure anticipated outcome-level outputs through specific and measurable indicators and agreed-upon means of verification. The SPPSP and the integrated framework will align all outcome level outputs to the extent possible, for the first three pillars of the UNITAMS mandate.

CONCLUSION

The SPPSP will remain a dynamic and living framework, whose operationalization should reflect the dynamic situation on the ground. It seeks to provide a framework that can support mandate implementation, and relevant programming.

Further work would need to be undertaken to prioritize and sequence interventions thematically and geographically, and to articulate clear developmental peace dividends. The process to develop the integrated framework/cooperation framework will take these efforts forward.

The dedicated “Peacebuilding and Stabilization” window in the Sudan Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), has been established to support programming towards the implementation of the UNITAMS mandate. It represents the preferred funding channel for the SPPSP. The MPTF “Peacebuilding and Stabilization” window is governed by a Steering Committee, whose functions are enshrined in its Terms of Reference and include making recommendations on fund allocations.

The National Coordination Committee for UNITAMS will be consulted regularly on programming in support of the UNITAMS mandate. The integrated framework/cooperation framework is consulted through the regular Government channels, with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning as the key entry point. Progress on implementation of programming in support of the UNITAMS mandate will also be discussed in other fora and thematic groups where government, international and regional partners engage, including the Sudan Partners Forum.